UPDATE 2017-11-10: answers (in Dutch, 9 pages; mirror) to parliamentary questions re: draft regulation DNA investigations in Wiv2017 (=Wiv20xx) intelligence law.

UPDATE 2015-06-15: the transcript (in Dutch) is available of the General Meeting that took place held on April 22nd 2015 in the parliament.

UPDATE 2015-04-15: the Dutch Minister of the Interior mentions (.pdf, in Dutch) “several dozen” DNA profiles were involved, which he requested to be destroyed, and are now destroyed. We now wait for that the bill that will be proposed to change the law such that it will be legal for the AIVD to store DNA profiles (under certain conditions and safeguards).

UPDATE 2015-04-01: the Dutch Minister of the Interior reportedly (in Dutch) seeks to change the law to allow the AIVD to store DNA profiles for the purpose of identifying persons. “If we have someone’s DNA and that person then carries out an attack, we can identify that person directly”, he said. The level of prior authorization required to store DNA is not yet determined, but it is suggested that in case of persons that have special professions, for instance lawyers and journalists, approval will typically need to be obtained from the Minister itself (highest possible level). The use of DNA for the purpose of determining a person’s health will remain forbidden.

On March 25th 2015, the Dutch Review Committee on the Intelligence and Security Services (CTIVD) published an oversight report (.pdf, in Dutch) about the use of forensic biology research methods by the Dutch General Intelligence & Security Service (AIVD) between 2002 to 2014. The CTIVD report was accompanied by a press release (.pdf, in Dutch).

Article 22 of the Dutch Intelligence & Security Act of 2002 (Wiv2002) permits the AIVD to “carry out research on objects for the purpose of establishing the identity of a person”, and is the main legal basis for the use of forensic biology research methods. Article 21 permits the AIVD to use agents, and agents may carry out tasks on behalf of the AIVD; for instance the application of forensic biology research.

While the AIVD is permitted to apply forensic biology research for the purpose of establishing the identity of a person, the CTIVD states that the AIVD is not permitted to do so for the purpose of examining a person’s health. The CTIVD found that the AIVD attempted to do so in two operations, part of one investigation, “a longer time ago”; the CTIVD finds this unlawful.

While the AIVD is permitted to take DNA from objects and store it until the identity of a person has been established, the CTIVD states that the AIVD is not permitted to store that DNA once an identity is established. The CTIVD found that the AIVD keeps a small-scale DNA database that contains information pertaining to persons that are already identified; the CTIVD finds this unlawful. The report itself states that the AIVD employs a forensic adviser, and that that adviser manages said DNA database. The database is stored on a stand-alone computer that is not accessible from the internal network of the AIVD. If an operational team wants to check a DNA profile, that has to be done via the forensic adviser or his supervisor. As stated in the press release, under the current Dutch law, that database can only contain DNA information of persons whose identity has not yet been established.

Here is a translation of the CTIVD’s press release:

The Dutch Intelligence & Security Act of 2002 does not permit the AIVD to create a DNA database

The Dutch Intelligence & Security Act of 2002 (Wiv2002) permits the AIVD to carry out forensic biology research. However, no specific regulation exists that safeguards the storage of cell material and DNA profiles. As soon as the AIVD has established the identity of a person, the DNA profile and possible cell material must be destroyed. The AIVD is thus not permitted to create its own DNA database. At the time of the investigation, it was found that the AIVD had such a database, at a limited scale. This is stated in a report published today by the Dutch Review Committee on the Intelligence and Security Services (CTIVD) about the application of forensic biology research methods by the AIVD.

If the AIVD examines physical characteristics of persons for the purpose of establishing their identity, the privacy of these persons is at stake. Examples include DNA research and dactyloscopy. The protection of privacy demands increasing attention, because the possibilities of, among others, DNA research have strongly increased. Much more personal characteristics can be derived from cell material (blood, saliva or body hair) nowadays than in the past. The CTIVD therefore in its oversight report established a framework for the application of forensic biology research methods.

Conditions

The law provides two conditions for the application of forensic biology research methods.

Condition 1: only objects, not persons, can be examined

The AIVD can only carry out forensic biologic research concerning objects that have body material on them. The Wiv2002 does not provide room to take such material from the body of persons, for instance by covertly pulling body hair. The AIVD is not permitted to infringe upon the physical integrity of persons.

Condition 2: examination is only permitted to establish a person’s identity

The purpose of the investigation must be to establish a person’s identity. That means:

• that the law does not provide room to carry out investigations if the identity is already known. It is required that at the time of the investigation, doubt exists about a person’s identity. A method in which, for instance, the DNA profile of an identified person is stored for future use to recognize the person’s identity when the person is expected to travel under an alias or disguise, is thus already not allowed because of this, and;
• the investigation can only be aimed at the identity of the person involved, or by means of related identifying characteristics, such as the DNA profile or the fingerprint. The Wiv2002 thus does not provide room for carrying out investigations into the decent or health of a person.

No legal basis for storing DNA profiles or cell material

European jurisprudence provides an additional condition for the application of forensic biology research methods. An adequate legal basis must exist for storing cell material and DNA profiles. This legal basis must provide minimal safeguards concerning storage period, use, third party access, procedures for maintaining the integrity and confidentiality of the data, and procedures for destruction.

The CTIVD found that such a specific regulation that provides safeguards for the storing of cell material and DNA profiles, does not exist for the AIVD. The Wiv2002 hence does not provide the legal basis. As long as the current law does not regulate the storing of DNA profiles and cell material, the AIVD is not permitted to create its own DNA database for any reason. At the time of the investigation, it was found that the AIVD had such a database, on a limited scale. As soon as the AIVD established a person’s identity, it must remove and destroy the DNA profile and possible cell material.

Examined operation

The CTIVD has examined all operations since 2002 — the year in which the law took effect — in which the AIVD has used forensic biology research methods. The number of operations was not large, but the use of such methods is increasing. The CTIVD has found unlawfulness in a limited number of operations.

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On March 23rd 2015, Dutch newspaper Volkskrant brought a story (in Dutch) alleging that information of the Dutch intelligence & security service AIVD ended up in the hands of criminals after theft of data from the Curaçao Security Service (VDC). Here is a translation of the Volkskrant article:

‘Information of Dutch intel agency AIVD in hands of criminals after data theft at Curaçao Security Service VDC’

by Charlotte Huisman

Information from the Dutch intelligence & security service AIVD has ended up in the hands of criminals after a large data robbery at the Curaçao security service VDC, according to Dutch MP Ronald van Raak (Socialist Party).

Leaked documents show how the former Prime Minister of Curaçao, Gerrit Schotte, was involved in possible corruption within the security service of Curaçao.

This security service must, among others, commissioned by the governor, investigate whether politicians are ‘clean enough’ to, for instance, become a Minister. Schotte and his team have put a lot of effort into blocking such a screening. How far they are willing to go in that, is made clear in this story.

Employees of the security service certainly can not have relations with politicians. Still, the head of the service, Lawrence P. of the then-Antillian security service, flew to Sint Maarten on September 16th 2010 for a meeting with Gerrit Schotte, Minister-to-be George Jamaloodin,  and Theo Heyliger, a controversial politician at Sint Maarten.

Report to police

On such small islands you will then be ‘signaled’. A day later, Edsel Gumbs, director of the Antillian security service, makes a phone call to the Antillian Minister of Justice about this forbidden meeting. In response, the Minister denies P. access to the building of the security service.

A lot changes on October 10th 2010. Curaçao is no longer part of the Netherlands Antilles, but as of that day is an autonomous country within the Kingdom of The Netherlands. Gerrit Schotte is the first Prime Minister. And the security service for the entire Antilles is reformed into the Curaçao Security Service (in Dutch: “Veiligheidsdienst Curaçao”, aka VDC).

The VDC filed a police report against P., the suspected head of service, for violating professional secrecy. From wiretapped phone data it is apparent that P. borrowed money from Jamaloodin, who has meanwhile been appointed Minister of Finance. In exchange for that, the Minister could obtain information about persons from P.

Prime Minister Schotte wants the suspended employee to return back to work at the VDC. The VDC’s oversight committee blocks that.

The hot issue is the mandatory screening that Schotte and his administration resist. Gumbs, director of the VDC, wants to continue the investigation, against Schotte’s will.

Incompetent

On October 27th 2010, the VDC writes an internal memo [.pdf; mirror] with a long list of incriminating information about Schotte and a number of his Ministers: among others, the Prime Minister is involved in dubious financial businesses, and has debts. It is clear that the majority of the Curaçao government ministers could never have been appointed if that screening was completed prior to their appointment.

On that same day, the government denies Gumbs access to the buildings of the VDC, which later fires Gumbs because he would be unsuitable to lead the service. In February 2015, the court of Curaçao ruled that Gumbs has been “intentionally damaged”: there is nothing, according to the judge, that he is unsuitable or incompetent to lead the security service.

After Gumbs left, the government appointed a new director for the VDC. In October 2011, under his regime, something remarkable happens. The network operator of the security service provides a detailed testimony about this before the Curaçao Ombudsman.

He says that in the beginning of October, he had to tell a number of ‘Columbians’ how the VDC’s information was protected. Commissioned by the Prime Minister, he was told by his supervisors. A few weeks later, the network operator had to provide the passwords of the system, after which all data present could be copied and changed; not just of the VDC, but also data exchanged with the Dutch general intelligence & security service AIVD and the American DEA and FBI.

Dutch MP Ronald van Raak says it might constitute the largest data theft ever concerning a secret service. Multiple sources confirm that the copied data has ended up in the hands of criminals. Data also allegedly was erased, for instance to make possible a positive screening of future politicians, according to Van Raak.

Van Raak finds that the Netherlands must intervene. ‘My request to Minister of the Interior, Ronald Plasterk, is: do something about it.’

Maffia ties

Gerrit Schotte (40) was the first Prime Minister of the country of Curaçao, from October 10th 2011 to September 29th 2012. He is suspected of having accepted 200,000 dollar from Francesco Corallo — who owns a lot of casinos in the Caribbean area and is considered to belong to the Italian maffia — in exchange for influence on the island and promoting the interest of his casino business. The Public Prosecution Service of Curaçao stated this on Friday, in the first hearing in the criminal case against the former Prime Minister. Schotte and his wife are also suspected of money laundering and forgery. The court case will take place in September. The current Prime Minister, Ivar Asjes, who is associated with the political party of Helmin Wiels (who was murdered in 2013), makes little hurry in cleaning things up in Curaçao.

Oversight

In response to questions from Van Raak, Plasterk states that not the Netherlands, but Curaçao itself is responsible for the course of events at the VDC. “I cannot confirm that information of the AIVD is stolen, copied, or erased. I cannot make public statements about how the AIVD and VDC cooperate. The country of Curaçao has its own oversight committee concerning the VDC. It is up to the government of Curaçao and the parliament of Curaçao to oversee the course of events.”

According to intelligence services expert Constant Hijzen (Leiden University), a reorganization of a security service is a sensitive moment: in this case on October 10th 2010, when the service changed from an Antillian security service into a Curaçao security service. “In such a phase, the question is who should be in charge, who determines what activities to carry out, what mandate the services get, and how they are supervised. And to what extent politics may influence personnel policy, how transparent the procedures are, and how checks it.”

Intelligence services do not give insight into the data they exchange, and thus the damage of data theft is difficult to determine. “As a rule of thumb, the services make an estimation of the reliability of parties they cooperate with. I suspect that the AIVD has not exchanged lots of data with the VDC; it will rather be specific information in certain joint operations”

The topic is scheduled for the Dutch parliamentary agenda of March 31st.

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UPDATE 2016-08-31: Nu.nl reports that the court of The Hague orders the Dutch government to pay Ibrahim A. EUR 1.1M, of the EUR 5M he demanded as compensation for lost business.

On Friday March 20th 2015, Dutch news paper De Telegraaf published a story about a former agent of the Dutch Military Intelligence & Security Service (MIVD) who threatened to disclose sensitive information unless the Ministry of Defense would pay him off — and the Ministry of Defense paid him EUR 500,000. The person involved is referred to as “I.A.”; a report from 2011 by De Telegraaf mentioned that the MIVD referred to him as a “Windhond” (which translates to “greyhound”). According to that same report, I.A. was owner of a construction consortium in Kabul; this would be confirmed by audio tapes possessed by De Telegraaf. It cites I.A.:

I delivered weapons, munition, vehicles. I took care of stamps in passports of the Dutch special forces. This allowed members of the Command Corps [‘Korps Commando Troepen’, MRK], who arrived at Kabul International Airport by military flights, to carry out their shadowy operations in secrecy. Observing and eliminating key figures of the Taliban, that’s what it was about. The rocket launchers, AK-47 machine guns and hand grenades were for that purpose.

Reportedly, the Dutch National Ombudsman and the Dutch Review Committee on the Intelligence and Security Services (CTIVD) have found I.A.’s complaints to be groundless.

Here is a translation of the new article in De Telegraaf (do read it entirely):

‘Former Dutch military intelligence agent extorted Dutch govt’

by Bart Olmer

The Dutch government has let itself be extorted by former Dutch military intelligence agent I.A., who threatened to disclose his secret activities in Afghanistan. That was stated before the court of The Hague by Marc Gazenbeek, director of legal affairs at the Ministry of Defense (MoD).

Out of fear that audio recordings that the ex-agent had made of conversations with MIVD officers would end up out in the open, the government, in a panic, offered I.A. half a million euro of ‘hush money’, says Gazenbeek. “We had no idea what other confidential information he had at his disposal”, according to the highest lawyer of the Ministry of Defense.

Gazenbeek: “The amount of 500.000 euro was intended to ensure the security of our personnel and to exclude the risk that information would be disclosed. He threatened with publicity, made a restless and emotionally unstable impression on us, and we were very worried about that. Our intent was for him to not publicize sensitive information, and thus we were willing to pay him an amount, without substantiation or obligations.”

Mission post

Entrepreneur I.A., a former police officer from the Netherlands who was active in Afghanistan as a contractor, claims that he was deployed as a secret agent in Kabul, and has suffered millions of euro’s of damage because the MIVD left him to his fate in Afghanistan. He built a mission post in Kabul, from which the Dutch special forces operated, and claims to have arranged weapons and munition, and cars with false license plates, including forged passport stamps that the special forces could use to leave Afghanistan.

Former MIVD director Pieter Cobelens denies knowing the I.A. was run as an agent. But MoD lawyer Gazenbeek confirms that I.A. arranged forged passport stamps during the mission in Afghanistan, and cars for special military units. Gazenbeek admits that I.A. is mentioned in a few weakly MIVD reports about the mission in Afghanistan. These were signed by Cobelens as having been seen.

Cobelens confirms that the Dutch special forces carried “local” weapons during the mission in Afghanistan, to not stand out. The court wanted to know by whom these Kalashnikovs were bought.

Cobelens: “You ask me whether I have knowledge about involvement of I.A. in the purchase of weapons in Afghanistan. I will not deny that weapons have been bought. That had to do with self-protection. The weapons had to fit what’s usually seen on the streets. I am precisely aware of the procedure that has been followed, and know with near certainty that I.A. did not buy the weapons, nor was he involved in it.”

Through the court case, in which a number of (former) MIVD officers are heard, I.A. wants to prove that he has been used as an agent, and that the government has a duty of care. The hearings have been ongoing for weeks. Today, an employee of the secret service will testify. I.A. claims millions.

At the height of the conflict with the MoD, he was overpowered in the inner city of The Hague by a special SWAT team. I.A. is currently once again a successful business man abroad.

EOF

On February 10th 2015, a General Meeting took place in the Dutch House of Representatives concerning the Dutch Intelligence & Security Act of 2002 (Wiv2002), which is currently being revised: see the highlights. During that meeting, the Minister of the Interior promised to send a letter that provides information on three topics raised during the debate: the offer of a technical briefing on cable interception, the Privacy Impact Assessment requested by MP Gerard Schouw (D66), and an explanation of the further procedure of revising the Wiv2002. On March 17th 2015, the Minister sent the letter (.docx; mirror) he promised. The Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA) model for the National Office that is referenced in the letter, is available here. A different, yet unknown, PIA model, tailored to the legal tasks of the AIVD and MIVD, will be applied to the proposed changes to the existing Intelligence & Security Act of 2002. In theory, a PIA is a ‘live document’ that is intended to motivate policy makers to make privacy-friendly choices, if such alternatives are available.

Here is a translation of the Minister’s letter:

During the General Meeting on February 10th 2015 with the Standing Committee on Home Affairs, I promised to provide you with further information regarding three issues related to the revision of the Intelligence & Security Act of 2002 (Wiv2002). It is primarily a technical briefing of your members by the heads of the intelligence and security agencies, concerning interception of cable communications. Secondly, I promised to give a detailed explanation of the possibility of carrying out a Privacy Impact Assessment with respect to the new Intelligence & Security Act (Wiv), which is currently being prepared. Finally, you asked me to outline the further procedure concerning the revision of this law. Also on behalf of the Minister of Defense I consecutively address these three issues.

Technical briefing on cable interception

During the General Meeting I offered to illustrate, in a confidential meeting with the Committees on Interior and Defense, the need for the proposed modification of interception powers, that makes it possible to intercept large amounts of raw data from cables. I propose that this explanation is provided by the two heads of the intelligence & security services. I like to hear whether the House wants to accept this offer, so that it can be scheduled in further consultation with the House.

Privacy Impact Assessment

The government has earlier informed you that as of September 1st 2013, the Model Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA) of the National Office must be applied by default in the development of new legislation and policies that provide for the construction of new ICT systems or the creation of large databases (Parliamentary Papers II 2012/13, 26 643, no. 282, Annex 252 629, as well as in a letter dated November 10, 2014 in response to the motion-Segers/Oosenbrug, Papers II 2014/15, 34000 VII, no. 21). The PIA model was implemented in the coalition agreement and by the motion-Franken et al. (Papers I, 2010/11, 31051, D).

Said PIA model is specifically aimed at the National Office and based on the requirements to the processing of data, as set out by the Data Protection Act (DPA), according to the notes in the PIA questionnaire. Under Article 2, paragraph b of the Wiv2002, the Wiv2002 exempts the intelligence & security services from the DPA, and the PIA model as such is not tailored to regulations governing the intelligence and security services.

Although a PIA is not mandatory for the new Wiv, the government wants to make clear, in a transparent way, how privacy risks are weighed. The legislation related to the intelligence & security services in particular concerns the balance between protecting national security and protecting the privacy of citizens. The allocation and application of powers in specific cases, the construction of ICT systems, and the construction of databases must be reviewed on necessity, proportionality and subsidiarity. A PIA tailored to the legal tasks of the Dutch intelligence & security services may serve as a helpful tool. The government will therefore commission a privacy impact assessment, to be carried out by one or more independent experts, in parallel to submitted the proposed legislation for public consultation.

Procedure for revision of the Wiv2002

During the General Meeting it was requested that the procedure be outlined that applies from the moment the legislative proposal is submitted for public consultation. The (internet-based) consultation period will start this spring (the aim is — as I indicated in the General Meeting — April 2015) and lasts six weeks. After that, the opinions and comments are processed as appropriate. It is expected that this will take six weeks. The proposal will then be prepared for submission to the Council of Ministers. The aim is to have this take place before the summer recess [July 3rd – August 31st]. Once the Council of Ministers accepts the proposal, it may be offered to the Advisory Department of the Council of State. Depending on the time that the Advisory Department needs to give its opinion, the detailed report will be established. The time required varies depending on the nature and content of the opinion. Given the above, it is expected that the bill will be offered to the House by the end of 2015, or early 2016.

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At the request (in Dutch) of MP Gerard Schouw (D66), the Dutch Minister of the Interior, Ronald Plasterk, on March 3rd 2015 responded to the report Mass surveillance (.pdf, Jan 26; mirror) that was written by Pieter Omtzigt, a Dutch member of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE). (More on that report here.) Omtzigt’s report was the basis for a draft resolution (.pdf) of the PACE Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights. In his response, Plasterk rejects the proposal of a multilateral “Intelligence Codex”, i.e., a no-spy treaty between European countries, citing it is unrealistic and would irresponsibly limit intelligence collection:

Concerning the recommendation to provide a multilateral “Intelligence Codex”, as proposed, I have serious doubts. A Codex in which signatory countries lay down that they will not exercise investigatory powers against each other for, for instance, political reasons, is not realistic. The intelligence tasks of the AIVD and MIVD — that notably involve intelligence collection concerning covert political and military intentions and activities of other countries — would  be limited in an irresponsible manner.

(Original Dutch: “Wat betreft de aanbeveling om te voorzien in een multilaterale «Intelligence Codex», zoals wordt voorgesteld, bestaan bij mij ter zake ernstige aarzelingen. Een Codex waarbij de aangesloten landen zich er op vastleggen dat men geen onderzoeksbevoegdheden jegens elkaar zal toepassen voor bijvoorbeeld politieke redenen, is niet realistisch. De inlichtingentaken van de AIVD en de MIVD – waar het juist ook gaat om inlichtingen in te winnen omtrent heimelijke politieke en militaire intenties en activiteiten van andere landen – zouden zo op onverantwoorde wijze kunnen worden ingeperkt.”)

On March 12th, Dutch news paper Volkskrant published an article (in Dutch) about it. Here is a translation of that article (hyperlinks and parts in [] are mine):

Dutch Minister of the Interior rejects no-spy treaty proposal

by Huib Modderkolk

Following the revelations about spying, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe wrote a comprehensive report [.pdf] about espionage. Led by Dutch MP Pieter Omtzigt (CDA), the Council spoke with several specialists, including NSA whistleblower Edward Snowden.

The report urges countries to make rules for the collection of information located in other European countries, and to establish a so-called “intelligence codex”. One of the recommendations is to allow Member States’ intelligence services to apply the same rules that also apply in their own country. That should prevent secret services from spying on citizens of other countries in a way that is not permitted in their own country.

Unrealistic

For instance, the British GCHQ hacked Belgian telecom operator Belgacom to covertly access, for 2.5 years, communications of European institutions. Countries that make a no-spy agreement mutually abstain from “political, economic and diplomatic” espionage. The codex is an idea of ​​former director of the German secret service and former Secretary of State for Justice, Hansjörg Geiger, and could for instance apply to a group of European countries.

Minister Plasterk does not find it realistic and does not see a use for it. “The intelligence tasks of the two services — that in fact includes intelligence collection about covert political and military intentions and activities of other countries — would then be limited in an irresponsible way,” Plasterk says. In October 2013 he said [in Dutch] a plan for a no-spy treaty with the United States was an “attractive idea”, and he would explore whether it is a viable path. Britain and the US have such an agreement.

Pieter Omtzigt, as one of the authors of the report, regrets Plasterk’s response. “Now that so much has become clear about the NSA eavesdropping in friendly nations, it is regrettable that the government did not support the proposal of the former head of the German BND, mr. Geiger, to establish a codex”, Omtzigt says.

“The NSA eavesdropped on more than 100 friendly governments (including Merkel), and sometimes entire countries. And there is no protection for data acquired ‘elsewhere’. It is also unwise for the Netherlands to reject the idea before other countries responded to it.”

Motion

In 2014, the House passed a motion [in Dutch] submitted by MP Segers (Christian Union) in which the government was requested “to consult with allied governments and agencies to establish explicit agreements concerning respect for human rights.” In response, Plasterk stated the General Intelligence & Security Service (AIVD) and the Military Intelligence & Security Service (MIVD) are working to establish standards for cooperation between European intelligence services, in which “respect for human rights sets boundaries for the framework.”

According to the report of the Council of Europe, current intelligence practice is  a “fundamental threat to human rights”. An “intelligence codex”, among others, should have changed that.

New Dutch intelligence law in the making

MP Recourt (Labour Party) therefore calls it a “sympathetic plan”. Recourt: “I support the basic idea, let’s do it.” Because he does not expect intelligence will abide by the rules, he also advocated sanctions for countries that violate the agreements.

MP Schouw (D66) does not understand the rejection of the no-spy treaty by Plasterk. He points out that a new intelligence law for the AIVD and MIVD is in the making. “But such a law is pointless if you do not first address this. Friendly services will go ahead regardless of what we put into law.” As an example, he mentions the hacking of SIM card manufacturer Gemalto service by the British GCHQ. Schouw: “Minister Plasterk has plenty of time, and he can leave an important legacy. Let him advocate a no-spy treaty. “

Other countries have yet to comment on the idea.

Related:

• 2015-03-04: Dutch govt response to PACE report “Mass surveillance”
• 2015-02-11: Highlights of Dutch parliamentary debate about upcoming bulk interception bill
• 2014-11-28: Germany signs no-spy deal with BlackBerry after NSA phone tapping (AP)
• 2014-11-22: Some details on Dutch govt seeking bulk cable-interception for intelligence and security services AIVD and MIVD
• 2014-02-13: No “No Spy” Agreements? (Ashley Deeks responds to statement by Obama)
• 2014-02-11: Obama: “There’s no country where we have a no-spy agreement” (TIME)
• 2013-11-12: Germans Rejected: US Unlikely to Offer ‘No-Spy’ Agreement (SPIEGEL)
• 2013-10-25: An exclusive club: The five countries that don’t spy on each other (PBS article on UKUSA & FVEY)
• 2013-09-15: Dutch govt response to revelations by Edward Snowden

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