In het WODC-onderzoeksprogramma 2015 (.pdf) staan 70 onderzoeken gepland. Hierbij een selectie van onderzoeken die binnen m’n eigen interessegebied vallen.

Vanuit het Directoraat Generaal Jeugd en Sanctietoepassing:

25 Haalbaarheidsonderzoek dark number jeugdige cybercriminelen (extern)

In 2013 heeft het WODC een onderzoek uitgevoerd naar de bestaande kennis op het terrein van jeugd en cybercriminaliteit. De conclusie daarvan luidt dat de prevalentie meevalt. Tegelijkertijd wordt geconstateerd dat er nog veel onbekend is. De indruk bestaat dat bepaalde categorieën van jeugdige cybercriminelen mogelijk onderbelicht zijn in de beschikbare gegevens en dat er mogelijk sprake is van een hoog dark number. Dit haalbaarheidsonderzoek moet inzicht geven in methoden voor een goede inschatting van het dark number van cybercrime.

Vanuit het Directoraat Generaal Rechtspleging en Rechtshandhaving en Openbaar Ministerie:

33 Nationale Veiligheidsindex 2015 (intern)

De NVI is een methode om zo betrouwbaar mogelijk de ontwikkeling in criminaliteit, overlast en onveiligheidsbeleving op landelijk niveau te beschrijven. Het doel van de NVI is de veelheid aan bestaande indices te vervangen en te komen tot een politiek-bestuurlijk bruikbare, duidelijk te communiceren rapportage over de ontwikkeling van de sociale veiligheid in Nederland. In oktober 2014 is de eerste NVI verschenen. In 2015 zal een nieuwe NVI worden opgeleverd, die duidelijk moet maken of een uitbreiding met cybercrime mogelijk is.

[…]

37 Inventarisatie opsporingstechnologie (extern)

Opsporingstechnologie ontwikkelt zich snel. Politie en openbaar ministerie zetten bij de opsporing en vervolging van misdrijven diverse technieken in, zoals DNA-onderzoek, analyse van camerabeelden en dactyloscopisch onderzoek. Het scala van opsporingstechnieken is groot en het ontbreekt aan een goed overzicht, zowel van de beschikbaarheid als van het gebruik dat ervan wordt gemaakt. Daarnaast ontbreekt overzicht van technologische ontwikkelingen (innovaties). Inzicht hierin is van belang voor de sturing van opsporing en vervolging.

[…]

49 De huidige stand van zaken met betrekking tot het onderzoek ten behoeve van de waarheidsvinding aan inbeslaggenomen elektronische gegevensdragers en inbeslaggenomen geautomatiseerde werken (extern)

Op dit moment mag een opsporingsambtenaar onderzoek doen aan inbeslaggenomen (elektronische) gegevensdragers en geautomatiseerde werken, zoals smartphones, laptops, computers, tablets, usb-sticks, externe harde schijven etc. Hij behoeft hiervoor geen toestemming of machtiging van de officier van justitie of rechter-commissaris. Ook bevat het wetboek geen regels over notificatie, het bewaren en vernietigen van niet-relevante gegevens, het ontoegankelijk maken van gegevens enzovoort. Deze situatie vertoont een grote mate van onevenwichtigheid ten opzichte van de regeling van de andere bevoegdheden tot het vergaren van vastgelegde gegevens, waarbij in beginsel de officier van justitie beslissingsbevoegd is. Gelet op het nog steeds groeiende gebruik van computers en smartphones waarop steeds grotere hoeveelheden gegevens van verschillende aard kunnen worden opgeslagen en het belang dat wordt gehecht aan bescherming van de persoonlijke levenssfeer in verband met dergelijke opgeslagen gegevens, wordt overwogen dit onderwerp in het Wetboek van Strafvordering nader te normeren. Daarvoor is inzicht in de huidige praktijk gewenst.

Vanuit de Cluster Secretaris Generaal:

52 Procedurele en inhoudelijke criteria voor wetsevaluaties (intern)

Wetten worden periodiek geëvalueerd. Volgens Aanwijzing 164 lijkt een evaluatietermijn van vijf jaar in de rede te liggen. Een evaluatiebepaling in deze Aanwijzing zegt dat – indien wenselijk – een wet éénmalig of periodiek wordt geëvalueerd en verslag wordt gedaan over de doeltreffendheid en de effecten van deze wet in de praktijk. In aanmerking komen zowel de mate van verwezenlijking van de doelstellingen en de neveneffecten als de evenredigheid, subsidiariteit, uitvoerbaarheid, handhaafbaarheid, afstemming op andere regelingen, eenvoud, duidelijkheid en toegankelijkheid. Voor een effectief wetsevaluatiebeleid is van belang dat wetsevaluaties aan bepaalde criteria voldoen. Maar welke zijn dat dan? Er is behoefte aan een handreiking of model om een goede wetsevaluatie op te zetten.

53 Gebruik, waardering en effect van internetconsultatie (extern)

De kwaliteit van het wetgevingsproces wordt verhoogd door burgers, bedrijven en organisaties tijdig te informeren over wetgeving in voorbereiding en hen uit te nodigen daaraan een bijdrage te leveren en zo voorstellen te toetsen aan de praktijk. Ook wordt de kwaliteit van wetgeving versterkt door gevraagde of ongevraagde adviezen van adviesorganen. De vraag is of op dit moment het volle potentieel uit consultaties wordt gehaald. Dit onderzoek moet uitwijzen wat de aard, omvang én het effect zijn van het gebruik van internetconsultatie. Hoe waarderen gebruikers internetconsultatie en wat is er te zeggen over de relatie tussen internetconsultatie en het draagvlak van de regeling in kwestie?

Vanuit de NCTV:

54 Cyber-vitaal (extern)

Het is wenselijk om meer inzicht te krijgen in de vitale processen en diensten in het cyberdomein, in de (onderlinge) afhankelijkheden en in het risico dat deze processen en diensten een doelwit worden van cyberaanvallen. De wijze waarop andere landen omgaan met deze vraagstukken kan hierbij worden betrokken. Het achterliggende doel van deze risicobenadering is het verhogen van de weerbaarheid van vitale processen en diensten en het inzetten op een effectieve gezamenlijke respons: publiekprivaat, civiel-militair en met behulp van internationale partners.

55 Evaluatie Nationale Cybersecurity Research Agenda (extern)

Onder de vlag van de Nationale Cybersecurity Research Agenda (NCSRA) zijn meerdere miljoenen euro’s bijeengebracht om onderzoek te doen op het gebied van cybersecurity. In 2013 is de tweede NCSRA verschenen. In dit onderzoek wordt bekeken wat er tot dusver met deze onderzoeksgelden is gedaan en tot welke resultaten dat heeft geleid.

[…]

57 Wisselwerking en mogelijke confrontaties tussen extreemrechts en jihadisme (extern)

In het Verenigd Koninkrijk en Duitsland zijn al vaker fysieke confrontaties geweest tussen extreemrechtse groeperingen en radicale moslims. Soms is dit zelfs geëscaleerd tot voorgenomen (maar verijdelde) moordaanslagen op de leiders van de respectievelijke groepen. In Nederland hebben we dit soort escalaties tussen extreemrechts en radicale moslims nog niet gezien. Welke factoren en dynamiek hebben in landen als het Verenigd Koninkrijk en Duitsland tot de genoemde confrontaties geleid en in hoeverre zijn onderscheiden factoren ook voor Nederland relevant?

58 Effectiviteit van counter narratives (extern)

In het kader van preventiebeleid worden door de Nederlandse overheid gematigde tegengeluiden tegen extremistische vertogen gestimuleerd met als doel om radicalisering tegen te gaan. Het gaat hier hoofdzakelijk om initiatieven die het gewelddadige jihadistische vertoog scherp tegen het licht houden en deconstrueren. Ook in andere (niet-Westerse) landen worden dergelijke geluiden door de overheid gestimuleerd of zelfs door de overheid geformuleerd. De vraag is welke methode effectief is en bij welke (elementen uit de) buitenlandse aanpak de Nederlandse overheid baat zou hebben.

59 Evaluatie Nationale Contraterrorisme Strategie 2011-2015 (extern)

De doelstelling van de Nationale Contraterrorisme Strategie is het verminderen van het risico op een terroristische aanslag en de vrees daarvoor, evenals het beperken van de mogelijke schade na een eventuele aanslag. De strategie wordt periodiek geëvalueerd; de eerstvolgende evaluatie start in 2015. Het onderzoek moet uitwijzen of de strategie op de genoemde terreinen effectief is geweest en daarnaast een overzicht geven van de kosten van de maatregelen voortvloeiend uit de strategie. Hoe verhouden deze kosten zich tot de resultaten?

60 Toegang en invloed van buitenlandse investeerders in de Nederlandse vitale sectoren (extern)

De (mogelijke) overname van, c.q. investering in enkele voormalige Nederlandse nutsbedrijven door buitenlandse partijen heeft het thema van buitenlandse investeringen op de beleidsagenda gezet van de ministeries van EZ en VenJ. De vraag daarbij is hoe nationale veiligheidsbelangen kunnen worden gewaarborgd wanneer voormalige nutsbedrijven in handen komen van staatsbedrijven uit landen waarmee Nederland niet direct dezelfde internationale belangen nastreeft. Meer in het bijzonder spelen daarbij issues als hoe ver de inzage reikt van (toekomstige) buitenlandse aandeelhouders in vertrouwelijke informatie van bedrijven in de Nederlandse vitale sectoren, de toegang tot vertrouwelijke publiek/private samenwerkingsverbanden en de eventuele invloed op cruciale besluitvorming ten aanzien van safety/ cybersecurity. Welke impact kunnen dergelijke aandeelhouders in theorie hebben op de wijze waarop het Nederlandse veiligheidsbestel is ingericht? En zijn er al voorbeelden van daadwerkelijk gebruik door buitenlandse aandeelhouders van mogelijkheden tot toegang, inzage en invloed in Nederland, Europa of daarbuiten?

[…]

EOF

In November 2011 it was decided (in Dutch) that an evaluation would be carried out of the Dutch National Counter Terrorism Strategy between 2011 and 2015. The Research and Documentation Centre (WODC) of the Ministry of Security & Justice in August 2014 published a report (.pdf, in Dutch) plus appendices (.pdf, in Dutch) in preparation of that evaluation, which itself will be carried out at the end of 2015. In February 2015, an official English summary (.pdf) of the preparation was published. Here is that summary in its entirety (~1800 words):

This research aims at and is delineated to policy measures, policy interventions and policy intentions that originated from the CT-strategy, which implementations result from input from the NCTV and are based on written documentation.

Examining the National Counterterrorismstrategy

The CT-strategy consists of a central aim, five ‘pillars’ and eight strategic priorities. The core idea behind the counterterrorism policy is the ‘brede benadering’ (‘broad approach’). The ‘brede benadering’ consists of five pillars: ‘verwerven’ (obtain), ‘voorkomen’ (prevent), ‘verdedigen’ (defend), ‘voorbereiden’ (prepare) and ‘vervolgen’ (prosecute). The pillar ‘verwerven’ (obtain) is the foundation for the other four pillars, as it obtains information and intelligence about threats. In the CT-strategy, the pillar ‘voorkomen’ (prevent) is considered the main pillar against terrorist threat.

Based on the documentation study, the interviews and our own analysis, the relation between the central goal, the five pillars and the eight strategic priorities is reconstructed in the means-end diagram below [click image to enlarge].

Analysis of the Dutch counterterrorism policy

This research describes an extensive and complex policy area, of which the coherence between the various components of the policies do not immediately attest from the strategy. Besides the strategic goals, the CT-strategy also describes executive and operational goals. As a consequence, the perception on counterterrorism (and terrorism) and the implementation and execution of counterterrorism measures are not separated. The counterterrorism policies have a strong focus on performance (or focus on ‘acting on new threats’), which means the focus of the counterterrorism policies are constantly shifting. The focus of policy is not defined strongly in the CT-strategy. This flexibility also has advantages; based on the most recent threat-analysis and specific incidents, a wide range of different policy measures offer a lot of possible approaches to new problems.

Using Pawson and Tilley’s CMO-model of policy analysis [footnote 1: R. Pawson & N. Tilley, Realistic Evaluation, Londen: Sage publications, 1997.], the assumptions on context, interventions and mechanisms are analysed. During the establishment of the CT-strategy (the context in which the strategy was produced), there was no strong terrorist threat in the Netherlands. The focus of counterterrorism policies were determined by new threats, new incidents and the political situation at the time.

Regarding the causes of terrorism, policymakers assume a strong causal relation between different determinants, radicalization and terrorist acts. However, in scientific literature and during the interviews, scientists and policymakers have declared that there is uncertainty regarding the exact workings of radicalization and mechanisms through which radicalisation manifests itself. There are no clear assumptions about the (establishing of) goals of counterterrorism policy in the CT-strategy.

Regarding interventions, the assumptions about the approach, the assumptions about the tasks and relations different government actors have, have been analysed. Assumptions regarding the approach are determined by the central idea behind the Dutch counterterrorism approach – the ‘brede benadering’ (‘broad approach’). Assuming intervening in an early stage of radicalization leads to the biggest chances of success, the main focus in counterterrorism policies is in the pillar ‘voorkomen’ (prevent). The ‘brede benadering’ (‘broad approach’) has narrowed in the last years: preventive measures, aimed directly at (suspected) culprits have become more prominent. Three types of generic interventions are embroiled throughout the entire policy area and are of great significance to the counterterrorism strategy: cooperation, coordination and communication.

Considering the exploratory nature of this research, the specific mechanisms behind the interventions and outcomes of these mechanisms have not been reviewed. However, this study does review literature on (identifying) mechanisms, which has led to an expansion of the CMO-model. Illustrating this expanded CMO-model, the new framework has been applied to two counterterrorism measures: the personal approach (‘de persoonsgerichte aanpak’) and training activities increasing resilience against radical ideas. The expanded framework can be used to identify specific workings and mechanisms of counterterrorism measures in the next evaluation.

Evaluations

This study included a search and review of every (known) public evaluation on every measure, intervention and intention resulting from the CT-strategy. We conclude that the strategic priorities have not been evaluated. A small portion of the measures in the five pillars of the ‘brede benadering’ (‘broad approach’) have been evaluated. Key elements of the counterterrorism policy – the pillar ‘verwerven’ (obtain) and a significant section of the pillar ‘voorkomen’ (prevent) – are barely evaluated; only a few measures within these pillars are evaluated. Examples are several evaluations of the work of intelligence services and several evaluations of the cooperation with other partners. Part of the pillar ‘voorkomen’ (prevent), preventing violent extremism, has been evaluated. In addition, we conclude that available evaluations mostly review the (legal) arrangements and the processing (or functioning) of the measures – and do not review the direct effect and results of the measures on countering terrorism. A significant portion on the available evaluations is aimed at reviewing goals and functioning beyond the field of counterterrorism, like the functioning of the intelligence agencies in general.

Conclusion

The relationship between parts of the CT-strategy, an extensive and complex policy area, is not well described in the strategy itself. Many parts of the strategy concern execution policy. The policy strategy and policy execution are not strictly separated. The precise focus of the counterterrorism policies is constantly shifting, depending on the political context and concrete threats at a certain moment. At this moment, the policy focuses on jihadist (travellers). A big advantage of the strategy is her flexibility. The ‘brede benadering’ (‘broad approach’) and the five pillars offer a wide range of measures; according to the threat level and concrete incidents, measures are chosen. However, as a result of this flexibility and the width of the measures that can be chosen the strategy is not the main factor in determining executive policy. This is more determined by concrete developments of threat.

EOF

UPDATE 2017-11-10: answers (in Dutch, 9 pages; mirror) to parliamentary questions re: draft regulation DNA investigations in Wiv2017 (=Wiv20xx) intelligence law.

UPDATE 2015-06-15: the transcript (in Dutch) is available of the General Meeting that took place held on April 22nd 2015 in the parliament.

UPDATE 2015-04-15: the Dutch Minister of the Interior mentions (.pdf, in Dutch) “several dozen” DNA profiles were involved, which he requested to be destroyed, and are now destroyed. We now wait for that the bill that will be proposed to change the law such that it will be legal for the AIVD to store DNA profiles (under certain conditions and safeguards).

UPDATE 2015-04-01: the Dutch Minister of the Interior reportedly (in Dutch) seeks to change the law to allow the AIVD to store DNA profiles for the purpose of identifying persons. “If we have someone’s DNA and that person then carries out an attack, we can identify that person directly”, he said. The level of prior authorization required to store DNA is not yet determined, but it is suggested that in case of persons that have special professions, for instance lawyers and journalists, approval will typically need to be obtained from the Minister itself (highest possible level). The use of DNA for the purpose of determining a person’s health will remain forbidden.

On March 25th 2015, the Dutch Review Committee on the Intelligence and Security Services (CTIVD) published an oversight report (.pdf, in Dutch) about the use of forensic biology research methods by the Dutch General Intelligence & Security Service (AIVD) between 2002 to 2014. The CTIVD report was accompanied by a press release (.pdf, in Dutch).

Article 22 of the Dutch Intelligence & Security Act of 2002 (Wiv2002) permits the AIVD to “carry out research on objects for the purpose of establishing the identity of a person”, and is the main legal basis for the use of forensic biology research methods. Article 21 permits the AIVD to use agents, and agents may carry out tasks on behalf of the AIVD; for instance the application of forensic biology research.

While the AIVD is permitted to apply forensic biology research for the purpose of establishing the identity of a person, the CTIVD states that the AIVD is not permitted to do so for the purpose of examining a person’s health. The CTIVD found that the AIVD attempted to do so in two operations, part of one investigation, “a longer time ago”; the CTIVD finds this unlawful.

While the AIVD is permitted to take DNA from objects and store it until the identity of a person has been established, the CTIVD states that the AIVD is not permitted to store that DNA once an identity is established. The CTIVD found that the AIVD keeps a small-scale DNA database that contains information pertaining to persons that are already identified; the CTIVD finds this unlawful. The report itself states that the AIVD employs a forensic adviser, and that that adviser manages said DNA database. The database is stored on a stand-alone computer that is not accessible from the internal network of the AIVD. If an operational team wants to check a DNA profile, that has to be done via the forensic adviser or his supervisor. As stated in the press release, under the current Dutch law, that database can only contain DNA information of persons whose identity has not yet been established.

Here is a translation of the CTIVD’s press release:

The Dutch Intelligence & Security Act of 2002 does not permit the AIVD to create a DNA database

The Dutch Intelligence & Security Act of 2002 (Wiv2002) permits the AIVD to carry out forensic biology research. However, no specific regulation exists that safeguards the storage of cell material and DNA profiles. As soon as the AIVD has established the identity of a person, the DNA profile and possible cell material must be destroyed. The AIVD is thus not permitted to create its own DNA database. At the time of the investigation, it was found that the AIVD had such a database, at a limited scale. This is stated in a report published today by the Dutch Review Committee on the Intelligence and Security Services (CTIVD) about the application of forensic biology research methods by the AIVD.

If the AIVD examines physical characteristics of persons for the purpose of establishing their identity, the privacy of these persons is at stake. Examples include DNA research and dactyloscopy. The protection of privacy demands increasing attention, because the possibilities of, among others, DNA research have strongly increased. Much more personal characteristics can be derived from cell material (blood, saliva or body hair) nowadays than in the past. The CTIVD therefore in its oversight report established a framework for the application of forensic biology research methods.

Conditions

The law provides two conditions for the application of forensic biology research methods.

Condition 1: only objects, not persons, can be examined

The AIVD can only carry out forensic biologic research concerning objects that have body material on them. The Wiv2002 does not provide room to take such material from the body of persons, for instance by covertly pulling body hair. The AIVD is not permitted to infringe upon the physical integrity of persons.

Condition 2: examination is only permitted to establish a person’s identity

The purpose of the investigation must be to establish a person’s identity. That means:

• that the law does not provide room to carry out investigations if the identity is already known. It is required that at the time of the investigation, doubt exists about a person’s identity. A method in which, for instance, the DNA profile of an identified person is stored for future use to recognize the person’s identity when the person is expected to travel under an alias or disguise, is thus already not allowed because of this, and;
• the investigation can only be aimed at the identity of the person involved, or by means of related identifying characteristics, such as the DNA profile or the fingerprint. The Wiv2002 thus does not provide room for carrying out investigations into the decent or health of a person.

No legal basis for storing DNA profiles or cell material

European jurisprudence provides an additional condition for the application of forensic biology research methods. An adequate legal basis must exist for storing cell material and DNA profiles. This legal basis must provide minimal safeguards concerning storage period, use, third party access, procedures for maintaining the integrity and confidentiality of the data, and procedures for destruction.

The CTIVD found that such a specific regulation that provides safeguards for the storing of cell material and DNA profiles, does not exist for the AIVD. The Wiv2002 hence does not provide the legal basis. As long as the current law does not regulate the storing of DNA profiles and cell material, the AIVD is not permitted to create its own DNA database for any reason. At the time of the investigation, it was found that the AIVD had such a database, on a limited scale. As soon as the AIVD established a person’s identity, it must remove and destroy the DNA profile and possible cell material.

Examined operation

The CTIVD has examined all operations since 2002 — the year in which the law took effect — in which the AIVD has used forensic biology research methods. The number of operations was not large, but the use of such methods is increasing. The CTIVD has found unlawfulness in a limited number of operations.

EOF

On March 23rd 2015, Dutch newspaper Volkskrant brought a story (in Dutch) alleging that information of the Dutch intelligence & security service AIVD ended up in the hands of criminals after theft of data from the Curaçao Security Service (VDC). Here is a translation of the Volkskrant article:

‘Information of Dutch intel agency AIVD in hands of criminals after data theft at Curaçao Security Service VDC’

by Charlotte Huisman

Information from the Dutch intelligence & security service AIVD has ended up in the hands of criminals after a large data robbery at the Curaçao security service VDC, according to Dutch MP Ronald van Raak (Socialist Party).

Leaked documents show how the former Prime Minister of Curaçao, Gerrit Schotte, was involved in possible corruption within the security service of Curaçao.

This security service must, among others, commissioned by the governor, investigate whether politicians are ‘clean enough’ to, for instance, become a Minister. Schotte and his team have put a lot of effort into blocking such a screening. How far they are willing to go in that, is made clear in this story.

Employees of the security service certainly can not have relations with politicians. Still, the head of the service, Lawrence P. of the then-Antillian security service, flew to Sint Maarten on September 16th 2010 for a meeting with Gerrit Schotte, Minister-to-be George Jamaloodin,  and Theo Heyliger, a controversial politician at Sint Maarten.

Report to police

On such small islands you will then be ‘signaled’. A day later, Edsel Gumbs, director of the Antillian security service, makes a phone call to the Antillian Minister of Justice about this forbidden meeting. In response, the Minister denies P. access to the building of the security service.

A lot changes on October 10th 2010. Curaçao is no longer part of the Netherlands Antilles, but as of that day is an autonomous country within the Kingdom of The Netherlands. Gerrit Schotte is the first Prime Minister. And the security service for the entire Antilles is reformed into the Curaçao Security Service (in Dutch: “Veiligheidsdienst Curaçao”, aka VDC).

The VDC filed a police report against P., the suspected head of service, for violating professional secrecy. From wiretapped phone data it is apparent that P. borrowed money from Jamaloodin, who has meanwhile been appointed Minister of Finance. In exchange for that, the Minister could obtain information about persons from P.

Prime Minister Schotte wants the suspended employee to return back to work at the VDC. The VDC’s oversight committee blocks that.

The hot issue is the mandatory screening that Schotte and his administration resist. Gumbs, director of the VDC, wants to continue the investigation, against Schotte’s will.

Incompetent

On October 27th 2010, the VDC writes an internal memo [.pdf; mirror] with a long list of incriminating information about Schotte and a number of his Ministers: among others, the Prime Minister is involved in dubious financial businesses, and has debts. It is clear that the majority of the Curaçao government ministers could never have been appointed if that screening was completed prior to their appointment.

On that same day, the government denies Gumbs access to the buildings of the VDC, which later fires Gumbs because he would be unsuitable to lead the service. In February 2015, the court of Curaçao ruled that Gumbs has been “intentionally damaged”: there is nothing, according to the judge, that he is unsuitable or incompetent to lead the security service.

After Gumbs left, the government appointed a new director for the VDC. In October 2011, under his regime, something remarkable happens. The network operator of the security service provides a detailed testimony about this before the Curaçao Ombudsman.

He says that in the beginning of October, he had to tell a number of ‘Columbians’ how the VDC’s information was protected. Commissioned by the Prime Minister, he was told by his supervisors. A few weeks later, the network operator had to provide the passwords of the system, after which all data present could be copied and changed; not just of the VDC, but also data exchanged with the Dutch general intelligence & security service AIVD and the American DEA and FBI.

Dutch MP Ronald van Raak says it might constitute the largest data theft ever concerning a secret service. Multiple sources confirm that the copied data has ended up in the hands of criminals. Data also allegedly was erased, for instance to make possible a positive screening of future politicians, according to Van Raak.

Van Raak finds that the Netherlands must intervene. ‘My request to Minister of the Interior, Ronald Plasterk, is: do something about it.’

Maffia ties

Gerrit Schotte (40) was the first Prime Minister of the country of Curaçao, from October 10th 2011 to September 29th 2012. He is suspected of having accepted 200,000 dollar from Francesco Corallo — who owns a lot of casinos in the Caribbean area and is considered to belong to the Italian maffia — in exchange for influence on the island and promoting the interest of his casino business. The Public Prosecution Service of Curaçao stated this on Friday, in the first hearing in the criminal case against the former Prime Minister. Schotte and his wife are also suspected of money laundering and forgery. The court case will take place in September. The current Prime Minister, Ivar Asjes, who is associated with the political party of Helmin Wiels (who was murdered in 2013), makes little hurry in cleaning things up in Curaçao.

Oversight

In response to questions from Van Raak, Plasterk states that not the Netherlands, but Curaçao itself is responsible for the course of events at the VDC. “I cannot confirm that information of the AIVD is stolen, copied, or erased. I cannot make public statements about how the AIVD and VDC cooperate. The country of Curaçao has its own oversight committee concerning the VDC. It is up to the government of Curaçao and the parliament of Curaçao to oversee the course of events.”

According to intelligence services expert Constant Hijzen (Leiden University), a reorganization of a security service is a sensitive moment: in this case on October 10th 2010, when the service changed from an Antillian security service into a Curaçao security service. “In such a phase, the question is who should be in charge, who determines what activities to carry out, what mandate the services get, and how they are supervised. And to what extent politics may influence personnel policy, how transparent the procedures are, and how checks it.”

Intelligence services do not give insight into the data they exchange, and thus the damage of data theft is difficult to determine. “As a rule of thumb, the services make an estimation of the reliability of parties they cooperate with. I suspect that the AIVD has not exchanged lots of data with the VDC; it will rather be specific information in certain joint operations”

The topic is scheduled for the Dutch parliamentary agenda of March 31st.

EOF

UPDATE 2016-08-31: Nu.nl reports that the court of The Hague orders the Dutch government to pay Ibrahim A. EUR 1.1M, of the EUR 5M he demanded as compensation for lost business.

On Friday March 20th 2015, Dutch news paper De Telegraaf published a story about a former agent of the Dutch Military Intelligence & Security Service (MIVD) who threatened to disclose sensitive information unless the Ministry of Defense would pay him off — and the Ministry of Defense paid him EUR 500,000. The person involved is referred to as “I.A.”; a report from 2011 by De Telegraaf mentioned that the MIVD referred to him as a “Windhond” (which translates to “greyhound”). According to that same report, I.A. was owner of a construction consortium in Kabul; this would be confirmed by audio tapes possessed by De Telegraaf. It cites I.A.:

I delivered weapons, munition, vehicles. I took care of stamps in passports of the Dutch special forces. This allowed members of the Command Corps [‘Korps Commando Troepen’, MRK], who arrived at Kabul International Airport by military flights, to carry out their shadowy operations in secrecy. Observing and eliminating key figures of the Taliban, that’s what it was about. The rocket launchers, AK-47 machine guns and hand grenades were for that purpose.

Reportedly, the Dutch National Ombudsman and the Dutch Review Committee on the Intelligence and Security Services (CTIVD) have found I.A.’s complaints to be groundless.

Here is a translation of the new article in De Telegraaf (do read it entirely):

‘Former Dutch military intelligence agent extorted Dutch govt’

by Bart Olmer

The Dutch government has let itself be extorted by former Dutch military intelligence agent I.A., who threatened to disclose his secret activities in Afghanistan. That was stated before the court of The Hague by Marc Gazenbeek, director of legal affairs at the Ministry of Defense (MoD).

Out of fear that audio recordings that the ex-agent had made of conversations with MIVD officers would end up out in the open, the government, in a panic, offered I.A. half a million euro of ‘hush money’, says Gazenbeek. “We had no idea what other confidential information he had at his disposal”, according to the highest lawyer of the Ministry of Defense.

Gazenbeek: “The amount of 500.000 euro was intended to ensure the security of our personnel and to exclude the risk that information would be disclosed. He threatened with publicity, made a restless and emotionally unstable impression on us, and we were very worried about that. Our intent was for him to not publicize sensitive information, and thus we were willing to pay him an amount, without substantiation or obligations.”

Mission post

Entrepreneur I.A., a former police officer from the Netherlands who was active in Afghanistan as a contractor, claims that he was deployed as a secret agent in Kabul, and has suffered millions of euro’s of damage because the MIVD left him to his fate in Afghanistan. He built a mission post in Kabul, from which the Dutch special forces operated, and claims to have arranged weapons and munition, and cars with false license plates, including forged passport stamps that the special forces could use to leave Afghanistan.

Former MIVD director Pieter Cobelens denies knowing the I.A. was run as an agent. But MoD lawyer Gazenbeek confirms that I.A. arranged forged passport stamps during the mission in Afghanistan, and cars for special military units. Gazenbeek admits that I.A. is mentioned in a few weakly MIVD reports about the mission in Afghanistan. These were signed by Cobelens as having been seen.

Cobelens confirms that the Dutch special forces carried “local” weapons during the mission in Afghanistan, to not stand out. The court wanted to know by whom these Kalashnikovs were bought.

Cobelens: “You ask me whether I have knowledge about involvement of I.A. in the purchase of weapons in Afghanistan. I will not deny that weapons have been bought. That had to do with self-protection. The weapons had to fit what’s usually seen on the streets. I am precisely aware of the procedure that has been followed, and know with near certainty that I.A. did not buy the weapons, nor was he involved in it.”

Through the court case, in which a number of (former) MIVD officers are heard, I.A. wants to prove that he has been used as an agent, and that the government has a duty of care. The hearings have been ongoing for weeks. Today, an employee of the secret service will testify. I.A. claims millions.

At the height of the conflict with the MoD, he was overpowered in the inner city of The Hague by a special SWAT team. I.A. is currently once again a successful business man abroad.

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