Author: mrkoot

Protecting Against Espionage: U.S. & Netherlands

UPDATE 2012-06-07: 

 


 

====== START OF ORIGINAL BLOGPOST FROM 2011-11-17 ======

In October 2011, the U.S. Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive (ONCIX) published the Report to Congress on Foreign Economic Collection and Industrial Espionage 2009-2011 (.pdf). Earlier, Dutch intelligence service AIVD published an analysis of vulnerability to espionage (.pdf). I cite the Executive Summary of both reports below, intending to give these publications a little extra exposure.

1/2. U.S.-NCIX: “Report to Congress on Foreign Economic Collection and Industrial Espionage 2009-2011”

Executive Summary

Foreign economic collection and industrial espionage against the United States represent significant and growing threats to the nation’s prosperity and security. Cyberspace—where most business activity and development of new ideas now takes place—amplifies these threats by making it possible for malicious actors, whether they are corrupted insiders or foreign intelligence services (FIS), to quickly steal and transfer massive quantities of data while remaining anonymous and hard to detect.

US Technologies and Trade Secrets at Risk in Cyberspace

Foreign collectors of sensitive economic information are able to operate in cyberspace with relatively little risk of detection by their private sector targets. The proliferation of malicious software, prevalence of cyber tool sharing, use of hackers as proxies, and routing of operations through third countries make it difficult to attribute responsibility for computer network intrusions. Cyber tools have enhanced the economic espionage threat, and the Intelligence Community (IC) judges the use of such tools is already a larger threat than more traditional espionage methods.

Economic espionage inflicts costs on companies that range from loss of unique intellectual property to outlays for remediation, but no reliable estimates of the monetary value of these costs exist. Many companies are unaware when their sensitive data is pilfered, and those that find out are often reluctant to report the loss, fearing potential damage to their reputation with investors, customers, and employees. Moreover, victims of trade secret theft use different methods to estimate their losses; some base estimates on the actual costs of developing the stolen information, while others project the loss of future revenues and profits.

Pervasive Threat from Adversaries and Partners

Sensitive US economic information and technology are targeted by the intelligence services, private sector companies, academic and research institutions, and citizens of dozens of countries.

  • Chinese actors are the world’s most active and persistent perpetrators of economic espionage. US private sector firms and cybersecurity specialists have reported an onslaught of computer network intrusions that have originated in China, but the IC cannot confirm who was responsible.
  • Russia’s intelligence services are conducting a range of activities to collect economic information and technology from US targets.
  • Some US allies and partners use their broad access to US institutions to acquire sensitive US economic and technology information, primarily through aggressive elicitation and other human intelligence (HUMINT) tactics. Some of these states have advanced cyber capabilities.

Outlook

Because the United States is a leader in the development of new technologies and a central player in global financial and trade networks, foreign attempts to collect US technological and economic information will continue at a high level and will represent a growing and persistent threat to US economic security. The nature of the cyber threat will evolve with continuing technological advances in the global information environment.

  • Over the next several years, the proliferation of portable devices that connect to the Internet and other networks will continue to create new opportunities for malicious actors to conduct espionage. The trend in both commercial and government organizations toward the pooling of information processing and storage will present even greater challenges to preserving the security and integrity of sensitive information.
  • The US workforce will experience a cultural shift that places greater value on access to information and less emphasis on privacy or data protection. At the same time, deepening globalization of economic activities will make national boundaries less of a deterrent to economic espionage than ever.

We judge that the governments of China and Russia will remain aggressive and capable collectors of sensitive US economic information and technologies, particularly in cyberspace.

The relative threat to sensitive US economic information and technologies from a number of countries may change in response to international economic and political developments. One or more fast-growing regional powers may judge that changes in its economic and political interests merit the risk of aggressive cyber and other espionage against US technologies and economic information.

Although foreign collectors will remain interested in all aspects of US economic activity and technology, we judge that the greatest interest may be in the following areas:

  • Information and communications technology (ICT), which forms the backbone of nearly every other technology.
  • Business information that pertains to supplies of scarce natural resources or that provides foreign actors an edge in negotiations with US businesses or the US Government.
  • Military technologies, particularly marine systems, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and other aerospace/ aeronautic technologies.
  • Civilian and dual-use technologies in sectors likely to experience fast growth, such as clean energy and health care/pharmaceuticals.

Cyberspace provides relatively small-scale actors an opportunity to become players in economic espionage. Under- resourced governments or corporations could build relationships with hackers to develop customized malware or remote-access exploits to steal sensitive US economic or technology information, just as certain FIS have already done.

  • Similarly, political or social activists may use the tools of economic espionage against US companies, agencies, or other entities, with disgruntled insiders leaking information about corporate trade secrets or critical US technology to “hacktivist” groups like WikiLeaks.

2/2. Netherlands-AIVD: “Analysis of vulnerability to espionage”

Executive Summary
The Dutch Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations (BZK) acknowledges that economic, strategic, technical and scientific espionage form a current threat to Dutch national safety and security. To gain a deeper understanding of this threat, and in order to make recommendations for its further reduction, the General Intelligence and Security Service of the Netherlands (AIVD) and the Directorate General for Safety and Security (DGV) at the Ministry of BZK have jointly analysed the risks from espionage in the areas of economic welfare & scientific potential, public administration and critical infrastructure. In the process of conducting its counterespionage analyses, the AIVD has observed that a number of foreign intelligence services are actively gathering information in sectors within these areas of attention.

Through various interviews and through use of available intelligence data from the AIVD, information and data were identified that would harm the Dutch national security if attained by foreign intelligence services/governments. Such data or collections of data are referred to in this report as core interests. The various ways in which core interests are vulnerable to espionage are referred to as vulnerabilities. These too have been analysed. As a result, the analysts concerned make a number of general recommendations based on the insights and conclusions described in this report. These recommendations point the way towards a follow-up policy trajectory under the umbrella of the Dutch national strategy of safety and security. In this follow-up policy trajectory the general recommendations will have to be made concrete and assigned to action owners.

Core interests

The analysis reveals that core interests can be found in all sectors investigated. These core interests can roughly be divided into the following categories:

  • Datasets and blueprints: this relates to databases, designs and drawings in organisations;
  • Positions and strategy: for example, policy premises, long-term philosophy and negotiating strategies;
  • Emerging core interests and infrastructure: for example, scientific innovations that may be able to make important contributions to the Dutch economy in the future.

Vulnerabilities

The most important pretexts for espionage activities by foreign intelligence services can be categorised as ‘people’ and ‘technology’. Intelligence services try to obtain information relevant to them via people who have direct or indirect access to this information or by deploying technical devices in order to hack, tap or monitor. The various ways of intercepting telecommunications form a significant vulnerability in this context. The analysis also reveals that the increasing interconnectivity and complexity of computer systems and the linking of data storage systems increase vulnerability of sensitive data. Outsourcing activities such as system and server management, data warehousing and data processing likewise carry the risk of espionage.

Targeted policy in both the private and public sector can serve to strengthen resistance to espionage and make the core interests of the Netherlands more secure. The quality of this policy will determine the extent to which core interests are vulnerable to intelligence activities. The analysis shows that certain policy decisions have inadvertently increased vulnerability to espionage activities in a few sectors. The promotion of knowledge migration from and to the Netherlands, for instance, has had the undesirable side-effect of enabling intelligence officers to conceal themselves relatively easily among the student population.

Counteracting intelligence activities requires those who are at risk of being spied on to be aware of the fact that they may be interesting to foreign services. It also requires them that they are aware of how intelligence activities are carried out. The analysis shows that awareness of espionage in the sectors concerned is often low. This limited awareness is visible on three levels:

  • Awareness of the value of information: organisations and individual workers sometimes fail to realise, or insufficiently realise, the value of the information they possess or to which they can obtain access;
  • Awareness of security: the security and safety of core interests do not always command sufficient attention in organisations; other considerations often take priority in their policy;
  • Weighing up interests: short-term organisational interests and/ or government interests are (often) given precedence over long-term interests. The defection of strategic knowledge or activity relevant for long-term Dutch national safety and security to other countries is given insufficient attention.

Recommendations

Based on these conclusions, three main recommendations are made for further strengthening resistance to espionage:

  • Actively strengthen awareness among managers and workers in government, industry and institutions of the value of the information they have and of the possible interest foreign governments may have in this information.
  • Work on changing the culture around security. In this respect users, the organisation of data flows and databases and the techniques used for detecting incidents are important focus areas.
  • When formulating policy, pay explicit attention to protecting core interests and the effects of policy on the Netherlands’ interests in the longer term. These recommendations are illustrated in chapter 10 with a number of possible, more concrete prospects for action. It is not within the remit of the analysis to make such actions more concrete or assign them; this will have to be done by the policy departments concerned in a follow-up policy trajectory.

More resources for the Netherlands:

The Quest For Cyber Peace

UPDATE 2011-12-18: also see Countering cyber war (.pdf, NATO Review, Winter 2001/2002).

In January 2011, ITU published The Quest For Cyber Peace (website). Here is its foreword:

“In the world of 2011, we enjoy the benefits of a boundless global information society, but with these benefits comes the threat of cyber attacks. They can arise anywhere, at anytime, and cause immense damage in the blink of an eye. This potential damage is increased exponentially by the linking of information and communication technologies (ICTs) with vital national infrastructures.

We must act now to stem this growing threat.

At the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS), world leaders and governments entrusted the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) with the task of coordinating a mechanism for building confidence and security in the use of ICTs. Since that time, Secretary General Touré has launched the Global Cybersecurity Agenda (GCA), and ITU has actively pursued fulfillment of this mandate through a number of initiatives. Above all else, ITU remains deeply concerned about cyberthreats among its Member States.

The World Federation of Scientists (WFS) promotes international collaboration in science and technology between scientists and researchers from all parts of the world. It strives to advance the free exchange of information so that everyone can benefit from the progress of science. In 2009, the WFS’s Permanent Monitoring Panel (PMP) on Information Security drafted the Erice Declaration on Principles of Cyber Stability and Cyber Peace, which calls for concerted, international action to ensure that information networks and systems remain stable, reliable, available, and trusted. The Declaration was adopted by the Plenary of the WFS on the occasion of the 42nd Session of the International Seminars on Planetary Emergencies in Erice (Sicily) on 20 August 2009 and has been distributed to every Member State of the ITU.

To achieve the mutual goal of ensuring Cyber Peace, collaboration between ITU and members of the science and technology community is critical. We cannot effectively confront the threat of cyberwar without the involvement of those with expert knowledge and insight of the technologies that are changing the global landscape.

This volume gives voice to that community. It represents a necessary step in the process of building international cooperation to address these challenges. We are grateful for the opportunity to present all our views on this critical issue.”

Direct link to .pdf: here.

Also, be reminded of these great resources:

Anomaly in DigiNotar Cert Revocations In June/July 2010

Inspired by Swa Frantzen’s DigiNotar breach – the story so far post at the ISC Diary, I looked at the CRL for DigiNotar Public 2025 Root CA (.crl) and found a spike in the number of certificate revocations during June/July 2010: 3282 out of 4880 revocations (67%) between December 2007 (oldest in the CRL) and August 2011 (most recent) occurred in June+July 2010. See the list counting those revocations.

Is there a business-as-usual explanation? I know that as per January 1st 2011, new PKIoverheid certs MUST be issued under the new SHA-256 based root, “PKIoverheid G2”. The CRL of the Dutch DoD smartcard “Defensiepas” (.crl) shows a big spike in September 2010: 32176 out of 71835 revocations (45%) between April 2009 and September 2011 occurred in September 2010. For that spike I settle with the migrate-to-G2 explanation: after all, the trust path for Defensiepas-certificates involves PKIoverheid. But the trust path for DigiNotar Public 2025 certificates doesn’t. It is orthogonal to PKIoverheid*. Perhaps some DigiNotar customer(s) went broke and dropped certs, or decided to migrate existing Public 2025 certs to PKIoverheid G2 certs? I have no idea. I contacted DigiNotar and am awaiting response.

If you can confirm 3000+ certs were revoked for business-as-usual reasons: please comment to this blog, or contact me via e-mail at koot=>uva.nl (“@” in stead of “=>”) or via Twitter at @mrkoot.

(*) Yes, the compromise of DigiNotar Public 2025 Root CA resulted in Dutch govt no longer trusting DigiNotar PKIoverheid G2 CA, but that is unrelated to this narrative AFAIK.

Dutch Police Investigation & Tor Spike: Correlation Or Also Causation?

UPDATE 2012-01-21: let me emphasize that the Dutch investigation and the spike are probably only correlated; there is no evidence for any causal relation.


UPDATE 2011-09-12: new spike in bridge connections occurring as we speak. For better information than my speculative thoughts, see the tor-talk mailinglist. I know hidden services and bridge connections are orthogonal; I’m considering the scenario where Dutch govt and Fox-IT are attempting some Tor-level attack — I don’t know whether expected benefit of successful attack would justify its cost though. Also see this and this response to my question on tor-talk — the latter mentions simpler / more likely explanations for the spike. I don’t oppose Ockham’s razor 🙂
 
On September 3rd 2011, Cryptome published Massive Automated Tor Bridge Requests: Why?  from the Tor-talk mailinglist. Some believe (credits to @ly_gs for enlightening me) that the August 2011 spike in Tor users via bridges may be related to the Dutch police investigation on Tor hidden services hosting child pornography, which also took place during that month. Wire Update News has an English-language article here, but I decided to translate myself the full August 31st press release from the Dutch Public Prosecutor (see below). Any ‘unnatural’ use of the English language is due to me translating as literal as possible, avoiding (mis)interpretation. Hyperlinks and parts between […] are mine.

Child porn on anonymous, deeply hidden websites
August 31st, 2011, National Office of the Dutch Public Prosecutor

During an investigation on the internet, the Dutch National Crime Squad stumbled upon large amounts of child pornography on anonymous meeting places and deeply hidden websites.

The reason for the investigation is the Amsterdam child porn case in which Robert [Mikelsons] is a prime suspect [Al Jazeera, CBS]. The National Crime Squad of the Dutch National Police (KLPD) started a multidisciplinary investigation team to map [Mikelsons]’s (international) network.

During the investigation, it was found that [Mikelsons] used hidden places, so called ‘hidden services’, on internet. He used the Tor-network, a worldwide network that enables anonymous surfing on the internet.

The investigated ‘hidden services’ comprised websites, forums and other hidden meeting places where child pornography images are exchanged. Visitors also communicate in chat channels about the abuse of children and the production and distribution of child porn.

Under responsibility of the National Office (“Landelijk Parket”) of the Dutch Public Prosecutor and with permission of the examining judge of the Rotterdam Court the investigators entered twelve ‘hidden services’ by breaking their security.

Images erased
The investigative team was able to gain administrative privileges to four websites. The two servers hosting the websites turned out to be located in the United States. The National Office of US Department of Justice was consulted about the investigation in advance. All images, userlists and chats containing personal data that were found on the child porn sites are handed over to the FBI. It involves tens of thousands of images of abused children. After securing [a copy of] the images [as evidence and/or for further investigation], the servers were completely erased.

On the other eight entered ‘hidden services’ the investigators were not able to gain administrative privileges. They were, however, able to erase the images, after copies were downloaded and secured for further investigation. One of these sites, “Violent Desires”, contained besides child pornography also a discussion forum, where visitors chatted about the kidnapping, abusing and killing of children. On all erased websites, the Dutch police team informed visitors about the investigation.

The police has not gained access to all hidden child pornography websites. On 11 websites the investigators registered themselves as visitor and left behind warnings containing the Dutch police logo. It remains unclear from which countries these ‘hidden services’ were hosted. In total, more than 220,000 child pornographic images and videos were found throughout the investigation.

A first comparison of the photo’s and video’s to material confiscated by police earlier showed that the findings partially contain new and unknown child pornography. It involves recent photo’s and video’s that are no more than five years old. The images will be made available internationally to police services if necessary. On the websites in the United States, investigators found two images that are already known from the Amsterdam case. The involved parents have been informed.

Aim
The most important aim in combating child porn is tracing and ending the abuse of children and arresting producers of child pornography. In this investigation the police also wants to make clear that anonymity inside the Tor-network nor national borders are in the way of the investigation of child porn.

The investigative team was made up of digital experts of the National Crime Squad, the Specialist Investigation Applications Service (DSRT), police Amsterdam-Amstelland, vice experts of IPOL Service and investigators of other KLPD services. Internet security company Fox-IT provided the team with technical advice, infrastructure and support.

Freedom of expression
The police investigation, which took place during the whole month of August, did not target the Tor-network itself, but the ‘hidden services’ hosting child porn within this anonymous, underground part of the internet. The Tor-network makes internet users anonymous by sending their IP address [sic] via various servers. Originally, Tor was a project of the US Navy.

The network primarily exists of private persons who enable Tor to function with their computers and internet connection. The use of the Tor-network is not by definition criminal. In countries without freedom of expression, for example, Tor is used by journalists and opponents of the ruling regime.

Both the Dutch investigation and the spike in the number of Tor users connecting via bridges happened in August 2011. Correlation, or also causation? [Update: Probably just correlation.] I don’t know what activities were performed during the investigation, but exploring de-anonymization attacks against Tor may fit the Dutch investigators’ aim of identifying those involved in child porn. The press release does not state that Tor hidden services (.onion sites) were the only lead from the Amsterdam case. Failure of Tor-level attacks may be irrelevant to mention in the press release, or preferred not to be disclosed because that would strengthen offenders’ confidence in relying on Tor for criminal purposes. Success might deliberately not be disclosed for the sake of ongoing investigations, or out of fear that criminals will then move to I2P or other systems perhaps less well-studied in digital forensics than Tor. This is all very speculative, of course.

I will update this post to reflect advancing insight, e.g. state “ONLY CORRELATION” if that turns out to be the case. Comment below, or contact me by e-mail (koot=>uva.nl) or Twitter (@mrkoot).

New Zealand SIS Only Uses SSL To Protect Public Informants’ Privacy

UPDATE 2011-08-26: I stand corrected. Here’s what Peter Gutmann said when asked whether SSL provides sufficient protection for NZSIS’ tip-off form (note: “phone them” refers to NZSIS’ existing public tip-off telephone number): “It depends what the threat model is. Given that the alternative is to phone them, that I can’t imagine anyone caring about intercepting random comments by random members of the public, and that 99.9% of said members of the public won’t be able to deal with anything more complex than that, it’s probably good enough.” That makes sense. More sense than me highlighting an attack that is theoretically possible but of which the cost outweighs the benefit in real life — in nearly all, if not all, real-life scenario’s.

UPDATE 2011-08-25: it appears that NZSIS removed the PGP key [2] from the source of https://providinginformation.nzsis.govt.nz/vwi/.

UPDATE 2011-08-21: As areopagita stated in comment below (thx!), the Soghoian/Stamm attack is indeed independent of the issuer; I only focus on a specific scenario here. Perhaps the following provides some clarification. Internet Explorer and Firefox are distributed with a root certificate of the Dutch govt, “Staat der Nederlanden”, installed by default (check your browser!). The Dutch govt might ask, coerce or compromise a New Zealand ISP to redirect providinginformation.nzsis.govt.nz to an IP address under Dutch govt control, and then, via a self-issued SSL-certificate for providinginformation.nzsis.govt.nz, see whatever is sent via the tip-off form; and perhaps even decide not to relay it to NZSIS. The fact that the Dutch govt (or Verisign, or etc.) can issue an SSL-cert that is automatically trusted by the browsers used to provide security tip-offs to New Zealand’s intelligence service to me seems a practical risk for both NZSIS and informants. If you have an opinion about this, please comment! I informed NZSIS about this post.

====== START OF ORIGINAL BLOGPOST FROM 2011-08-19 ======

Via IntelNews.org I learned that the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service (NZSIS) opened up a public tip-off form at providinginformation.nzsis.govt.nz. The form is protected by SSL (Verisign-issued certificate), but due to the attack explained in [1], I believe SSL offers an unacceptably low level of privacy protection to New Zealand’s public informants. The actual form is loaded in an IFRAME, and its source contains a (public) PGP key [2] — but it can’t be trusted to be authentic, because it’s sent over what should be assumed to be an insecure channel. I decided to submit an obviously nonsensical test-tip while Firebugging my connection, and low and behold: the information I entered is HTTP POST’d via XMLHttpRequest in unencrypted-by-PGP form in the Aviarc.datasets variable. So basically, if you submit a tip, the only protection you have is the Verisign-signed SSL cert. It’s not for me to decide, but I’d personally rather not take that risk when tipping off NZSIS about, e.g., presence of, hypothetically, US spies in New Zealand. Does New Zealand really have such urgency for public tip-offs that this insufficient level of protection of informants is considered acceptable for now?

[1] Christopher Soghoian and Sid Stamm, Certified Lies: Detecting and Defeating Government Interception Attacks Against SSL (.pdf), presented at HotPETS 2010, Berlin

[2] The PGP key (4096 bit RSA, created 2011-07-19, never expires):

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Version: GnuPG v2.0.17 (MingW32)
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=+R2P
—–END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK—–