Voor wie meer wil leren over terrorismebestrijding en de relatie met mensenrechten zijn de deliverables van het Europese project SECILE (@EuSECILE) goed leesvoer. Eerst een beschrijving van het SECILE project (bron):

SECILE (Securing Europe Through Counter-Terrorism: Impact, Legitimacy, and Effectiveness) is a part-EU funded project of assembled European human rights and legal research experts tasked with exploring the true impact of European counter-terrorism policy since 2001.

In the first European project of its kind, the project team will, over the next 18 months, look to assess and understand the extent to which various actors have been impacted by counter-terrorism legislation in Europe – from the citizen, to the legislator, to the security services, and the domestic courts.

SECILE loopt van oktober 2012 tot april 2014, draait gedeeltelijk op FP7-funding en heeft de volgende deelnemers: Statewatch, Durham University, Centre for Irish and European Security (CIES), National Maritime College of Ireland, Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), King’s College London’s en de Supreme Court of the Republic of Latvia.

In deze post wordt uitgelegd welke onderzoeksvragen SECILE adresseert:

Counter-terrorism is full of difficult questions, such as: What is the level of threat? Who does it come from? How can we combat it? What prices are we prepared to pay to be—or to feel—safer? How can we put into action the political commitments to security that governments make? SECILE is fundamentally concerned with understanding how we can ask—and how we can properly answer—three of the other difficult questions about counter-terrorism:

1. What are the impacts of counter-terrorism on a whole range of actors (such as political institutions, individuals, communities, state security services, police, private corporations and NGOs)?
2. How can we assess whether or not counter-terrorist measures introduced by the European Union are legitimate? And what does legitimacy mean in this context?
3. How can we assess whether or not EU counter-terrorist measures are effective? What does ‘effectiveness’ mean in this context?

In Q4/2013 is een reeks rapporten opgeleverd. Hierbij de links naar de rapporten en de SECILE-blogpost bij elk rapport:

• rapport (.pdf; mirror) — Data Retention in Europe: A Case Study (Nov 6)
• rapport (.pdf; mirror) — Transposition of EU Counter-Terrorism Measures (Nov 26)
• rapport (.pdf; mirror) — Catalogue of EU Counter-Terrorism Measures (Dec 3)
• rapport (.pdf; mirror) — How does the EU assess its counter-terrorism law? (Dec 4)
• rapport (.pdf; mirror) — Democratic Perspectives on Impact, Legitimacy and Effectiveness in the Counter-Terrorism Context (Dec 6)
• rapport (.pdf; mirror) — Legal Understandings of Impact, Legitimacy and Effectiveness in the Context of Counter-Terrorism (Dec 6)
• rapport (.pdf; mirror) — Operational Perspectives on Impact, Legitimacy and Effectiveness in Counter-Terrorism (Dec 9)
• rapport (.pdf; mirror) — Societal Perspectives on Impact, Legitimacy and Effectiveness in the Counter-Terrorist Context (Dec 9)

Verder aanbevolen leesvoer over terrorisme:

• Mensenrechten en staatsveiligheid: verenigbare grootheden? Opschorting en beperking van mensenrechtenbescherming (2005, juridisch proefschrift van Jan-Peter Loof, Open Access)
• Terrorisme – Studies over terrorisme en terrorismebestrijding (2012, uitgeverij Kluwer, $$$).
• Handling ethical problems in counterterrorism: An inventory of methods to support ethical decisionmaking (.pdf, 2013, rapport door RAND Europe iov Rijksoverheid)

EOF

UPDATE 2014-01-19: Marcy Wheeler (@emptywheel) wrote a critique: The Tech Back Door in Obama’s New Spying Policy. James Oliphant (@jamesoliphant) of the National Journal wrote a critique: Obama’s NSA Proposals Fall Far Short of Real Change.

UPDATE 2014-01-17: The Register ‘translated’ it to plain English: Those NSA ‘reforms’ in full: El Reg translates US Prez Obama’s pledges – Filleting fact from fiction.

On January 17th 2014, the U.S. Presidential Policy Directive (PPD-28) on Signals Intelligence Activities (.pdf) was published and Obama gave a speech. Guardian has a piece on this, and ACLU commented on the speech. Here is an excerpt from PPD-28 (emphasis is mine):

The United States, like other nations, has gathered intelligence throughout its history to ensure that national security and foreign policy decisionmakers have access to timely, accurate, and insightful information.The collection of signals intelligence is necessary for the United States to advance its national security and foreign policy interests and to protect its citizens and the citizens of its allies and partners from harm. At the same time, signals intelligence activities and the possibility that such activities may be improperly disclosed to the public pose multiple risks. These include risks to: our relationships with other nations, including the cooperation we receive from other nations on law enforcement, counterterrorism, and other issues; our commercial, economic, and financial interests, including a potential loss of international trust in U.S. firms and the decreased willingness of other nations to participate in international data sharing, privacy, and regulatory regimes; the credibility of our commitment to an open, interoperable, and secure global Internet; and the protection of intelligence sources and methods.

In addition, our signals intelligence activities must take into account that all persons should be treated with dignity and respect, regardless of their nationality or wherever they might reside, and that all persons have legitimate privacy interests in the handling of their personal information.

In determining why, whether, when, and how the United States conducts signals intelligence activities, we must weigh all of these considerations in a context in which information and communications technologies are constantly changing. The evolution of technology has created a world where communications important to our national security and the communications all of us make as part of our daily lives are transmitted through the same channels. This presents new and diverse opportunities for, and challenges with respect to, the collection of intelligence – and especially signals intelligence. The United States Intelligence Community (IC) has achieved remarkable success in developing enhanced capabilities to perform its signals intelligence mission in this rapidly changing world, and these enhanced capabilities are a major reason we have been able to adapt to a dynamic and challenging security environment. [Footnote 1: For the purposes of this directive, the terms “Intelligence Community” and “elements of the Intelligence Community” shall have the same meaning as they do in Executive Order 12333 of December 4, 1981, as amended (Executive Order 12333).] The United States must preserve and continue to develop a robust and technologically advanced signals intelligence capability to protect our security and that of our partners and allies.  Our signals intelligence capabilities must also be agile enough to enable us to focus on fleeting opportunities or emerging crises and to address not only the issues of today, but also the issues of tomorrow, which we may not be able to foresee.

Advanced technologies can increase risks, as well as opportunities, however, and we must consider these risks when deploying our signals intelligence capabilities. The IC conducts signals intelligence activities with care and precision to ensure that its collection, retention, use, and dissemination of signals intelligence account for these risks. In light of the evolving technological and geopolitical environment, we must continue to ensure that our signals intelligence policies and practices appropriately take into account our alliances and other partnerships; the leadership role that the United States plays in upholding democratic principles and universal human rights; the increased globalization of trade, investment, and information flows; our commitment to an open, interoperable and secure global Internet; and the legitimate privacy and civil liberties concerns of U.S. citizens and citizens of other nations.

Presidents have long directed the acquisition of foreign intelligence and counterintelligence [Footnote 2: For the purposes of this directive, the terms “foreign intelligence” and “counterintelligence” shall have the same meaning as they have in Executive Order 12333. Thus, “foreign intelligence” means “information relating to the capabilities, intentions, or activities of foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations, foreign persons, or international terrorists,” and “counterintelligence” means “information gathered and activities conducted to identify, deceive, exploit, disrupt, or protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted for or on behalf of foreign powers, organizations, or persons, or their agents, or international terrorist organizations or activities.” Executive Order 12333 further notes that “[i]ntelligence includes foreign intelligence and counterintelligence.”] pursuant to their constitutional authority to conduct U.S. foreign relations and to fulfill their constitutional responsibilities as Commander in Chief and Chief Executive. They have also provided direction on the conduct of intelligence activities in furtherance of these authorities and responsibilities, as well as in execution of laws enacted by the Congress. Consistent with this historical practice, this directive articulates principles to guide why, whether, when, and how the United States conducts signals intelligence activities for authorized foreign intelligence and counterintelligence purposes. [Footnote 3: Unless otherwise specified, this directive shall apply to signals intelligence activities conducted in order to collect communications or information about communications, except that it shall not apply to signals intelligence activities undertaken to test or develop signals intelligence capabilities.]

Section 1. Principles Governing the Collection of Signals Intelligence.

Signals intelligence collection shall be authorized and conducted consistent with the following principles:

• (a) The collection of signals intelligence shall be authorized by statute or Executive Order, proclamation, or other Presidential directive, and undertaken in accordance with the Constitution and applicable statutes, Executive Orders, proclamations, and Presidential directives.
• (b) Privacy and civil liberties shall be integral considerations in the planning of U.S. signals intelligence activities. The United States shall not collect signals intelligence for the purpose of suppressing or burdening criticism or dissent, or for disadvantaging persons based on their ethnicity, race, gender, sexual orientation, or religion. Signals intelligence shall be collected exclusively where there is a foreign intelligence or counterintelligence purpose to support national and departmental missions and not for any other purposes.
• (c) The collection of foreign private commercial information or trade secrets is authorized only to protect the national security of the United States or its partners and allies. It is not an authorized foreign intelligence or counterintelligence purpose to collect such information to afford a competitive advantage to U.S. companies and U.S. business sectors commercially.
• (d) Signals intelligence activities shall be as tailored as feasible. In determining whether to collect signals intelligence, the United States shall consider the availability of other information, including from diplomatic and public sources. Such appropriate and feasible alternatives to signals intelligence should be prioritized.

Section 2. Limitations on the Use of Signals Intelligence Collected in Bulk

[…]

In particular, when the United States collects nonpublicly available signals intelligence in bulk, it shall use that data only for the purposes of detecting and countering:

• (1) espionage and other threats and activities directed by foreign powers or their intelligence services against the United States and its interests;
• (2) threats to the United States and its interests from terrorism;
• (3) threats to the United States and its interests from the development, possession, proliferation, or use of weapons of mass destruction;
• (4) cybersecurity threats;
• (5) threats to U.S. or allied Armed Forces or other U.S or allied personnel; and
• (6) transnational criminal threats, including illicit finance and sanctions evasion related to the other purposes named in this section.

In no event may signals intelligence collected in bulk be used for the purpose of suppressing or burdening criticism or dissent; disadvantaging persons based on their ethnicity, race, gender, sexual orientation, or religion; affording a competitive advantage to U.S. companies and U.S. business sectors commercially; or achieving any purpose other than those identified in this section.

[…]

The DNI shall maintain a list of the permissible uses of signals intelligence collected in bulk.  This list shall be updated as necessary and made publicly available to the maximum extent feasible, consistent with the national security.

[…]

EOF

UPDATE 2016-05-04: de lijst van updates/actualiteiten is naar de bodem verplaatst.

In voetnoot 257 van het Dessens-rapport (.pdf, zie p.133) staat het volgende over tapstatistieken van de AIVD/MIVD (vetgedrukte markering is van mij):

In 2010 heeft de Minister van BZK dergelijke gegevens verstrekt over de inzet van telefoontaps door de AIVD en de MIVD (Kamerstukken II 2009/10, 30 517, nr. 21) nadat de Tweede Kamer in een motie daarom gevraagd had. De Minister heeft dit soort verzoeken sindsdien geweigerd met als argument dat meerjaarlijkse gegevens teveel inzicht zouden geven in de werkwijze van de diensten. De CTIVD heeft onlangs geconstateerd dat ‘van een aanmerkelijke kans op schade aan de nationale veiligheid’ geen sprake is als er een meerjaarlijks overzicht van de tapstatistieken van de AIVD beschikbaar zou zijn (toezichtrapport 33, (2012), blz. 27).

Openheid in de vorm van (meerjarige) statistieken over inzet van bijzondere bevoegdheden, zoals het huidige Artikel 25 (afluisteren), maar liefst ook Artikel 24 (hackbevoegdheid) en Artikel 27 (SIGINT-selectie), is betekenisvolle transparantie: het stelt de samenleving en de (volledige) Tweede Kamer (i.p.v. alleen de besloten Commissie IVD aka ‘Commissie Stiekem’ die thans uit fractievoorzitters bestaat) in staat om, naast het rechtmatigheidstoezicht van de CTIVD, een vinger aan de pols te houden van de omvang van de activiteiten van de IVD’s. De cie-Dessens stelt terecht het volgende (p.133):

Een zo groot mogelijke mate van transparantie draagt bij aan maatschappelijk vertrouwen en draagvlak voor het werk van de diensten. Tegelijkertijd draagt transparantie bij aan de waarborging van grondrechten. Overheidsorganen moeten zich openstellen voor daadwerkelijke publieke controle. Dit is bijvoorbeeld mogelijk door meer actieve openbaarmaking van gegevens die in het verleden door de diensten zijn verwerkt. De transparantie kan ook bevorderd worden door royaler cijfermatige informatie te verstrekken over de activiteiten van de diensten.

Openheid over (de omvang van) inzet van de hack- en SIGINT-bevoegdheden zal geen eenvoudig vraagstuk zijn, net zo min als het vraagstuk over tapstatistieken, maar het lijkt me wenselijk dat ook dáárover wordt nagedacht. Waar in redelijkheid niet kan worden gesproken van `aanmerkelijke kans op schade aan de nationale veiligheid’, past het openheid te overwegen. Zeker gezien de vervagende grens tussen inlichtingen- en opsporingsdiensten en gezien de verwachte uitbreiding van de SIGINT-bevoegdheid naar kabelgebonden communicatie.

Hieronder citeer ik enkele relevante paragrafen van pagina 20 en verder uit CTIVD-toezichtsrapport 33 – De rubricering van staatsgeheimen door de AIVD (.pdf, 2012), waar in Dessens’ voetnoot 257 aan wordt gerefereerd, over de interne rubriceringsvoorschriften van de AIVD (hyperlinks en tekst in [] zijn van mij):

In het [beveiligingsplan van de AIVD] wordt de AIVD gekenmerkt als een “staatsgeheimenfabriek” waarin wordt gewerkt met “(veelal) staatsgeheime productiemiddelen (medewerkers, bronnen, hulpmiddelen en methodieken)” en waarbij “(veelal) staatsgeheime halffabrikaten en eindproducten (informatie)” worden vervaardigd. Gelet op de enorme hoeveelheid gerubriceerde documenten die de AIVD op jaarbasis produceert, kan de Commissie niet anders dan deze typering onderschrijven.Het beleidsdocument stelt het volgende:

“(…) inbreuken op de vertrouwelijkheid of veiligheid tasten de slagkracht, effectiviteit en geloofwaardigheid van de dienst aan omdat:

• bronnen, medewerkers en relaties fysieke, geestelijke of maatschappelijke schade oplopen;
• vertrouwelijke informatie wordt gecompromitteerd;
• lopende onderzoeken gefrustreerd worden;
• interstatelijke betrekkingen, politieke verhoudingen, opsporings- en vervolgingsbelangen, de privacy van individuen geschaad of verstoord worden;
• het imago van en het zorgvuldig opgebouwde vertrouwen in de AIVD aangetast worden;
• de voorbeeldfunctie van de dienst waar het gaat om veiligheid en vertrouwelijkheid niet waargemaakt wordt;
• zij een negatieve invloed hebben op de bereidheid van bronnen en relaties om samen te werken met of informatie te verstrekken aan de AIVD.“

De voornoemde redenen zijn niet in alle gevallen op zichzelf voldoende om informatie staatsgeheim te rubriceren maar geven de ongewenste gevolgen aan van een inbreuk op de vertrouwelijkheid of veiligheid. Het belang van een degelijk beveiligingsbeleid van de AIVD wordt hiermee onderstreept.

[…]

In het beveiligingsplan is het volgende opgenomen ten aanzien van staatsgeheimen bij de AIVD.

“Staatsgeheimen bij de dienst betreffen de volgende categorieën. Gegevens:

• die zicht bieden op het actuele kennisniveau van de dienst. Hieronder wordt begrepen het enkele gegeven of een persoon of organisatie al dan niet bekend is bij de dienst;
• waaruit niet open bronnen kunnen worden afgeleid;
• waaruit een niet algemeen bekende werkwijze van de dienst kan worden afgeleid;
• aangaande de identiteit van medewerkers;
• die betrekking hebben op de beveiliging van het gebouw en de inrichting van de dienst.”

[…]

Naar aanleiding van een aangenomen motie in de Tweede Kamer is het totale aantal ingezette taps (artikel 25 Wiv 2002) in 2009 openbaar gemaakt [Voetnoot 80: Kamerstukken II 2009/10, 30 517, nr. 21: “In totaal zijn er ex art. 25 Wiv 2002 in 2009 1.078 taps geplaatst door de AIVD en 53 door de MIVD”]. Deze informatie werd tot dat moment door de AIVD als staatsgeheime informatie aangemerkt. In navolging van het openbaar worden van deze informatie heeft de AIVD een inzageverzoek ontvangen waarin werd gevraagd om inzage in de tapstatistieken van meerdere jaren. Inzage werd door de AIVD geweigerd met als redengeving dat deze informatie zicht biedt op de modus operandi van de AIVD. De Commissie is van oordeel dat een meerjaarlijks overzicht van de tapstatistieken niet als staatsgeheime informatie kan worden aangemerkt. Aangezien enkel inzage werd gevraagd in de totale hoeveelheid taps zal het voor een derde niet inzichtelijk zijn door welke factoren deze hoeveelheid wordt beïnvloed of op welke wijze het totale aantal taps is belegd binnen de AIVD. Indien het aantal taps in een bepaald jaar hoger is dan het jaar daarvoor kan dit velerlei oorzaken hebben, waarover een buitenstaander weliswaar vermoedens kan hebben maar waarover hij geen duidelijkheid kan verkrijgen. De Commissie wijst in dit verband op veranderende onderzoeksprioriteiten, nieuwe opgekomen onderzoeksonderwerpen, capacitaire beperkingen of de subsidiaire toepassing van andere (bijzondere) bevoegdheden. Zelfs indien het totaal aantal taps gelijk is gebleven sluit dit uit dat hieraan een significant andere interne verdeling ten grondslag ligt, zowel wat betreft het type tap als het onderzoeksgebied. Het is de vraag wat de schade voor de nationale veiligheid zou kunnen zijn indien wordt overgegaan tot de openbaarmaking van de desbetreffende gegevens. De nationale veiligheid zal met name kunnen worden geschaad indien personen of organisaties die de AIVD onderzoekt, door kennisneming van de werkwijze van de dienst, het gedrag hierop kunnen aanpassen waardoor de AIVD minder goed in staat zal zijn om zijn wettelijke taak te vervullen. [Voetnoot 81: Zie bijv. Kamerstukken II 1997/98, 25 877, nr. 3, p. 68; Kamerstukken II 1999/2000, 25 877, nr. 8, p. 122.] Behoudens de situatie dat bekend wordt dat de AIVD (bijna) geen taps inzet, acht de Commissie het niet waarschijnlijk dat een persoon of organisatie op basis van de enkele wetenschap van het totale aantal taps zijn gedrag hierop kan aanpassen, anders dan door het besluit te nemen om niet langer gebruik te maken van enig telecommunicatiemiddel. Van een aanmerkelijke kans op schade aan de nationale veiligheid is hier dus geen sprake.

De CTIVD geeft in datzelfde rapport op (genummerde) pagina 7 het volgende overzicht van rubriceringsgrondslagen:

De grondslagen voor rubricering zijn nader gedefinieerd in de bijlage “Toelichting op de artikelen VIRBI 2013” van het VIRBI.

Er worden bij “nationale veiligheid” zes belangen onderkend (bron: begrippenlijst ministerie van J&V):

UPDATES (van recent naar oud)

UPDATE 2016-05-04: Bits of Freedom bericht dat de bestuursrechter in hun hoger beroep heeft uitgesproken dat de minister de AIVD-tapstatistieken niet mag geheimhouden zonder uitleg te geven voor die geheimhouding. Dus: openbaarmaken of fatsoenlijk motiveren waarom dat niet kan (terwijl dat in andere landen zoals België en Duitsland al jarenlang wel gebeurt). Bits of Freedom heeft de minister twee jaar geleden gevraagd die statistieken openbaar te maken. (Zoals daarvóór en daarná ook anderen dat hebben gedaan, waaronder Reporter Radio.)

UPDATE 2016-01-29: …en de minister zegt in reactie op kamervragen dat ie, conform de uitspraak van de RvS, een nieuw besluit zal nemen.

UPDATE 2016-01-13: Minister moet geheimhouding statistieken taps AIVD beter motiveren (Nu.nl) – berichtgeving over de uitspraak van de Raad van State in het hoger beroep van de zaak van de journalist van Reporter Radio.

UPDATE 2015-08-29: op 2 juli 2015 heeft het kabinet het Wiv-wetsvoorstel in consultatie gebracht; zie hier een (lange en Engelstalige) post met enkele details over dat voorstel. Joris van Hoboken en ik hebben gezamenlijk een reactie ingestuurd op de consultatie, waarin ook een oproep om cijfermatige transparantie is opgenomen. Er zijn in totaal 557 openbare reacties; zie hier een selectie daaruit. De CTIVD laat in haar jaarverslag 2014-2015, dat verscheen vóór de consultatie, ook (opnieuw) blijken voorstander te zijn van cijfermatige transparantie.

UPDATE 2014-12-10: het is onder Artikel 85 Wiv2002 verboden voor aanbieders van telecommunicatie statistieken te publiceren over tapverzoeken.

UPDATE 2014-10-23: in de rechtszaak van Reporter Radio tegen de AIVD heeft de Haagse rechter geoordeeld, deels op basis van vertrouwelijke stukken, dat de AIVD tapstatistieken niet openbaar hoeft te maken. Het oordeel luidt als volgt:

UPDATE 2014-10-08: @MauritsMartijn schrijft op de Correspondent: Waarom wil Plasterk niet vertellen hoe vaak zijn geheime dienst afluistert?

UPDATE 2014-10-07: betekenisvol toeval: de CTIVD heeft vandaag rapport 40 (.pdf) gepubliceerd en noemde daarin oorspronkelijk statistieken t.a.v. inzet door AIVD van Art.25/Art.27 Wiv2002, maar die statistieken zijn door de Minister van BZK gecensureerd. Overigens is censuur in het publieke deel van een CTIVD-rapport niet uniek: ook in eerdere CTIVD-rapporten is het wel eens voorgekomen dat markeringen zijn aangebracht, bijvoorbeeld in CTIVD-rapport 26 inzake de d-taak van de AIVD (inlichtingentaak buitenland).

UPDATE 2014-10-06: zich baserend op de hieronder vetgemarkeerde opmerking van de CTIVD eist Reporter Radio a.s. donderdag bij de rechter in Den Haag openbaarmaking van alle AIVD-tapstatistieken over de jaren 2002-2008 en 2010-2012 (over 2009 waren reeds statistieken openbaar).

EOF

UPDATE 2017-09-13: further updates/additions moved to the bottom.

UPDATE 2015-02-05: new EU Factsheet on EU Intelligence Analysis Center (IntCen).

On November 27th 2013, the Dutch cabinet responded (in Dutch) to parliamentary questions about EU IntCen. The response is only available in Dutch; here is my English translation.

1 Are you familiar with the European FOIA request to the European External Action Service (EEAS) for information about the secret European EU Intelligence Analysis Centre (Intcen) service?

Yes.

2 Is it true that Member States voluntarily transmit intelligence to IntCen, and what is the nature of this intelligence?

Yes. Expatriate staff of civilian intelligence and security services of several EU Member States are deployed as analysts together with European officials in the EU Intelligence Centre (IntCen). The IntCen was established to make strategic analyses on the basis of intelligence of the various Member States, with the purpose of common foreign and security policy, and on the area of counter-terrorism.
IntCen is not an intelligence service, does not have special powers and therefore does not carry out intelligence gathering itself. IntCen also does not process personal data, it focuses solely on strategic analyses.
The contributions from the Member States are provided on a voluntary basis. The IntCen sends questions (requests for information) to the Member States, both to the Ministries of Foreign Affair as well as the respective intelligence and security services. The information that is shared can be  characterized as analytical material, in which available intelligence, insofar a contributing service can or is willing to release it, is processed. This component determines the [secrecy] classification of the information.

3 What is the legal basis for the organization and activities of IntCen?

IntCen was established shortly after the attacks of 9/11 by the Council of Europe as organic part of the Council Secretariat. Its name was EU SITCEN (EU Situation Centre, in Dutch: “situatiecentrum van de Europese Unie”). The Council Decision of July 26th 2010 to establish the organization and functioning of the European External Action Service (EEAS) (OJ L 201, 3.8.2010, p 30), determined in Article 4, paragraph sub a, third indent, that EU SITCEN has become part of the European External Action Service, under the direct authority and direct responsibility of the High Representative.
Through an internal decision by mid-March 2012, the EU SITCEN changed its name and has since been called EU IntCen. The core tasks of producing strategic analyses have not changed.
Given that SitCen only prepares strategic analyses, does not process personal data, does not gather intelligence and that information from the Member States is provided only on a voluntary basis, the Council considered that the establishment of SitCen did not require a special legal basis, and that SitCen could be set up in a similar manner as every organic part of the Council Secretariat. Additionally, the SitCen being part of the Council, it is subject to the same rules and legal control as the Council and the Council Secretariat. This situation has not changed with the transfer of SitCen to the European External Action Service, with the proviso that SitCen is expressly mentioned in the Council decision quoted above as one of the services which are transferred to the European External Action Service.

4 What is the formal legal status of IntCen? How does the legal status of IntCen relate to the legal status of the EEAS?

As indicated above, IntCen is an integral part of the EEAS, and thus operates within the same legal framework. This means in particular that the rules on the protection of personal data as they apply to the EU institutions are fully applicable to IntCen. Also, the European data protection controller is authorized to carry out oversight.
Moreover, all other rules that normally apply to the European institutions fully apply to IntCen. These rules include the rules on access to documents, the financial regulation, the rules on staff (including ethical standards for EU staff). All legal means normally available against decisions of European institutions are also open to the acts of IntCen as part of the EEAS. The European Ombudsman and the European Court of Justice are fully authorized to oversee the legality of acts of IntCen.

5 With which parties does IntCen share her gathered intelligence and analyses?

Analyses of IntCen be shared with the Member States of the European Union, and with relevant decision makers within the European Commission, EEAS and in some cases the Council, provided that such employees are in possession of the necessary ‘clearance’ issued by the Member States themselves.

6. Does IntCen use information and analysis of the Dutch intelligence and security services? If so, how is oversight on IntCen carried out by the Dutch Parliament, the judiciary, experts or other possible means?

Yes, the Netherlands is one of the Member States that analyzes information provided to IntCen. One AIVD officer is permanently detached at IntCen in Brussels. A secure digital connection with this officer is used for daily contact between the AIVD and IntCen.
For each of the intelligence and security services that share intelligence analyses with IntCen, their own national legal framework and monitoring mechanisms apply. In the case of the Netherlands, the information shared with IntCen is collected within the framework of the Dutch Intelligence and Security Act (Wiv2002) and under the supervision of the Dutch Review Committee on the Intelligence and Security Services (CTIVD).

7 How does IntCen relate to the Dutch intelligence and security services?

IntCen is one of the recipients of the intelligence analyses of the AIVD and the analyses of IntCen are shared with the AIVD.

8 Does the Dutch Court of Justice have jurisdiction in the event that the activities of the IntCen exceed the mandate or the legal basis of EU law? If so, what? If not, why not?

See the answer to question 4.

9 Does IntCen process personal data in the context of its intelligence activities? Is IntCen permitted to process personal data? If so, under what conditions? If so, how is the oversight on the processing of personal data organized?

No, IntCen does not carry out intelligence activities and does not process personal data. Also see the answer to questions 2 and 4.

10 To what extent is IntCen bound by privacy regulations of the European Union?

As indicated in the answer to question 4, all the European regulations on privacy fully apply to IntCen.

Full EU factsheet as published on 2015-02-05 (mirrored below for posterity):

Factsheet on EU Intelligence Analyses Center (INTCEN)

Summary: 5 February 2015, Brussels – The EU Intelligence Analysis Centre (EU INTCEN) is the exclusive civilian intelligence function of the European Union, providing indepth analysis for EU decision makers. Its analytical products are based on intelligence from the EU Member States’ intelligence and security services.

EU INTCEN’s mission is to provide intelligence analyses, early warning and situational awareness to the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Ms Federica Mogherini and to the European External Action Service (EEAS).

The Centre does this by monitoring and assessing international events, focusing particularly on sensitive geographical areas, terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and other global threats. EU INTCEN also offers its services to the various EU decision making bodies in the fields of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and counterterrorism (CT), as well as to the Member States. EU INTCEN is not an operational agency and does not have any collection capability. The operational level of intelligence is the member states’ responsibility. EU INTCEN only deals with strategic analysis.

History

The creation of the EU INTCEN – or the EU Situation Centre (EU SITCEN) as it was called until 2012 – is intimately linked to the establishment of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) and the creation of the post of High Representative in 1999. The development of the ESDP crisis management capabilities, and deployment of both civilian and military missions, made it clear that a broader intelligence analysis structure was needed. The events of 11 September 2001 and the increasing threats of global terrorism also emphasised the need of timely and accurate intelligence analysis to support EU policy making.

In 2002, EU SITCEN was established in the Council General Secretariat, directly attached to the office of the High Representative, Dr Javier Solana. The same year, staff from Member States’ intelligence services were seconded to EU SITCEN. In 2005, EU SITCEN was reinforced by the arrival of a team of counter-terrorist experts seconded from Member States’ security services. This enabled EU SITCEN to provide the Council with strategic terrorism threat assessments based on intelligence from national services.

In 2007, the EU SITCEN reinforced its collaboration with the EU Military Staff (EUMS) Intelligence Directorate by concluding a functional arrangement, the so-called Single Intelligence Analysis Capacity (SIAC). All intelligence assessments issued to Member States are joint products prepared under SIAC. With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty on 1 December 2009, EU SITCEN came under the authority of the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the Commission. On 1 January 2011, the EU SITCEN was transferred to the European External Action Service (EEAS). Following organisational changes in the EEAS in March 2012, the EU SITCEN was renamed into EU Intelligence Analysis Centre (EU INTCEN).

Main functions and tasks

•  Provide exclusive information that is not available overtly or provided elsewhere to the High Representative/Vice President and the PSC, based on contributions from Member States’ intelligence and security services;
•  Provide assessments and briefings and a range of products based on intelligence and open sources to the High Representative/Vice President and to the EEAS, to the various EU decision making bodies in the fields of CSFP/CSDP and CT, as well as to the Member States;
•  Act as a single entry point in the EU for classified information coming from Member States’ civilian intelligence and security services;
•  Support and assist the President of the European Council and the President of the European Commission in the exercise of their respective functions in the area of external relations.

 Sources, products and services

EU INTCEN’s analytical products are based on information provided by Member States’ security and intelligence services, open sources (media, websites, blogs etc.), diplomatic reporting, consular warden networks, international organisations, NGOs, CSDP missions and operations, EU Satellite Centre, visits and field trips.

EU INTCEN offers its customers the following products:

• Intelligence assessments: Long-term strategic papers, mainly based on intelligence.
• Intelligence reports: Follow-up of a crisis or an event, or a thematic paper focusing on a specific topic of current interest.
• Intelligence summaries: Focusing on current important events with a short intelligence based analysis.
• Threat assessments: Focusing on risks for EU personnel in a given country.

In addition to these products, EU INTCEN gives ad-hoc briefings, e.g. to the HR/VP, EU Special Representatives, various Council bodies and the European Parliament.

Structure

The EU INTCEN is a Directorate of the EEAS, reporting directly to the High Representative. It is composed of two Divisions: The Analysis Division and the General and External Relations Division.

Staff

The majority of EU INTCEN staff are EU officials and temporary agents. Furthermore a number of national experts from the security and intelligence services of the EU Member States are seconded to EU INTCEN.

Budget

The EU INTCEN does not have its own budget. All expenditure is paid from the EEAS budget. The needs for staff and budget are assessed in the same way and through the same procedures as for other EEAS departments. The EEAS budget is broken down and managed for the headquarters as a whole by nature of expenditure (e.g. staff, buildings, information and communication technologies) and not by department.

Legal basis

The EU INTCEN (EU Intelligence Analysis Centre) is the successor of the EU Situation Centre (EU SITCEN), which is mentioned in Article 4, paragraph 3, sub (a), third indent of the Council Decision (2010/427/EU) of 26 July 2010 on establishing the organisation and functioning of the European External Action Service. The reference to the EU SITCEN in the Council Decision serves as legal basis for EU INTCEN, which took over the intelligence and analytical tasks of EU SITCEN.

UPDATES (new to old)

UPDATE 2018-12-xx: Intelligence Support for EU Security Policy – Options for Enhancing the Flow of Information and Political Oversight (mirror: .pdf). Abstract: “Since 2015, security cooperation between European Union (EU) member states has progressed at an accelerated pace. For the Union’s foreign, security, and defence policy, there is the prospect that increased cooperation and enhanced arms cooperation will create more international capacity to act. As far as internal security is con­cerned, the continuing threat of terrorism is spurring the establishment of a “Euro­pean Security Union” based on an intensive exchange of information between security authorities. In the shadow of these developments is the question of the extent to which European intelligence cooperation should also be promoted. In this particularly sensitive area, no steps towards integration that would attract public attention are to be expected. However, existing approaches to intelligence support for EU security policy should be deepened and better monitored.”

UPDATE 2017-10-05: German spy officials dismiss calls to create European intelligence agency (IntelNews)

UPDATE 2017-09-13: EU intelligence agency not a priority (Nikolaj Nielsen, EU Observer)

UPDATE 2017-07-17: Counter-terrorism recommendations from 2006 declassified (Statewatch) — policy paper drafted on the basis of IntCen papers (IntCen was then known as Joint Situation Centre, or SitCen); refers to the Dutch-initiated Terrorism Work Group (TWG). Also, unrelated: a Master’s Thesis: Intelligence Effectiveness in the EU in the New Security Environment (.pdf, by Constantin-Marian Birsan, U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, December 2012) and another Master’s Thesis: The Post-9/11 European Union Counterterrorism Response: Legal-Institutional Framework (.pdf, by Bozenko Devoic, U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, December 2012).

UPDATE 2015-02-11: Secrecy reigns at the EU’s Intelligence Analysis Centre (.pdf, 2013, Statewatch) — analysis by Chris Jones / Statewatch.

UPDATE 2015-02-09: the Draft Council Conclusions on Counter-Terrorism (.pdf, Feb 6) state: “Reinforcing, within the existing parameters, the role of EU INTCEN as the hub for strategic intelligence assessment at EU level, including on counter-terrorism”. I.e., no new mandate for EU intelligence centre.

UPDATE 2013-11-05: Viviane Reding: “The NSA needs a counterweight. My [proposal is] to set up a European Intelligence Service by 2020.”

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