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Outlines of priorities and focus for the Dutch General & Military Intelligence and Security Service in 2020 (AIVD & MIVD)

On 19 December 2019, the Dutch government sent the outlines of the 2020 year plan (in Dutch) of the General Intelligence & Security Service (AIVD) — here — and the Military Intelligence & Security Service (MIVD) — here — to the parliament. In Dutch it is referred to as “Jaarplanbrief”, which literally translates to “Year Plan Letter”.

The remainder of this post consists of a translation of the section “Priorities and focus” in both letters, ±1000 words in total.


AIVD Priorities and focus 2020

Jihadist terrorism

The jihadist-terrorist threat picture is generally unchanged and is an important priority for the AIVD. The situation is still characterised by a threat of attacks in the West emanating from both globally active jihadist organisations and local networks and individuals. Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) and al-Qaeda (AQ) have been the main exogenous jihadist threats for some time. Both organisations are still focused on carrying out attacks in the West. In addition, ISIS and AQ encourage their jihadist supporters in the West to carry out attacks independently.

The threat picture is also determined by returnees. In general, returnees have a higher threat profile than jihadists who have never travelled to a combat zone). Among the men in particular there is evidence of combat and explosion training, combat experience, tenacity and transnational jihadist contacts. When they return they can use these experiences and contacts to strengthen and/or mobilise local networks into violent action. The AIVD continues to deploy a substantial part of the available resources and capabilities to investigate terrorist threats by maintaining its intelligence positions at the desired level. In this context, the (inter)national cooperation with partner organisations, including the Counter Terrorism Group (CTG), is also being shaped.

Radicalisation

Radicalisation of various population groups In the Netherlands, the AIVD is concerned about and prompted to intensify its investigations into this issue. In its investigations into radicalisation from an Islamic perspective, the AIVD focuses on non-violent radical Islam in the Netherlands in general. Extra focus is placed on the drivers of non-violent radical Islam. The AIVD also investigates Salafist institutions in the Netherlands. The focus here is on the funding itself and its influence and interference.

Extremism

The research efforts in the field of extremism will be continued. The focus of research remains on the, sometimes violent, hard core of left-wing and right-wing extremists.

Anti-Islam feelings, fear of loss of national identity and ethnonationalism are the most important motives within the current right-wing extremist movement. An increasingly violent discourse is visible among right-wing extremists on social media in particular. In addition, right-wing terrorist attacks abroad can lead to copying behaviour. This broadens the AIVD’s field of attention from a right-wing extremist to (potentially) a right-wing terrorist threat. Clarification of the potential threat is essential if we are to offer our chain partners and authorities the prospect of action at national and local level.

Left-wing extremism in the Netherlands is characterised by individual or group activities in areas such as anti-fascism, asylum and immigration policy and anarchism. Dutch left-wing extremists/activists are often active on several themes.

Proliferation

Weapons of mass destruction pose a major threat to international peace and security. The Netherlands has signed treaties aimed at countering the proliferation of such weapons. The AIVD and the MIVD jointly investigate countries suspected of developing or already possessing weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery in violation of these treaties.

Investigations on countries

The AIVD conducts investigations in other countries in order to provide the Dutch government with background information and prospects for action. This information can be used in consultations on subjects affecting Dutch national and international political interests. Geo-political and other developments around the world determine which countries are investigated by the AIVD.

Espionage and undesirable foreign interference

States often use digital means to gain access to vital parts of Dutch society, such as the energy or telecom sector, in order to be able to commit sabotage in this way. Russia, China and Iran, among others, show excessive interest in information from the Netherlands and companies operating in the Netherlands. All these activities can damage Dutch national security, sovereignty and economic interests. In 2020 the AIVD will expand its investigative capabilities against the use of digital resources by other countries.

In addition to the deployment of digital means of spying, in 2020 foreign powers will also continue to carry out traditional intelligence activities in the Netherlands or against Dutch interests. The main objective of espionage activities is the gathering of (secret) information in the fields of politics, defence, science and economics. In addition, they develop activities to surreptitiously influence political and economic decision-making or public opinion.

Information security

High-quality digital attacks, by Russia, China and Iran among others, aimed at espionage, influence, sabotage or terrorism pose a major and increasing threat to the integrity and confidentiality of the Dutch government. The AIVD provides (external) stakeholders with information security advice. This is done by the National Communications Security Agency (NBV), which also develops and evaluates security products for securing state secret and sensitive information.

Unprecedented threat

The AIVD’s investigations are aimed not only at providing an insight into all aspects of existing, already known threats, but also at the timely identification and identification of as yet unknown threats, both within and outside the GAI&V.

MIVD Priorities and focus 2020

Investigations on countries and mission areas

In 2020, the MIVD will conduct research into Afghanistan, Syria and Iraq, among other things. It also supports the deployment of Dutch military personnel in the context of enhanced forward presence (eFP). Together with the AIVD, the MIVD also investigates developments in the Kingdom’s overseas territories.

Counterproliferation

The MIVD and the AIVD jointly investigate countries suspected of developing or already possessing weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery in violation of treaties. This investigation will be continued in 2020.

Military technological developments and proliferation

The MIVD also conducts research into military technological developments and the proliferation of high-grade military technology and weapon systems to crisis areas, so that the Dutch armed forces can be properly equipped against existing and future threats. This research will also be continued in 2020.

Espionage and influence

Espionage, influence and sabotage are a constant threat to the Netherlands and its allies. States with great geopolitical ambitions are looking for information to modernise their armed forces, strengthen their economies or influence political decision-making. This can be classic espionage, digital espionage or a combination of both. Hacking offers opportunities for sabotage and influencing political and administrative decision-making or public opinion. By means of takeovers or investments, states also try to obtain information or create strategic dependencies. The MIVD investigates these themes from a military perspective. In 2020, the MIVD will increase its commitment to these themes.

Radicalisation and extremism

Research into possible forms of radicalisation among defence personnel will be continued in 2020. The aim of this research is to identify undesirable behaviour in good time. The MIVD advises on the measures to be taken to identify and deal with these threats. Promoting awareness and understanding requires permanent attention.

20 December: Russian state security officers’ annual professional holiday (since 1995)

In April 1995, KGB-successor FSB was born under president Boris Yeltsin. In a presidential decree that Yeltsin issued that same year, 20 December aka Chekist Day was appointed as annual professional holiday for Russian state security officers.

The choice for that date can be traced back to 20 December 1917: the day Cheka agency was born, “the first of a succession of Soviet secret-police organizations”. The UK government has a short piece on it: What’s the Context? 20 December 1917: formation of the Cheka, the first Soviet security and intelligence agency. Also, on 20 December 1920, the Cheka’s Foreign Department was born — a predecessor of the KGB’s First Chief Directorate.

From a layman’s perspective I’m curious what meaning that day holds to present-day officers, considering that the date also bears an association with historical political persecutions by Cheka. I have no answer that question; but did find a relevant interview with FSB director Nikolai Patrushev that was published in daily tabloid Komsomolskaya Pravda on 20 December 2000 (a few months after Vladimir Putin was elected).

The remainder of this post consists of an automated translation (using DeepL) of that interview; some 2800 words. The translation is legible, but beware non-obvious inaccuracies. That being said, I found it worth taking note of.


FEDERAL SECURITY SERVICE

IF WE “BREAK DOWN” AND LEAVE THE CAUCASUS, THE COUNTRY WILL COLLAPSE.
Nikolai Patrushev

“Komsomolskaya Pravda”, December 20, 2000.

WHAT’S THE HOLIDAY IN THE LUBYANKA TODAY?

  • Mykola Platonovych, you always emphasize that the FSB is a new domestic intelligence service. And at the same time, the Day of Chekist is celebrated on December 20 – on this day in 1917 the Chekist Committee was created. Is there no contradiction here, which gives the ill-wishers an excuse to claim that “the spirit of nostalgia for the former omnipotence of the Soviet intelligence services is hovering on Lubyanka”?
  • We’re not sneaking around, calling the FSB a new security service. It was created in April 1995 on the basis of the Federal Counterintelligence Service. That year, laws were adopted that opened a new stage in the development of domestic security agencies – “On Bodies of the Federal Security Service” and “On the Operational and Search Activities”. For the first time in the history of the country, including the Tsarist period, the legislator regulated the activities (including tacit) of intelligence services, outlined the tasks and functions of the FSB, defined its rights and powers, prescribed mechanisms of state and public control over its activities. This is a qualitative difference from those times when the activities of state security agencies were dominated by the principle of partyhood, i.e. the supremacy of interests of the ruling party (or, more precisely, its top). Loyalty to the law, not to anybody, work only in the legal field – a guarantee of not repeating the tragic pages of the past. This is a sensible position of today’s generation of Lubyanka employees.

We have not given up our past, honestly said: “The history of Lubyanka of the passing century is our history, no matter how bitter and tragic it may be”. Everything in it that works for the benefit of Russian statehood, serves the interests of development and prosperity of Russia, its national security, should be preserved and multiplied.

It was December 20 that was unofficially celebrated for many decades as “the day of the Chekist” in the teams of state security officers. The decree on this, signed exactly five years ago, demonstrated demand for and social significance of the work of security service employees. And the departmental sign of the FSB combines the two-headed eagle of Tsarist Russia and “shield and sword” – a traditional symbol of the Soviet era security services.

  • What toast, by tradition, will be the first in the circle of counterintelligence on the day of professional holiday?
  • You must be impressed by movies like “National Security Agent” and think that the whole FSB will be “buzzing” in the morning. No, of course not. The units will hold personnel meetings, hand out certificates and departmental insignia, congratulate the veterans, visit the families of the victims. And when we gather at the festive tables in the evening, we will definitely wish good luck to our colleagues who are currently on a mission: in Chechnya, at checkpoints, in operations – to get out of the fight alive. And a third toast to those who haven’t returned – that stack will be very bitter… After all, the FSB is a fighting organization. We honor the memory of our fallen comrades, constantly taking care of their families, helping widows to solve domestic problems, raising children. This is one side of our corporate brotherhood, our best traditions.

WHAT DOES THE FSB DO IN CHECHNYA?

  • What tasks were a priority for your department in the past year?
  • First of all, it’s the fight against terrorism. We should not have allowed a repetition of the terrible tragedies of “black September” last year, when 305 people died. I would like to note at once that in 2000 law enforcement agencies prevented another 13 explosions of powerful explosive devices, including six in Moscow, five in Pyatigorsk, one each in Buynaksk and Vladikavkaz.

Investigations into the September bombings of residential buildings clearly showed that the traces of the crime were in Chechnya, which during the years of the Dudayev and Maskhadov regimes became a springboard for the forces of international terrorism. It would have been impossible to protect the population of Chechnya from terror without defeating the militant groups, depriving them of their training bases and resources, and freeing the republic from the criminal and terrorist clique that had seized it.

Modern terrorism is a complex social and political phenomenon, and Chechnya is only one of the nodal points on its map. The ability of our people to defend themselves is being tested there. If we break down, leave the Caucasus, the process of irreversible collapse of the country will begin. The state will expressed in 1999 – for the first time in recent years – is the guarantee that this will not happen.

  • “Komsomolka” has repeatedly written about the threat of pseudo-Islamic Muslim extremism. Does the FSB share this concern?
  • To the fullest extent, and you are right to raise this issue. The threat is really great, but you can only fight it in the legal field. For example, Wahhabism is prohibited by law in the Republic of Dagestan.
  • According to your estimates, in what condition are the leaders of Chechen fighters currently in? Have the military, border guards, the Interior Ministry and the Federal Security Service managed to seriously impede the inflow of mercenaries into gangs, limit the flow of money and arms of the terrorist?
  • One of the tasks is to uncover and cut off the channels of resource supply for the militants. But we are also responsible for investigation and prevention of terrorist attacks, search for the leaders of the separatists, participants in the attacks on Budennovsk, Kizlyar and Pervomaiskoye and armed invasion of the Republic of Dagestan. Recently our officers detained former chief of the so-called “special service of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria” Atgeriev. Work on the leaders of the militants continues…

I will highlight the problem of mercenarism in particular. Recently FSB officers detained in Chechnya a native of Iraq, Abd al-Aziz Mohammed Abd al-Wahhab. This adherent of “Wahhabism ideas” not only took part in illegal armed formation, conducted ideological processing of its members, but also kidnapped, tortured and raped 4 women, turning them into slaves.

In the passing year illegal activities of foreign security services in the North Caucasus that were carried out under the cover of international organization Khalo-Trust were revealed. Its activists assisted Chechen militants in training local subversives.

The separatists continue their attempts to stir up tension in the neighbouring Russian regions of Chechnya – Ingushetia, Dagestan, Karachay-Cherkessia, Kabardino-Balkaria. There is information about attempts by extremist leaders to establish militant bases here and to involve certain ethnic groups and supporters of various Islamic currents in armed conflict with federal forces. Therefore, there will be a long and difficult struggle to preserve the territorial integrity of the country, interfaith harmony and peace and tranquillity of our multi-ethnic people. I am talking about this directly, without hiding anything in front of the million audience of Komsomolka.

SHOULD ONE FEAR THE CHEKISTS IN POWER?

  • Coming to the higher echelons of power of people who started their way in special services, generates different conversations – up to categorical statements about “threat to democracy”…
  • This thesis, willingly picked up in some media, is, in my opinion, an attempt to “demonize” the former employees of SVR and FSB who came into power. The aim is understandable – to create an image of some “dark force” defending not the national, but its own narrowly corporate interests, and thus to weaken the resource of people’s trust in the new leadership of the country. The appearance of people in the Old Square, in the Kremlin and in the regions who have completed the school of leadership in the national security structures is a vital necessity to pour “fresh blood” into the Russian management corps, an aspiration to use the potential of responsible and organized people who have preserved, despite everything, the “spirit of public service. I know many of them well. They are modern thinkers, educated people. They are not unwilling idealists, but tough pragmatists who understand the logic of international and domestic political developments, emerging contradictions and threats. At the same time, they understand well the impossibility of returning to the old, the need to develop the country based on a reasonable combination of liberal and traditional values.

HOW DOES COUNTERINTELLIGENCE “CATCH MICE”?

  • What other priority lines of work did the FSB have in the past year?
  • These are the fight against the intelligence and subversive activities of foreign intelligence services, work to identify and prevent threats to economic security, fight corruption, illegal export of goods, smuggling of drugs and weapons, cultural values.
  • Can we elaborate on the fight against espionage?
  • Special services of foreign states have made significant efforts to expand operational positions in Russia. One of the main goals was to identify the true plans of the new government of Russia on both domestic and foreign policy issues. The activities of foreign intelligence services in the Russian direction are now more coordinated than ever. Intelligence of the leading NATO countries today is “welcome guests” in most European countries that were formerly part of the Warsaw Pact, as well as in the Baltic States. However, the main danger is that Western intelligence, through its residences, conducts its own intelligence from the territories of these states, including operations of communication with Russian citizens’ agents. Thus, this year counterintelligence arrested a British and Estonian intelligence agent. In the recent past, he was a senior officer of one of the Russian security services and used his connections among the security services, political and business circles to gather information.

The FSB bodies were aimed at protecting our scientific and technical potential, unique breakthrough technologies and developments, without which the country’s revival is impossible. Here too, the case of Edmond Pope, a former career U.S. Naval Intelligence Officer, is landmark. In the muddy waters, foreign intelligence businessmen were very comfortable. For a penny, it was possible to acquire know-how that had been created by thousands of people. In the Pope case, Russia showed that time was running out. The country’s leadership let the international community know that it was defending its national interests strictly and fundamentally. And the president’s decision to pardon Pope, the very time of its adoption, is a demonstration of good will.

In October 1999, Sutyagin, an employee of the US and Canadian Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences, was detained. The investigation revealed the facts of spying activities of his connection – an American citizen Joshua Handler, a specialist in nuclear safety, who is now in the United States. It has been preliminary established that Handler received from Sutyagin secret information about the Russian Armed Forces and passed it on to U.S. intelligence agencies. Unfortunately, some journalists, unaware of this, show Sutyagin in their publications as “an honest and courageous citizen who advocates democratic freedoms.

SO WHAT IS THE POWER, IF NOT MONEY?

  • What does the FSB keep smart people who, as far as we know, work for a modest salary?
  • I do not want to say high words, but our best employees, the honor and pride of the FSB, do not work for money. When I have to hand out government awards to our guys, I look at their faces. High intellectuals-analysts, broad-shouldered weathered Special Forces fighters, silent bomb technicians, strict investigators, discreet opera scouts… Outwardly, they are different, but there is one important quality that unites them – these are serving people, if you like, modern “neophytes”. On the obelisk to an FSB officer, Hero of Russia, who died in the Caucasus, there are lines, it seems to me, accurately conveying the moral “core” of our people: “Service to the Fatherland, friendship to comrades, heart to loved ones, honor to no one. Service gives a sense of involvement in a great state affair, the excitement of struggle, when you defeat an opponent better equipped and “paid”, an enemy brazen and confident, who thinks that there are no real professionals left on Lubyanka. This will not replace even the highest salary of a private guard. He works for his master, and we – for the state. Remember the words of the protagonist in the movie “Brother-2”: “Not in money strength, American, but in truth”? That’s the truth the FSB is fighting for…

Although I do not condemn those who have to leave the service due to the difficult financial situation of their families. It’s only bitter that I can’t do anything… People in epaulets hope that the state, the new leadership of the country, which knows their problems firsthand, will approach with attention the long overdue issue of improving the living standards of soldiers.

  • Tell us about those of your subordinates who did heroic deeds in the passing year.
  • This year six employees of the FSB were awarded the title of Hero of the Russian Federation. Captain Igor Yatskov was posthumously awarded the title of Hero of the Russian Federation. As part of the advanced units of the 136th Motorized Rifle Brigade near the village of Kiri of the Cheberloyevsky district of the Chechen Republic on January 11, 2000, he took part in a battle with superior forces of the militants. Having received several serious wounds, the officer, bleeding out, remained in the ranks. Captain Alexei Gorbunov, Major Andrei Chirikhin, FSB special forces officers Valery Alexandrov, Mikhail Seregin, Nikolai Shchekochikhin, Major Alexander Alimov and others were awarded the Order of Courage (posthumously).
  • You are a man, for obvious reasons, “closed”. And yet, how do you rest? What do you manage to read?
  • I’m the one who really likes the phrase: “My hobby is work” (laughs). Our work needs to be given in its entirety, it requires you everything. How am I resting? I like to play volleyball. I was serious when I was a student. It’s a collective sport. And it’s like our job: defense and assault… It’s a good way to switch hunting. I’ve been into it for a long time, just like fishing.

I start my day by watching fresh newspapers, and of course, “Komsomolka” is one of the first…

  • What would you like to wish your employees today through “Komsomolka”?
  • I wish them and their families, our veterans, everyone who helps us in the difficult task of protecting the homeland, I wish them health and fortitude.

PERSONAL BUSINESS:
Patrushev Nikolay Platonovich was born in 1951 in Leningrad in the family of a sailor. After graduating from the Leningrad Shipbuilding Institute, he worked there for some time. After joining the state security bodies, he received professional training in Minsk KGB school. Then he worked for a long time on various positions in the KGB in Leningrad region. In 1992 he was appointed Minister of Security of Karelia. In 1994, he was transferred to Moscow. Since August 1999, he has been Director of the FSB of Russia. Colonel-General.

Patrushev’s wife – doctor, specialist in ultrasound. The family has two sons.

At leisure, Nikolai Platonovich manages to read books, but, as he himself admitted, prefers “short forms” – it’s painfully short time. For example, he reads Chekhov and Zoshchenko’s stories in the mood.

EVERYTHING:
Experts have not yet “come to terms” with a specific date on which to count down the history of national security. But its milestones have been established precisely: the Order of Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich’s Secret Affairs, the Preobrazhensky Order, the Secret Search Cases of Peter the Great’s Office, the Secret Expedition to the Senate, the Special Chancellery of the Ministry of Police of Alexander I, the III Division of Emperors Nicholas I and Alexander II’s own Office, the State Police Department, the Special Division of the Police Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and a number of other structures. As for counterintelligence itself, its “birthday” in the course of scientific discussions was determined on January 21 (old style) 1903. On this day, Nicholas II decided to create in the structure of the General Staff of the Russian Army, the first in the history of the country, a permanent special unit to fight against espionage – the “Exploration Department”. Its first chief was gendarmerie company minister Vladimir Nikolaevich Lavrov. The Day of the Security Bodies Employee is also a professional holiday of the employees of SVR, FAPSI, FSO, GUSP, FPS – structures that were born in the early 90s on the basis of a number of departments of the USSR KGB. It is a holiday of all those who protect the interests of the Fatherland.

EOF

Physical Counter Surveillance – Dry Cleaning and Evading Capture

In a meeting with a former counter-intelligence practitioner I first learned of ‘dry cleaning’ as tradecraft jargon in the realm of countersurveillance. Willam E. Dyson’s book Terrorism – An Investigator’s Handbook, 4th Edition (2015; first edition published in 2011) defines it as follows:

dry cleaning A process by which a subject takes actions that enable him to “lose” anyone who is attempting to follow him. A person may “dry clean” himself by entering a crowded movie theater and leaving soon after through a rear door. Undercover officers and informants should also undertake “dry cleaning” maneuvers before meeting each other.

The Terms & Definitions of Interest for DoD Counterintelligence Professionals (.pdf, 2011) from the U.S. Office of Counterintelligence (DXC), part of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), contains a definition taken from an old manual of the Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI):

Dry Cleaning. [Tradecraft jargon] Any technique used to elude surveillance. A usual precaution used by intelligence personnel when actively engaged in an operation. (AFOSI Manual 71-142, 9 Jun 2000)

Following the meeting I did a bit of self-study and came across a reposted text apparently once shared at the now-defunct forum at XtremeRoot.net. I’m reposting it here because 1) it is IMO a useful read that covers (a subset of) aspects that also came up in said meeting, and 2) LOCKSS. I could not readily identify whom to contact to ask for permission to re-post it here. If you’re the author, feel free to contact me (see sidebar).

Further reading on this topic (friendly reminder: always apply critical thinking):

Traditional humint tradecraft presumably remains a key aspect of modern intelligence, notwithstanding the tech-heavy era we now live in. And be reminded that technology can fail — for instance by accident, by sabotage or (indirectly) by adversarial interception/surveillance.

NOTE: everything below this line is NOT authored by me, except for one [NOTE: (…)] block that I added.


I recently underwent some counter surveillance training, and it was one of the most exciting things I’ve ever done. As such, I thought I’d write up a short tutorial based on what I was taught and what I went through. This is all related to personal counter surveillance – i.e. preventing people following you.

There are 3 major parts to counter surveillance:
1) Planning
2) Identification – Spotting people who may be following you and verifying their intent.
3) Evasion – Making it difficult to follow you by performing certain maneuvers and following certain rules.

These principles, when put together, form something called a cleaning run. Its objective is to get you to a destination whilst identifying and losing any tail you might have.

Planning
The basic rules of a cleaning run are as follows:

  • Give yourself roughly double to triple the amount of time usually needed to get to the destination. A cleaning run can last up to 3 hours!
  • Plan your journey before heading out.
  • Move across a large geographic area.
  • Act naturally.
  • Try to spend at least 50% of your journey in areas that are not covered by CCTV.
  • Vary your transport method. Travel by bus, tram, train and taxi as well as on foot.
  • Be aware of your surroundings and the people nearby.
  • Be prepared! You need a pen, paper, envelope, stamps and enough cash for transport and visits to cafes / coffee shops. If you smoke, take some cigarettes and a lighter too.

The first step is to plan your journey. Start in an arbitrary direction, heading nowhere near your destination. You need to visit a variety of locations including quiet suburbs and busy city centres. Try to make the path you take relatively realistic (e.g. don’t walk round a block twice) and make it look like you have a reason to go to certain places along the way. You need at least two locations that will be almost entirely deserted – large open areas like parks are excellent for spotting someone following you. Make sure that your route crosses a few bridges and goes down some small side streets. You need to be able to stop off frequently at shops and other attractions. Look up timetables for buses, trams and trains, and use these services in your journey. You’ll also want to find places with post boxes and phone boxes, as they can provide some useful distractions.

Identification
Before you can shake a tail, you need to identify it. The best way to do this is to spot people you have seen before. A professional team can consist of 10 or more people, of which 2 or 3 at a time will follow you. They do a hand over periodically and try to avoid re-using the same members so that you don’t notice the tail. The “tried and tested” positioning system is to have one person follow directly behind you and another follow on the other side of the road further behind. If a third person is used, they are usually kept further back. If they think you’ve identified an agent, they’ll pull them out and replace them if possible.

The following things about a person can help you identify them as a tail:

  • If there are multiple agents, expect 90% of them to be 30 years old or less.
  • A professional team member usually has a precise watch. You can spot these quite easily if you’re close by.
  • They will change their course when you stop or change your course.
  • They will avoid looking directly at you, or stare.
  • Untrained people in a team might talk into their sleeve or talk to themselves.
  • If there are only one or two agents and they are associated with the police (CID, SOCA, etc), they will usually be wearing a suit (this is true for the UK, at least).
  • When waiting, they will usually loiter aimlessly or appear fascinated by a mundane sign or poster.

When walking down quiet roads it is easy to notice someone following you. However, it is difficult to turn round and get a good look at them without them noticing. One great method to this is to enter a shop and purchase something. As you enter, glance behind you to see if anyone is there. If there is, hold the door for them. When you leave, go back the way you came for a while, then turn off and go another direction. You can usually identify at least one surveillance member this way.

In places with some traffic, cross over at an intersection. If you’re on the left of the street turn right and vice versa. This gives you chance to stop and look around as if you were checking for traffic. If you cross at a pedestrian crossing, pretend to press the button but don’t. This gives you time to stop and look around longer, making anyone following you quite obvious.

Small bridges and alleys can make great choke points. Be aware that isolated areas might be problematic because they might confront you, so try to pick areas with at least a few people around. If you smoke, stop to light up as you walk down a choke point. Stand sideways so that you can see both directions. This means that anyone following you will have to walk straight past, so you can easily identify them. You could also stop to write an SMS message – it’s feasible that you can’t walk and text at the same time. If you do this, start writing it and stop after the 4th or 5th letter. Most people will at least try to write and walk before failing!

In larger shops, stand and browse the magazines. You can use the short periods between picking up each magazine to glance in a direction to look for anyone you remember from before, or anyone looking at you. Untrained people will often behave unusually and can easily give themselves away in certain situations. They may stare intently at you, or completely avoid making eye contact. In the case of the ones who are quite obviously attempting to watch you without directly looking, orchestrate your path so that you walk past them, then stop and ask the time. This usually shocks and disorientates them, and they’ll usually get flustered and stutter their reply.

Use your pen and paper to jot down short descriptions of people that might be following you and anyone that you see twice. You can buy a newspaper and use the crossword to jot things down too. If you see someone twice in two far apart areas, you’re probably being followed. The same applies if you see the same person three times as you’re performing your run.

A clever trick is to scan for Bluetooth devices nearby when sat around. If you see the same name twice, you have a tail. [NOTE: one probably should not carry any electronic device to a secret meeting to begin with, except burners — which still requires tradecraft. Radio emissions — and not only Bluetooth or Wi-Fi — should be assumed to be unique fingerprints.]

Evasion
Once you’ve spotted the people you want to escape, you need to start doing things to divert their attention from you to thin out the crowd. The text-book stuff like dodging down an alley or switching back on yourself is way too obvious and a professional will be able to handle it easily.

Organise your journey so that you arrive at a train station, get your tickets, then have to wait 10 minutes in the coffee shop before boarding a train. If possible, use the automated ticket machine and jump in just before someone else gets in the queue behind you. This helps stop agents from shoulder-surfing to find out where you’re going, or listening in on your conversation with the ticket office person. Wait until the last minute before moving to the platform, or sit on the wrong platform until your train is announced and then move to the correct one. Sit as close to a door as possible so you can see the entire carriage.

When travelling by bus, pay for a ticket to the furthest destination it goes to, then get off before that stop. This helps divert resources and prevent any surveillance teams from setting up in a target location. If you can sit at the back do so, as you can see where everybody is. On double-decker buses you might want to sit up top to make it more obvious if you’re being followed.

Towards the final quarter of your run, make it look like you’re doing something sinister. Go to a phonebox and call the number of a small computer shop. Ask something like “how much is your cheapest SATA hard drive?” and write down the price and a random postal code that’s near the computer shop. Write a single letter on the bottom of the paper to make it more confusing, then place it on top of the phone unit and leave the box. This will look like you’re trying to perform a dead-drop, so an agent would investigate. This reduces the number of people following you. You can then go into another phone box, fumble around underneath it to make it look like you’re grabbing something that’s taped to the bottom, get out an envelope and pretend to put this non-existent thing inside it, attach a stamp, write an address on there (somewhere around five miles away) and go post it in a postbox. An agent will need to get someone to open the phone box, so this will delay them further.

Strike up a conversation with someone in the street to make it look like that’s who you went to go see. This is best done in a quiet area, so you can watch the people nearby.

You can perform a covert U-turn by walking past a shop and showing some interest in it (stare at it as you walk) and then stopping 20 feet down the road as you very obviously check your watch. Stare at your watch for a second, then turn back and go to that shop. This makes it look like you couldn’t decide if you had time to go to the shop. Some poorly trained agents might just stop still and stare at you gormlessly if you do this.

In extreme circumstances, you can go for certain overt techniques that give away the fact that you know you’re being followed:

  • Do a U-turn whilst walking and check out everyone who looks at you.
  • Do the whole “tying my shoelace” thing. It can mean agents have to be dropped because they have to pass you, but it’s very obvious and you can’t actually identify them easily.
  • Ask someone you think is tailing you for a lighter. Strike up conversation about the weather or contemplate them on their hair, shirt or watch if they have to spend more than 5 seconds fumbling around for it.
  • Dodge down an alleyway quickly or move in a circuitous through a store with multiple exits. These allow you to shake a tail, but make it obvious that you are immediately wary of someone following you.
  • Sit in a coffee shop and wait until you see someone that you know is following you. As you get up to leave, they will look over. Stare directly at them and wave before leaving.
  • Use a payphone to call for three taxis. Book one from your current location (or nearby) to position A, and book the other two from near position A to position B. Take only one of the second taxis, then have them drop you off slightly outside location B. If they’re resourceful enough to be able to pull phone records, they’ll spend resources trying to find out who you called and where you asked to go to. Once they discover you have called 3 taxis, they’ll know something is odd.

[…]

[Dutch] Kwetsbare Pulse Connect Secure SSL-VPNs in Nederlandse IP-adresruimte: bevindingen en gedachten

Klik hier om voorbij de updates te skippen en direct naar de oorspronkelijke publicatie te gaan.

  • UPDATE 2021-04-20: een onbekende kritieke bug (0-day) in Pulse Connect Secure >=9.0R3 wordt actief uitgebuit door, allegedly, “Chinese-backed state hackers”: CVE-2021-22893 = preauth RCE, CVSSv3.1 Base Score = 10 (hoogst mogelijke score). Leverancier Pulse Secure, sinds vorig jaar eigendom van Ivanti, hoopt in mei een spoedpatch uit brengen. Tot die tijd kan een workaround worden toegepast. Zie US-CERT Alert (AA21-110A), NCSC-2021-0345 en deze post van FireEye: Check Your Pulse: Suspected APT Actors Leverage Authentication Bypass Techniques and Pulse Secure Zero-Day.
  • UPDATE 2020-08-17: Overheid wist wie kwetsbaar was, maar liet bedrijven toch gehackt worden (FD) en ‘Overheid waarschuwt bedrijven niet altijd bij hack’ (NOS).

    Heel zuur. De kern van het verhaal: reeds in augustus 2019 waren bij NCSC lijsten van kwetsbare Pulse-systemen bekend, maar (mede) doordat het NCSC ingevolge hun (beperkte) mandaat niet alle informatie heeft doorgezet zijn sommige Nederlandse systemen in mei/juni 2020 alsnog gecompromitteerd. Informatie over systemen die niet onder rijk/vitaal vallen is door het NCSC niet doorgezet aan de betrokken organisaties.

    Organisaties, vitaal of niet-vitaal, zijn en blijven verantwoordelijk voor hun eigen informatiebeveiliging. Maar dat betekent niet dat áls je informatie hebt over actuele kwetsbaarheden, het acceptabel is dat die informatie niet terechtkomt bij die organisaties. Mij was destijds niet bekend dat het NCSC uit zulke lijsten alleen vitaal & rijk doorzette en niets deed (c.q. mocht doen) met de informatie over andere systemen, waaronder systemen van zorginstellingen en enkele van de nu alsnog gecompromitteerde bedrijven. Dat is me pas duidelijk geworden in de nasleep.

    Herhaling voorkomen eist herziening v/d status quo, waaronder mogelijk het aanpassen v/h mandaat van NCSC zodat zij die informatie wél mogen doorzetten.

    Mijn persoonlijke mening is dat organisaties — ongeacht welke — bij kwetsbaarheden v/d ernst van Pulse/Forti/Palo/Citrix/etc. niet alleen moeten worden gemaild (zoals DIVD normaal gesproken doet, o.a. via het Security Meldpunt) maar dat er ook ‘actief’ 1-op-1 contact moet zijn, bijvoorbeeld telefonisch. Een e-mail belandt nog wel ‘s in een spambox of wordt om andere reden gemist of niet doorgezet. Dat is ook de reden dat de meeste pentestbedrijven bij het aantreffen van hoge en kritieke risico’s hun klant direct bellen en niet alleen per e-mail informeren (en in onversleutelde e-mail ook nooit concrete kwetsbaarheden benoemen).

  • UPDATE 2020-08-04: Hacker leaks passwords for 900+ enterprise VPN servers (ZDNet). Kwaadwillenden lijken in juni/juli aanvallen te hebben uitgevoerd op ~900 Pulse-systemen wereldwijd. Van een grote reeks organisaties zijn o.a. inloggegevens gelekt via webfora. Dit is in omvang/scope het grootste openbaar bekende incident met ongepatchte Pulse-systemen tot nu toe.
  • UPDATE 2020-06-03: Field Note on CVE-2019-11510: Pulse Connect Secure SSL-VPN in the Netherlands, gepubliceerd in ACM DTRAP Vol. 1 Issue 2, mei 2020. Bedoeld als discussiestuk hopende de passiviteit c.q. angst c.q. risicomijdendheid te doorbreken: we moeten m.i. (doorgaan met) proactief scannen bij nieuwe kritieke kwetsbaarheden. Daar zitten juridische, ethische, organisatorische en technische aspecten aan. De Field Note bevat daarover een aantal vragen om de gedachten te prikkelen. Citeren kan als:
    Matthijs Koot. 2020. Field Note on CVE-2019-11510: Pulse Connect Secure SSL-VPN in the Netherlands. Digital Threats: Research and Practice 1, 2, Article 13 (May 2020), 7 pages. DOI:https://doi.org/10.1145/338276
  • UPDATE 2020-02-11: Kamerbrief over resultaten analyse VPN software (mirror .pdf). Het daarin genoemde DTC (van MinEZ) is (nog?) niet operationeel t.a.v. informatiedeling over specifieke kwetsbare systemen/IP-adressen. Het DTC zet algemene adviezen/waarschuwingen van het NCSC door en die worden alleen ter ore genomen door ontvangers die zelf doorhebben gebruiker te zijn van een bepaald IT-product c.q. een bepaalde IT-configuratie. De ervaring leert dat zelfbewustzijn (‘situational awareness’) daarover dikwijls verre van perfect is. En dus gaan we gewoon door met ongevraagd (pro)actief scannen en melden — de belangen zijn te groot om het over te laten aan bureaucratie. Dat zulke scanning zélf strikt genomen computervredebreuk kan inhouden, zoals het geval bij (betrouwbaar) testen op Pulse CVE-2019-11510 en Citrix CVE-2019-19781, is zeer ongemakkelijk: voor mij persoonlijk kan “einde VOG” betekenen “einde carrière”. Noodzaak, proportionaliteit en subsidiariteit van scanactiviteiten zijn dus cruciaal. Maar met kritieke kwetsbaarheden die zo breed in de samenleving blijken te bestaan moeten we wel. Niets doen is geen optie.

    Tot het DTC op het punt van informatiedeling over specifieke kwetsbare systemen/IP-adressen operationeel is blijft het Nederlandse Security Meldpunt (dat tijdens het ad hoc “live gaan” op 13/14 januari informeel is ondergebracht bij DIVD) een nuttige aanvulling op het NCSC voor het (doen) dissemineren van informatie over specifieke kwetsbare systemen aan personen die daar iets mee kunnen/moeten, zoals IT-beveiligers en -beheerders bij de betrokken organisaties en/of hun IT-dienstverleners.

    De kamerbrief benoemt overigens (begrijpelijk) niet alles dat in de praktijk heeft gespeeld c.q. nog speelt. Een voorbeeld daarvan is dat in retrospect bleek dat het NCSC ten tijde van het Pulse-verhaal in augustus 2019 geen kennis had van alle IP-adressen van alle ABDO-bedrijven c.q. -toeleveranciers en dat dáárom systemen van een tiental ABDO-bedrijven c.q. -toeleveranciers door het NCSC in de door derden bij het NCSC aangeleverde lijsten niet als zodanig zijn herkend en geïnformeerd. Informatie over het kwetsbaar zijn van die specifieke systemen is dus bij het NCSC blijven liggen en bij Defensie pas op de radar gekomen nadat ik m’n lijst (ook) beschikbaar maakte aan het Bureau Industrieveiligheid van de MIVD. Zij beschikken in tegenstelling tot het NCSC t.a.v. ABDO-bedrijven over doorzettingsmacht. Dat de betreffende systemen na het contact met Bureau Industrieveiligheid heel snel alsnog gepatcht of (tijdelijk) offline zijn gehaald zal allicht ook aan die doorzettingsmacht te danken zijn.

    De brief vermeldt verder: “De AIVD en de MIVD hebben gesignaleerd dat statelijke actoren misbruik maken van de kwetsbaarheid in de Pulse Secure VPN-software.” Weet daarbij dat het niet gaat om het napraten van NSA & GCHQ.

    Binnenkort verschijnt bij ACM DTRAP een veldnotitie van ondergetekende over de Pulse-casus, incluis enkele gedachten over proactief scannen door CSIRTs in een gefedereerd/decentraal model. Om meerdere redenen, waaronder autonomie/privacy en informatiemacht (geen extra big brother…), ben ik persoonlijk geen voorstander van een gecentraliseerd model waarbij, zeg, het NCSC zelf méér zou scannen dan alleen rijksoverheidorganisaties en infrastructuur die raakt aan vitale processen. Pragmatisch, efficiënt, betrouwbaar en vertrouwelijk zijn m.i. kernwaarden bij proactief scannen.
  • UPDATE 2019-10-07: Mitigating Recent VPN Vulnerabilities (.pdf, advies uitgebracht door de Amerikaanse NSA). Citaat: “Multiple Nation State Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) actors have weaponized CVE-2019-11510, CVE-2019-11539, and CVE-2018-13379 to gain access to vulnerable VPN devices”.
  • UPDATE 2019-10-02: Vulnerabilities exploited in VPN products used worldwide (NCSC-UK, onderdeel van het Britse GCHQ).
  • UPDATE 2019-10-01: de publicaties van Volkskrant en Reporter Radio zijn vandaag besproken in de Tweede Kamer tijdens het vragenuurtje, op initiatief van Ronald van Raak (SP).
  • UPDATE 2019-09-29: als iemand vragen heeft — stel ze vooral en vermijd aannames cq onjuiste interpretaties. Ik ben goed bereikbaar via e-mail en Twitter (zie sidebar) en help graag mee.
  • UPDATE 2019-09-28: Netwerk honderden bedrijven, waaronder KLM, Shell en Schiphol, maandenlang lek (Volkskrant) en ‘Bedrijven en overheid maandenlang kwetsbaar door groot beveiligingslek’ (NOS).

    Qua oplossingsrichting is verdere drang/dwang uit Den Haag misschien niet nodig – er is reeds een wettelijke plicht voor verwerkingsverantwoordelijken tot adequate beveiliging van persoonsgegevens die is vastgelegd in Art 32. AVG; en de bestuursdwang richting vitale sector en digitale dienstverleners die is vastgelegd in Art. 27 Wbni.

    De oplossing zit in het bieden van meer ruimte voor proactief onderzoek (zoals scannen) en handelen: niet alleen aan NCSC, maar ook universiteiten en bedrijfsleven. Ik ben echter geen jurist — en het is nu een politiek vraagstuk. Ik roep politici op zich te laten informeren door de juiste mensen — waaronder inhoudelijk deskundigen, zoals technisch specialisten (o.a. uit CERT-gremia). Er wordt gesproken over doorzettingsmacht voor het NCSC. Laten we daar kalm en met koel hoofd over nadenken — dat vindt ook Jaap-Henk Hoepman — want doorzettingsmacht kan contraproductief zijn. Bijvoorbeeld in de goede/soepele verstandhouding tussen NCSC en haar doelgroepen, waarin drang/dwang vanuit NCSC ongewenste gevolgen kan hebben.

    Opmerking van algemene strekking: in beginsel hoeft niemand zich te schamen voor een kwetsbaarheid en zelfs niet voor compromitering. Techniek is complex en iedereen, ook de deskundige, kan iets over het hoofd zien of een menselijke (inschattings)fout maken. Schamen moet men zich wél als ernstige kwetsbaarheden langdurig onopgemerkt aanwezig zijn en blijven indien dat (mede) wordt veroorzaakt door passiviteit (bijvoorbeeld desinteresse) of risicoaversie (niet durven scannen/testen; terwijl kwaadwillenden dat wél doen). Het beschermen van overheid, bedrijfsleven en individuen op internet is een ‘whole of society’-vraagstuk. Iedereen die kan bijdragen aan verbetering, moet zich vrij voelen dat te doen, zonder te hoeven vrezen voor een strafblad (ervan uitgaande dat men zorgvuldig handelt: noodzaak, proportionaliteit, subsidiariteit), en die bijdragen moeten worden omarmd door ons allemaal. Wie dat doet, hoeft nimmer een promotie te worden ontzegd, verdient het niet om via media reputatieschade te lijden, en kan na onverhoopte compromitering een goed en eerlijk verhaal vertellen. Laat alle organisaties in onze samenleving het idee van Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure (CVD; voorheen Responsible Disclosure/RD genaamd) omarmen. En laten we wat vergevingsgezinder zijn — ook richting organisaties met kwetsbaarheden — omwille van het hogere gemeenschappelijke doel: een voldoende veilige en vrije informatiesamenleving.

Oorspronkelijke publicatie

[Onderstaand bericht is gepubliceerd in samenwerking met Ralph Moonen, CTO bij Secura. Zie eventueel BNR Nieuwsradio, 2 september 2019: “Interne netwerk van tientallen Nederlandse bedrijven en organisaties staat wagenwijd open”.]

Pulse Secure, een spinoff van Juniper die het Juniper-product Junos Pulse zelfstandig heeft voortgezet onder een nieuw handelsmerk, is één van de grootste leveranciers van producten voor netwerktoegangsbeveiliging: marktonderzoekbedrijf Frost & Sullivan erkende het in oktober 2018 als één van de belangrijkste vier spelers in het marktsegment voor het MKB en grootbedrijven, met wereldwijd 20.000 klanten.

In april 2019 publiceerde Pulse Secure een kritiek beveiligingsadvies voor Pulse Connect Secure en Pulse Policy Secure, respectievelijk een SSL-VPN en NAC/BYOD-oplossing. Klanten van Pulse Secure gebruiken de producten voor beveiligde toegang van (bijvoorbeeld) medewerkers tot een extranet of een intern netwerk.

Het bijschrift in het advies luidt als volgt (markering is origineel):

Multiple vulnerabilities were discovered and have been resolved in Pulse Connect Secure (PCS) and Pulse Policy Secure (PPS). This includes an authentication by-pass vulnerability that can allow an unauthenticated user to perform a remote arbitrary file access on the Pulse Connect Secure gateway. This advisory also includes a remote code execution vulnerability that can allow an authenticated administrator to perform remote code execution on Pulse Connect Secure and Pulse Policy Secure gateways. Many of these vulnerabilities have a critical CVSS score and pose significant risk to your deployment. We strongly recommend to upgrade to the corresponding version with the fix as soon as possible.

De beveiligingspatches, die dus reeds in april 2019 zijn gepubliceerd door de vendor, verhelpen een reeks ernstige kwetsbaarheden. Daarvan had CVE-2019-11510 de hoogst mogelijke (CVSSv3-)kwetsbaarheidscore: 10.

Via die kwetsbaarheid kan een anonieme, niet-ingelogde aanvaller op afstand vanaf internet willekeurige bestanden uitlezen, waaronder de .mdb-database met gebruikersnamen, wachtwoorden (in leesbare en/of ontsleutelbare vorm) en sessie-identifiers van VPN-sessies. Actieve sessies kunnen worden gekaapt (bron); trouwens ook via CVE-2019-11540, een cross-site script inclusion kwetsbaarheid, in combinatie met (bijvoorbeeld) BeEF. Tweefactorauthenticatie is daarmee ook buitenspel gezet. In combinatie met andere kwetsbaarheden kan ook infectie met malware/spionage-software plaatsvinden.

Het is aan systeem- c.q. netwerkbeheerders bij organisaties die deze producten gebruiken om op de hoogte zijn van deze beveiligingspatch(es) en deze vrijwel onmiddelijk installeren (eventueel via een noodprocedure binnen het normale change management-proces). Al dan niet op aanwijzing van hun CISO, naar aanleiding van een beveiligingsadvies van het NCSC, en/of een tip van een derde. De realiteit toont aan dat dat in dit geval bij veel organisaties niet goed is verlopen.

In augustus hebben de Taiwanese ontdekkers van de kwetsbaarheden — Orange Tsai en Meh Chang van DEVCORE, die uitstekend werk hebben geleverd — tijdens Black Hat USA 2019 (slides in .pdf-formaat) en DEF CON 27 (videos) details van hun ontdekkingen gepubliceerd, en vrij snel daarna werd o.a. CVE-2019-11510 being exploited in the wild gezien. Op zaterdagochtend 24 augustus was dat te zien in de logs van dit blog (scroll in het grijze schermpje naar rechts om de rest v/d regel te zien):

/var/log/www.cyberwar.nl-access.bloglog:- 81.40.150.167 - - [24/Aug/2019:10:45:57 +0200] "GET /dana-na/../dana/html5acc/guacamole/../../../../../../etc/passwd?/dana/html5acc/guacamole/ HTTP/1.1" 400 226 "-" "Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1)"

Naar aanleiding daarvan is onderzoek verricht op Nederlandse IP-adressen. Daarover is zaterdagavonds een heads-up gestuurd aan het NCSC (cert@ncsc.nl), die daarop terugbelde met een ontvangstbevestiging. Zondagochtend 25 augustus is het resultaat van het onderzoek(je) — een lijst met 538 kwetsbare Pulse Connect Secure-systemen — aan het NCSC doorgegeven (cert@ncsc.nl). In de communicatie met het NCSC hebben we dat weekend twee gevallen uitgelicht die (volgens ons) in potentie als “ernstig” of “zeer ernstig” zijn te kwalificeren voor nationale veiligheid. Beide systemen zijn vrijwel direct gepatcht.

De afgelopen week is dagelijks opnieuw getest (en dat blijft de komende tijd doorgaan). De uitkomst is als volgt:

Nota bene: het is mogelijk dat er méér kwetsbare systemen bestaan dan tijdens dit onderzoek zijn gevonden. Van de systemen die wél zijn meegeteld is aannemelijk dat die daadwerkelijk kwetsbaar zijn (en dus geen foutpositieve, zoals een honeypot). Niet elk systeem is van een Nederlandse organisatie: er zitten ook buitenlandse organisaties bij die gebruikmaken van de goede internetinfrastructuur die we in Nederland hebben.

Ten tijde van schrijven zijn dus nog ruim 300 Pulse Connect Secure SSL-VPN’s op Nederlandse IP-adresruimte kwetsbaar (*) voor ten minste CVE-2019-11510.

Het initiële lijstje van kwetsbare systemen in Nederlandse IP-adresruimte loog er niet om — het omvatte onder meer:

  • Rijksoverheid
  • lokale overheden
  • luchtvaartsector (zowel flight operators als industrie/onderzoek)
  • beursgenoteerde bedrijven (o.a. met high-tech intellectueel eigendom)
  • defensie-industrie (10 organisaties)
  • onderwijssector (waaronder een universiteit en een hogeschool)
  • financiële sector (meerdere banken, verzekeraars, belasting- en administratiekantoren)
  • ICT-bedrijven (meerdere bekende/grote namen, met o.a. Defensie als klant; en enkele ICT-beveiligingsbedrijven)
  • havenbedrijven
  • petrochemische industrie
  • zorgpartijen (o.a. zorgaanbieders en nationale zorg-ICT)
  • enkele kleinere ISPs en telecomproviders
  • […meer…]

Attributie aan de organisaties is gebaseerd op een combinatie van WHOIS-gegevens van het IP-adres, de systeem-/domeinnamen in het TLS-certificaat, en PTR- en A-records in DNS. Slechts in enkele gevallen ging het — oordelend naar die gegevens — om een test- of ontwikkelsysteem. De rest betreft productieomgevingen of voormalige productieomgevingen. In voormalige productieomgevingen kunnen nog altijd actuele gebruikersnamen/wachtwoorden staan; dus ook dán is er in potentie een ‘echt’ probleem, ook als die omgeving onmiddels is ontkoppeld van de rest van het netwerk.

Organisaties die Pulse Connect Secure gebruiken doen er goed aan hun logs te controleren op aanwezigheid van de volgende waarden (zonder de “[…]”):

[...]/data/runtime/mtmp/lmdb/dataa/data.mdb?[...]
[...]/data/runtime/mtmp/lmdb/randomVal/data.mdb?[...]
[...]/data/runtime/mtmp/system?[...]

Als één of meer hiervan succesvol is gedownload door een onbekende derde dan is het zaak de VPN-gebruikers onmiddellijk hun wachtwoord te laten wijzigen op alle systemen waar zij dat wachtwoord gebruiken. Hopelijk betreft dat niet óók hun privéaccounts bij Facebook, Google, Apple, enzovoorts; hergebruik van wachtwoorden blijft een hardnekkig fenomeen.

Het NCSC heeft meerdere meldingen ontvangen inzake Pulse Secure en verschillende partijen geïnformeerd. Ons (Secura) is niet bekend welke partijen wel en welke niet. Vanwege de ernst van de situatie hebben ook wij direct actie in gang gezet (better safe than sorry): een reeks organisaties is vorige week door ons gebeld en een meerdere kwetsbare systemen zijn inmiddels gepatcht. Ongetwijfeld zullen meer partijen zo’n inspanning hebben ondernomen. We hebben het echter druk genoeg met onze normale werkzaamheden en zouden dit dus liever niet hoeven doen; maar voelen het een beetje als een morele plicht (if not us, then who?).

Dit soort situaties is onacceptabel: het kan niet zo zijn dat honderden systemen — in dit geval ook bij grootbedrijven en in vitale sectoren — na het bekend worden van ernstige kwetsbaarheden nog maandenlang actief zijn als sitting ducks voor kwaadwillenden.

Daarover het volgende.

Zowel het NCSC als private ICT-beveiligingsbedrijven als journalisten als (andere) individuele onderzoekers hebben beperkte mogelijkheden en resources. Het testen van andermans systemen op een kwetsbaarheid kan strafbaar zijn onder de wet computercriminaliteit, ook al zijn de bedoelingen goed en doorstaat de werkwijze de toets aan subsidiariteit/proportionaliteit (zo was ons onderzoek beperkt tot het uitlezen van versie-informatie en een bestand dat op alle Pulse Connect Secure-systemen identitiek is — dus geen gebruikersgegevens verwerven, laat staan code injecteren of commando’s uitvoeren).

Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure (CVD; voorheen Responsible Disclosure) is voor dit soort cases hooguit een lapmiddel, want te arbeidsintensief gegeven de urgentie en omvang van het aantal kwetsbare organisaties. De verantwoordelijkheid kan niet liggen bij individuele onderzoekers of beveiligingsbedrijven die ongevraagd ad-hoc testen. Maar getuige wat is aangetroffen kan de verantwoordelijkheid vooralsnog óók niet alleen liggen bij de private organisaties zelf. En de vendor heeft gedaan wat deze moest doen: een beveiligingspatch uitbrengen en daarover communiceren aan klanten.

Het NCSC is dan weer met handen en voeten gebonden door wetgeving en ethische overwegingen: misschien wenst de Rijksoverheid zich in beginsel niet wil te mengen in private aangelegenheden. En ICT-beveiliging van private organisaties is en blijft in beginsel een private aangelegenheid.

De situatie rondom CVE-2019-11510 toont echter aan dat die verantwoordelijkheid bij private organisaties nog onvoldoende effectief wordt gedragen, ook bij organisaties die competente IT-beveiligers in dienst hebben (zo weten we beroepshalve). Hoe de huidige situatie zich laat verklaren is niet duidelijk — het zou een onderwerp kunnen zijn voor een (wetenschappelijk?) evaluatieonderzoek.

Het idee is niet nieuw, maar misschien zou het NCSC of een ander (Rijks)overheidsorgaan de ruimte/bevoegdheid moeten krijgen om Nederlandse IP-adresruimte bij (uitsluitend) zeer ernstige kwetsbaarheden in internet-facing producten onder voorwaarden proactief te testen (of laten testen) op kwetsbare systemen. Een centraal contactlijstje met CISOs van MKB en grootbedrijven zou daarbij kunnen helpen, als dat niet reeds bestaat.

Het opent wel een can of worms:

  • Risico’s
    • Wat als een privaat systeem uitvalt door een test die de overheid uitvoert? (of laat uitvoeren)
    • Hoe weet je dat een IP-adres(blok) op het tijdstip van een test nog in gebruik is door organisatie X, en alleen door die organisatie?
    • Hoe om te gaan met blacklisting/whitelisting van IP-adressen waarmee de overheid test?
  • Privacy
    • Wat als grondig/zorgvuldig testen met zich meebrengt dat gebruikersgegevens worden uitgelezen, al is het maar een beetje?
    • In hoeverre is het mogelijk om op een betrouwbare/robuuste manier de IP-adresruimte die door individuele burgers wordt gebruikt (dus niet bedrijfsmatig door een organisatie) buiten de scan te laten?
  • Taakopvatting van de overheid
    • Vinden we dit wel/niet een taak voor de overheid?
    • Is er een minder inbreukmakend middel waarmee hetzelfde doel kan worden bereikt?
    • Zou het voor private organisaties opt-in of opt-out moeten zijn?
    • Hoe om te gaan met gevallen waarbij een private organisatie ook na melding door de overheid een kwetsbaar systeem niet patcht?
    • Welke kwetsbaarheden wel testen, welke niet?
    • Hoe weten we dat de overheid de gevonden kwetsbaarheden niet zelf uitbuit voor (andere) overheidsbelangen zoals opsporings- en inlichtingenwerk? (misschien geen groot punt van zorg; maar het kan niet buiten beschouwing blijven.)

Misschien eist actief testen op kwetsbaarheid door de Rijksoverheid een verandering in wetgeving. Dat is dan een kluif voor juristen en/of politiek.

Tot slot als quick-reference het lijstje met affected en non-affected versies van Pulse Connect Secure en Pulse Policy Secure (bron: SA44101):

SA44101 - 2019-04: Out-of-Cycle Advisory: Multiple vulnerabilities
resolved in Pulse Connect Secure / Pulse Policy Secure 9.0RX

Affected Versions:
Pulse Connect Secure 9.0R1 - 9.0R3.3
Pulse Connect Secure 8.3R1 - 8.3R7
Pulse Connect Secure 8.2R1 - 8.2R12
Pulse Connect Secure 8.1R1 - 8.1R15
Pulse Policy Secure 9.0R1 - 9.0R3.3
Pulse Policy Secure 5.4R1 - 5.4R7
Pulse Policy Secure 5.3R1 - 5.3R12
Pulse Policy Secure 5.2R1 - 5.2R12
Pulse Policy Secure 5.1R1 - 5.1R15

Not Affected:
Pulse Connect Secure 9.1R1 and above
Pulse Connect Secure 9.0R4 & 9.0R3.4
Pulse Connect Secure 8.3R7.1
Pulse Connect Secure 8.2R12.1
Pulse Connect Secure 8.1R15.1 
Pulse Policy Secure 9.1R1 and above
Pulse Policy Secure 9.0R4 & 9.0R3.4
Pulse Policy Secure 5.4R7.1
Pulse Policy Secure 5.3R12.1
Pulse Policy Secure 5.2R12.1
Pulse Policy Secure 5.1R15.1

P.S. 1: wie klant is bij een cyberverzekeraar en vier maanden lang een kritieke beveiligingspatch op een internet-facing systeem niet installeert hoeft bij een compromittering waarschijnlijk niet te rekenen op een uitkering. Lees meer: ‘Vlijt en naarstigheid’ in een digitale wereld: eigen schuld en beredding in de context van de cyberverzekering (.pdf) van mr. N.M. Brouwer in AV&S 2019/23, augustus 2019.

P.S. 2: Pulse Secure-productversies die later kwetsbaar bleken hebben begin 2018 in de VS een Common Criteria-certificering gekregen. Daarmee zijn die versies goedgekeurd voor gebruik in bepaalde gevoelige(re) omgevingen in de VS. Een positieve resultaat van een Common Criteria-certificeringstraject, zoals in Nederland uitgevoerd door het AIVD-NBV en onder het BSPA-programma via geaccrediteerde bedrijven, betekent niet dat een product foutloos is. Het komt vaker voor dat in goedgekeurde producten kwetsbaarheden worden gevonden — ook ernstige. Dat houdt verband met het (EAL-)niveau waarop zekerheid wordt gevraagd, en daaraan gekoppeld de scoping, beschikbare tijd, kennis, vaardigheden, apparatuur, documentatie, en (on)beschikbaarheid van broncode. Iets dat in de nabije toekomst weer ‘s zelfstandig aandacht verdient.

* Het publiceren van deze blogpost — terwijl er nog kwetsbare systemen zijn — gebeurt met gemengde gevoelens. Bad Packets heeft al gepubliceerd dat wereldwijd liefst 14.500 (!) kwetsbare instances actief zijn. Mede daarom lijkt verder wachten ons, en de personen bij wie we een zienswijze hebben gevraagd, méér onverantwoordelijk dan nu naar buiten te treden met de actuele aantallen; zonder daarbij IP-adressen of namen van organisaties te benoemen.

Detecting corruption & money laundering: 72 potential indicators, from the perspective of Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs)

Front page of public summary document released by the Egmont Group.

The Egmont Group (Twitter: @EGFIU) is a platform for exchange of expertise and financial intelligence that consists of 164 (!) Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs) worldwide. In mid-July 2019, it released a public summary (.pdf, 22 pages; mirror) of the “FIU Tools and Practices for Investigating Laundering of the Proceeds of Corruption”. The release stems from an initiative started by the FIUs of Israel (IMPA), the Netherlands (FIU-Nederland), Russia (Rosfinmonitoring) & Ukraine (SFMS).

The summary provides, notably, a list of 72 indicators (pp.16-22; a ‘checklist’, if you will) to identify possible cases of corruption and money laundering. Be reminded that the latter is also relevant to combat terrorist financing. The indicators are grouped as follows:

  • Indicators of Corruption in Public Procurement
  • Indicators of Unexplained Wealth or Income
  • General Indicators

They serve as potential triggers for FIU investigations and can be used by banks and accountancy firms — but investigative journalists (‘follow the money’) and others may also want to take note. For the latter and other purposes I (re)post the indicators below as quick reference.

NOTE #1: there is no substitute for reading original documents in full, so do read the original public summary in full. Context always matters.

NOTE #2: for some historic reading and background on FIUs, see the IMF publication Financial Intelligence Units: An Overview (.pdf, 2004, 149 pages; mirror).


Egmont Group Set of Indicators for Corruption Related Cases From the FIUs’ Perspective

Indicators of Corruption in Public Procurement

  1. Services provided to state-owned companies or public institutions by shell companies, offshore companies or formations, companies in registration offices or P.O. companies.
  2. Services provided to state-owned companies or public institutions by companies registered in high-risk jurisdictions.
  3. Long-term contracts are repeatedly awarded to the same subcontractor, or a certain legal entity or legal arrangement consistently winning a majority of the largest contracting authority tenders/public procurement bids.
  4. The issuance of unreasonable specifications for the performance of the contract (including restrictive conditions for the location of the contractor, restrictive conditions for the materials needed for the performance of the contract, particularly tight deadlines, etc.) by the procuring authority.
  5. Subcontractors have common director(s), beneficial owner(s) and/or are related with the management of the contractor.
  6. Subcontractors/intermediaries brought in on business deals once a contract has already been agreed and for no obvious reason.
  7. Contractors, subcontractors or their counterparties (within the timeframe for completion of the state contract) are linked by address, telephone number, IP-address, etc.
  8. Procurement projects which are funded through loan agreements by governing bodies such as development institutions but where the eventual tender price put out is significantly higher than the loan amount requested.
  9. Deposits in public officials’ accounts with checks issued by construction companies, individuals or non-governmental entities that previously benefited from public works contracts.
  10. Legal entities with little or limited experience receiving highly complex and technical government contracts/projects (not compatible with the size or experience of the entity) or receiving government contracts/projects that are not related to their field of business.
  11. A certain legal entity or arrangement, which is a contractor to a state-owned company, usually receives payments of higher amounts for goods or services which normally should cost less (when compared to the normal market prices for equivalent products or services).
  12. Funds received by a contractor of public procurements are not spent within a reasonable timeframe to fulfil the contract needs.
  13. Checks issued in favor of public officials and come from accounts of persons that benefited from public procurements/funds, without an evident justification.
  14. Checks issued by a public entity being cashed out and subsequently deposited to accounts of public officials or entities related to public officials.
  15. Public officials, especially those having a role in government contract management or public procurement of high-value assets, receive funds transfer instructions:
    • from business and/or personal accounts, where these funds appear to be excessive in value;
    • according to in-built distribution methods or contractors or intermediaries;
    • from distributors used at the request of the contracting party;
    • according to existence of rebate arrangements, particularly if agreed outside the contract;
    • under requirements to obtain licenses and other government permits as a pre-requisite of doing business.
  16. Use of third parties, such as contractors, consultants, vendors, suppliers and advisor/intermediaries, in order to facilitate procurement contracts fulfilment:
    • Requests for compensation not explicitly contemplated in the third party contract
    • Requests that payments be made to different third parties
    • Third party requests for charitable or political contributions
    • A third party is in a different line of business than that for which it is engaged
    • The third party has little or no experience in the relevant industry or activity
    • The third party does not have an office in the country where services will be performed
    • The third party was recently formed or incorporated
    • The third party has poor financial stability or credit record
    • The third party has a high level of reliance on subcontractors or intermediaries (so-called “fourth parties”)
    • The third party became part of a transaction at the express request or insistence of a public official
    • The third party is recommended or referred by a public official
    • Third party commissions are unreasonably large or based on inaccurate or incomplete invoices
  17. Contracting party issues commercial cards to individuals that are not employees of contracting party and are used to purchase luxury goods, make payments for high-cost services or other transactions that are not normal business expenses.
  18. Payments based on a public procurement contract are conducted at a price higher than originally contracted.
  19. Payments conducted according to public procurement contracts where there was only a single bid for a government procurement tender, which signals a lack of competition and closed access.
  20. Receipt of commission or fees before signing of agreement for services or carrying out a function or process in relation to public procurement contract.
  21. Commissions, interest or payments under commercial terms of public procurement contract are increased, reduced or restructured in a manner that is not commercially viable.
  22. Repeated or subsequent purchases of low-quality goods, works and services at market prices of goods of higher quality or purchases of goods, works and services at higher than market prices.
  23. Payments for goods according to public procurement contracts without delivery of such goods to customs territory of the country.
  24. Payments are conducted to accounts of providers of goods, works and services, which are opened in countries different from where such goods, works and services are originated or provided.

Indicators of Unexplained Wealth or Income

  1. The subjects in a transaction are domestic or foreign public officials and receive and/or send unusually large amounts of funds in different currencies.
  2. Funds received in accounts of persons, legal entities, or legal arrangements with no visible connection to public officials, but known to be controlled by such, or persons related to them (a frontman, a strawman, or legal entity established to conceal the beneficial ownership), where the funds have been sent by a shell company. The additional information provided with regard to the funds refers to “loans”, “investment purposes”, or “purchase of real estate property”, or otherwise reveal an irreconcilable conflict of interest involving commercial business between a private enterprise and a public official.
  3. Representative of a public official (i.e. lawyer, secretary, accountant) opens account and purchases expensive property or luxury goods with the express intent of bypassing Customer Due Diligence (CDD) process screening for public officials.
  4. “Straw men” (especially in the remittance sector) can be used to obfuscate the beneficial ownership of the assets by involving public officials’ employees i.e. cleaner/ gardener/driver. Usually, the funds received on the accounts of such straw men significantly exceed their legitimate employment income.
  5. Public officials receive or purchase shares (or the option to purchase shares):
    • In a company in exchange for services; or
    • In a company where the purchase is financed by the vendor; or
    • In a company where the purchase price is below the net asset value of the company; or
    • In a company and receives a dividend from the company which is disproportional to the purchase price; or
    • Which give the right to sell shares at a price which is higher than either the current market value or the price at which the shares were purchased; or
    • And profit from a share transaction where the purchase and selling dates of shares are within a short time period.
  6. Public officials receive loan guarantees from a public corporation or government body, or a loan under favorable conditions.
  7. Public officials receive large amounts of money for their attendance in workshops, conferences or as consultants to projects, in order to disguise the origin of the funds from being seen as a payment of corruption.
  8. Public officials receive debt forgiveness or repayment requirements are waived by the creditor.
  9. Public officials perform transactions with sovereign wealth funds or government-linked companies.
  10. Misrepresentation and/or inconsistency between the declared source of wealth of public officials through their sworn asset declarations, and those established during the due diligence process.
  11. Public officials have purchased virtual assets in a total amount higher than their legally declared income.
  12. The purchase of goods or services, or transfer of payments, or the receipt of any other benefits (i.e. rental payments, school fees, chauffeur fees, fees for private healthcare, funding of private jets, consultancy fees, high commissions, etc.) for or on behalf of a public official, from the contracting authority, or a contractor in the period of the execution of the state contract.
  13. Transactions that take place in accounts of public officials involving cash deposits or withdrawals in unusual frequency and amounts.
  14. Incoming transactions from foreign jurisdictions (specifically from high-risk jurisdictions) on accounts of public officials, which are intended for real estate purchases or purchases of high-value or luxury goods, typically contain no additional information about the transaction itself, and the necessary remittance information is vague (e.g. refers to ‘consultancy fees’). Such situations result in a lack of transparency with regard to the transaction and difficulty determining the source of funds.
  15. Purchases or leases of movable or immovable assets by public officials which do not coincide with the subject’s income.
  16. The use of hawala type mechanisms (especially through the remittance sector) by public officials to move money abroad.
  17. Fixed Term Deposit Certificates made by companies with the main purpose that the capital and interest generated from the investment should be transferred immediately to accounts of a political party.
  18. Cash deposits with no rationale:
    • Credit card/ home loan applications (even if declined) are useful to find out what the public official earns versus what is deposited into their account; or
    • Cash deposits made into the same public official’s account from different locations.
  19. The immediate transfer of funds from a private entity’s account to a personal account of a public official and the subsequent movement of the funds to third party accounts. These funds are eventually moved abroad, which indicates the use of the aforementioned accounts as a temporary node. Some of the persons in the described chain may deduct a percentage of the amount before transferring it further, which indicates that these persons have received a commission for their services.
  20. Incoming cash or electronic transfers from different external sources on accounts of public officials are later spent at online gambling sites – credit from the same site or different online gambling sites can then be seen.
  21. Transferring of funds from accounts of public officials to high-risk vehicles abroad, such as corporate trusts.
  22. Public officials establish legal entities or legal arrangements, which have purchased land and buildings of significant value (as is evident from their accounting documents), despite the absence of any other commercial activity, or without a justifiable source of funds.
  23. Public officials have made cash transactions involving large amounts (e.g. currency exchange, use of cash to purchase high value goods, etc.).
  24. Transaction payments of unusual amounts or frequency from public officials to lawyers, accountants, or other professional intermediaries.
  25. Payments in favor of public officials are made to facilitate or expedite a government service.
  26. Use of state funds to purchase shares in private companies or private companies belonging to public officials, at prices above market value.
  27. Issuance of sovereign debt to public officials or entities known to be controlled by them, at interest rates above the prevailing market rate.
  28. Use of Joint Venture (JV) structures for government contracts in which public officials or a company belonging to them are silent partners. For example, in a JV between a state-owned company and a private company, a third silent shareholder owned or controlled by a public official is inserted in order to allow the public official to take a share of the profit.
  29. Payments by entities to NPOs that public officials are known to be associated with.
  30. A transaction or financial activity, which involves foreign nationals with no significant link (apart from the financial) to the country where the transactions took place. These foreign nationals are known to be active consultants or employees of lobbying organizations and are sometimes reluctant to explain the source of wealth/funds or give unsatisfactory explanations.
  31. Financial flows, which reveal complex financial mechanisms and intervention by foreign legal entities or arrangements, are received in an account in another jurisdiction, where the account is related to a public official.
  32. International transfer from the Treasury of a foreign country to shell companies, to entities with no public profile, or no physical or online presence, or to individuals who are not known employees of the government.
  33. The stated source of wealth of funds received to an account of a public official may be inconsistent with the client’s stated career history, expertise, or age. In this regard a mismatch may exist between the applicant’s stated career history and their total net worth.
  34. Transactional activity usually characterized by first party payments to and from accounts in the same name or between offshore company and trust structures (linked or known to be linked to public officials).
  35. Customer, especially when it is a public official, transferring funds to/from other public officials, including law enforcement officers.

General Indicators

  1. Open source information, which can relate specific financial activity to ongoing investigations into individuals, and concerns about corruption.
  2. An entity that receives public contracts and its legal representative/s appear in media reports, which link/s him/her/them to corruption or other financial crimes.
  3. Payments made by contractors for consultancy services, particularly in industries with a higher risk to corruption, such as arms, mineral extraction, telecoms, public infrastructures, where the amount paid appears to be outside the normal price range for consultancy services.
  4. A fiduciary service company which set up the structure for the applicant may be the subject of negative press reporting.
  5. Close family members or associates of public officials are appointed as senior management officials in private companies without meeting the necessary requirements for taking up the position or the hire’s salary or compensation package is not commensurate with market conditions.
  6. Applicant wants to open an account with an unnecessarily complex structure of economic and beneficial ownership possibly involving eclectic wealth planning arrangements or bearer share companies (known to be linked to a public official).
  7. Applicant (who is a public official) expresses urgency on an application (e.g. completion on a mortgage or other time critical transaction).
  8. Explanations for transactions may include the use of words and phrases often used as euphemisms for bribes (for example commission, marketing fees, surcharge, etc.).
  9. Public officials increase their standard of living after the expiration of the officials’ mandate without any legally justifiable reasons. Another possibility would be an inability or refusal by these persons to provide a credible account regarding how the wealth was generated or to provide corroborative support for the source of wealth. In other cases, the corroborative documentation provided raises concerns about authenticity or is otherwise inconsistent with the source of wealth statement.
  10. Opaqueness of government business schemes used to encourage diversity, which should be overtly transparent.
  11. Companies which pay other firms to perform logistical roles in countries where there is a high degree of perceived corruption and which they could perform themselves, in order to transfer the risk to the other firm.
  12. Companies changing the terms of agreements and definitions of intermediaries to avoid registration and regulatory oversight in other countries.
  13. Company wins a public tender with short submission period (i.e. number of days between publication of a call for tenders and the deadline for submission of the bid).

EOF

The Twenty-Five Rules of Disinformation — H. Michael Sweeney, 2001

Here’s a shameless rip of Twenty-Five Ways To Suppress Truth: The Rules of Disinformation (last updated 2001) as permitted by the copyright notice of its author H. Michael Sweeney (Twitter: @PPPBooks). Reasons for reposting it on my blog are that 1) it has gained renewed relevance in recent years, and 2) Lots of Copies Keeps Stuff Safe. I left out references to the author’s original domain (proparanoid dot com) because it is no longer under his control.

Click here to jump directly to the 25 rules, each with explanation, an example, and a proper response.

Quick overview:

  1. Hear no evil, see no evil, speak no evil
  2. Become incredulous and indignant
  3. Create rumor mongers
  4. Use a straw man
  5. Sidetrack opponents w name calling, ridicule
  6. Hit and Run
  7. Question motives
  8. Invoke authority
  9. Play Dumb
  10. Associate opponent charges with old news
  11. Establish and rely upon fall-back positions
  12. Enigmas have no solution
  13. Alice in Wonderland Logic
  14. Demand complete solutions
  15. Fit the facts to alternate conclusions
  16. Vanish evidence and witnesses
  17. Change the subject
  18. Emotionalize, Antagonize, and Goad
  19. Ignore facts, demand impossible proofs
  20. False evidence
  21. Call a Grand Jury, Special Prosecutor
  22. Manufacture a new truth
  23. Create bigger distractions
  24. Silence critics
  25. Vanish

 

Twenty-Five Ways To Suppress Truth: The Rules of Disinformation

by H. Michael Sweeney
[…]
(c) 1997, 2000, 2001 All rights reserved

Permission to reprint/distribute hereby granted for any non commercial use provided information reproduced in its entirety and with author information in tact. […]

Built upon Thirteen Techniques for Truth Suppression by David Martin, the following may be useful to the initiate in the world of dealing with veiled and half-truth, lies, and suppression of truth when serious crimes are studied in public forums. This, sadly, includes every day news media, one of the worst offenders with respect to being a source of disinformation. Where the crime involves a conspiracy, or a conspiracy to cover up the crime, there will invariably be a disinformation campaign launched against those seeking to uncover and expose the truth and/or the conspiracy. There are specific tactics which disinfo artists tend to apply, as revealed here. Also included with this material are seven common traits of the disinfo artist which may also prove useful in identifying players and motives. The more a particular party fits the traits and is guilty of following the rules, the more likely they are a professional disinfo artist with a vested motive. People can be bought, threatened, or blackmailed into providing disinformation, so even “good guys” can be suspect in many cases.

A rational person participating as one interested in the truth will evaluate that chain of evidence and conclude either that the links are solid and conclusive, that one or more links are weak and need further development before conclusion can be arrived at, or that one or more links can be broken, usually invalidating (but not necessarily so, if parallel links already exist or can be found, or if a particular link was merely supportive, but not in itself key) the argument. The game is played by raising issues which either strengthen or weaken (preferably to the point of breaking) these links. It is the job of a disinfo artist to interfere with these evaluation… to at least make people think the links are weak or broken when, in truth, they are not… or to propose alternative solutions leading away from the truth. Often, by simply impeding and slowing down the process through disinformation tactics, a level of victory is assured because apathy increases with time and rhetoric.

It would seem true in almost every instance, that if one cannot break the chain of evidence for a given solution, revelation of truth has won out. If the chain is broken either a new link must be forged, or a whole new chain developed, or the solution is invalid an a new one must be found… but truth still wins out. There is no shame in being the creator or supporter of a failed solution, chain, or link, if done with honesty in search of the truth. This is the rational approach. While it is understandable that a person can become emotionally involved with a particular side of a given issue, it is really unimportant who wins, as long as truth wins. But the disinfo artist will seek to emotionalize and chastise any failure (real or false claims thereof), and will seek by means of intimidation to prevent discussion in general.

Twenty-Five Rules of Disinformation ~

  1. Hear no evil, see no evil, speak no evil
  2. Become incredulous and indignant
  3. Create rumor mongers
  4. Use a straw man
  5. Sidetrack opponents w name calling, ridicule
  6. Hit and Run
  7. Question motives
  8. Invoke authority
  9. Play Dumb
  10. Associate opponent charges with old news
  11. Establish and rely upon fall-back positions
  12. Enigmas have no solution
  13. Alice in Wonderland Logic
  14. Demand complete solutions
  15. Fit the facts to alternate conclusions
  16. Vanish evidence and witnesses
  17. Change the subject
  18. Emotionalize, Antagonize, and Goad
  19. Ignore facts, demand impossible proofs
  20. False evidence
  21. Call a Grand Jury, Special Prosecutor
  22. Manufacture a new truth
  23. Create bigger distractions
  24. Silence critics
  25. Vanish

Eight Traits of The Disinformationalist ~

  1. Avoidance
  2. Selectivity
  3. Coincidental
  4. Teamwork
  5. Anti-conspiratorial
  6. Artificial Emotions
  7. Inconsistent
  8. Newly Discovered: Time Constant

It is the disinfo artist and those who may pull their strings (those who stand to suffer should the crime be solved) MUST seek to prevent rational and complete examination of any chain of evidence which would hang them. Since fact and truth seldom fall on their own, they must be overcome with lies and deceit. Those who are professional in the art of lies and deceit, such as the intelligence community and the professional criminal (often the same people or at least working together), tend to apply fairly well defined and observable tools in this process. However, the public at large is not well armed against such weapons, and is often easily led astray by these time-proven tactics. Remarkably, not even media and law enforcement have NOT BEEN TRAINED to deal with these issues. For the most part, only the players themselves understand the rules of the game.

This why concepts from the film, Wag-The-Dog, actually work. If you saw that movie, know that there is at least one real-world counterpart to Al Pacino’s character. For CIA, it is Mark Richards, who was called in to orchestrate the media response to Waco on behalf of Janet Reno. Mark Richards is the acknowledged High Priest of Disinformation. His appointment was extremely appropriate, since the CIA was VERY present at Waco from the very beginning of the cult to the very end of their days — just as it was at the People’s Temple in Jonestown. Richards purpose in life is damage control.

For such disinformationalists, the overall aim is to avoid discussing links in the chain of evidence which cannot be broken by truth, but at all times, to use clever deceptions or lies to make select links seem weaker than they are, create the illusion of a break, or better still, cause any who are considering the chain to be distracted in any number of ways, including the method of questioning the credentials of the presenter. Please understand that fact is fact, regardless of the source. Likewise, truth is truth, regardless of the source. This is why criminals are allowed to testify against other criminals. Where a motive to lie may truly exist, only actual evidence that the testimony itself IS a lie renders it completely invalid. Were a known ‘liar’s’ testimony to stand on its own without supporting fact, it might certainly be of questionable value, but if the testimony (argument) is based on verifiable or otherwise demonstrable facts, it matters not who does the presenting or what their motives are, or if they have lied in the past or even if motivated to lie in this instance — the facts or links would and should stand or fall on their own merit and their part in the matter will merely be supportive.

Moreover, particularly with respects to public forums such as newspaper letters to the editor, and Internet chat and news groups, the disinfo type has a very important role. In these forums, the principle topics of discussion are generally attempts by individuals to cause other persons to become interested in their own particular position, idea, or solution — very much in development at the time. People often use such mediums as a sounding board and in hopes of pollination to better form their ideas. Where such ideas are critical of government or powerful, vested groups (especially if their criminality is the topic), the disinfo artist has yet another role — the role of nipping it in the bud. They also seek to stage the concept, the presenter, and any supporters as less than credible should any possible future confrontation in more public forums result due to their early successes. You can often spot the disinfo types at work here by the unique application of “higher standards” of discussion than necessarily warranted. They will demand that those presenting arguments or concepts back everything up with the same level of expertise as a professor, researcher, or investigative writer. Anything less renders any discussion meaningless and unworthy in their opinion, and anyone who disagrees is obviously stupid — and they generally put it in exactly those terms.

So, as you read any such discussions, particularly so in Internet news groups (NG), decide for yourself when a rational argument is being applied and when disinformation, psyops (psychological warfare operations) or trickery is the tool. Accuse those guilty of the later freely. They (both those deliberately seeking to lead you astray, and those who are simply foolish or misguided thinkers) generally run for cover when thus illuminated, or — put in other terms, they put up or shut up (a perfectly acceptable outcome either way, since truth is the goal.) Here are the twenty-five methods and seven traits, some of which don’t apply directly to NG application. Each contains a simple example in the form of actual (some paraphrased for simplicity) from NG comments on commonly known historical events, and a proper response. Accusations should not be overused — reserve for repeat offenders and those who use multiple tactics. Responses should avoid falling into emotional traps or informational sidetracks, unless it is feared that some observers will be easily dissuaded by the trickery. Consider quoting the complete rule rather than simply citing it, as others will not have reference. Offer to provide a complete copy of the rule set upon request (see permissions statement at end):

Twenty-Five Rules of Disinformation ~

Note: The first rule and last five (or six, depending on situation) rules are generally not directly within the ability of the traditional disinfo artist to apply. These rules are generally used more directly by those at the leadership, key players, or planning level of the criminal conspiracy or conspiracy to cover up.

  1. Hear No Evil, See No Evil, Speak No Evil ~ Regardless of what you know, don’t discuss it — especially if you are a public figure, news anchor, etc. If it’s not reported, it didn’t happen, and you never have to deal with the issues.
    • Example: Media was present in the courtroom (Hunt vs. Liberty Lobby) when CIA agent Marita Lorenz ‘confession’ testimony regarding CIA direct participation in the planning and assassination of John Kennedy was revealed. All media reported was that E. Howard Hunt lost his libel case against Liberty Lobby (Liberty Lobby’s newspaper, The Spotlight, had reported Hunt was in Dallas that day and were sued for the story). See Mark Lane’s remarkable book, Plausible Denial, for the full confessional transcript.
    • Proper response: There is no possible response unless you are aware of the material and can make it public yourself.. In any such attempt, be certain to target any known silent party as likely complicit in a cover up. In this case, it would be the entire Time-Warner Media Group, among others. This author is relatively certain that reporters were hand-picked to cover this case from among those having intelligence community ties.
  2. Become Incredulous and Indignant ~ Avoid discussing key issues and instead focus on side issues which can be used show the topic as being critical of some otherwise sacrosanct group or theme. This is also known as the ‘How dare you!’ gambit.
    • Example: ‘How dare you suggest that the Branch Davidians were murdered! the FBI and BATF are made up of America’s finest and best trained law enforcement, operate under the strictest of legal requirements, and are under the finest leadership the President could want to appoint.’
    • Proper response: You are avoiding the Waco issue with disinformation tactics. Your high opinion of FBI is not founded in fact. All you need do is examine Ruby Ridge and any number of other examples, and you will see a pattern of abuse of power that demands attention to charges against FBI/BATF at Waco. Why do you refuse to address the issues with disinformation tactics (rule 2 – become incredulous and indignant)?
  3. Create Rumor Mongers ~ Avoid discussing issues by describing all charges, regardless of venue or evidence, as mere rumors and wild accusations. Other derogatory terms mutually exclusive of truth may work as well. This method which works especially well with a silent press, because the only way the public can learn of the facts are through such ‘arguable rumors’. If you can associate the material with the Internet, use this fact to certify it a ‘wild rumor’ from a ‘bunch of kids on the Internet’ which can have no basis in fact.
    • Example: ‘You can’t prove his material was legitimately from French Intelligence. Pierre Salinger had a chance to show his ‘proof’ that flight 800 was brought down by friendly fire, and he didn’t. All he really had was the same old baseless rumor that’s been floating around the Internet for months.’
    • Proper response: You are avoiding the issue with disinformation tactics. The Internet charge reported widely is based on a single FBI interview statement to media and a similar statement by a Congressman, neither of which had actually seen Pierre’s document. As the FBI is being accused in participating in a cover up of this matter and Pierre claims his material is not Internet sourced, it is natural that FBI would have reason to paint his material in a negative light. For you to assume the FBI to have no bias in the face of Salinger’s credentials and unchanged stance suggests you are biased. At the best you can say the matter is in question. Further, to imply that material found on Internet is worthless is not founded. At best you may say it must be considered carefully before accepting it, which will require addressing the actual issues. Why do you refuse to address these issues with disinformation tactics (rule 3 – create rumor mongers)?
  4. Use a Straw Man ~ Find or create a seeming element of your opponent’s argument which you can easily knock down to make yourself look good and the opponent to look bad. Either make up an issue you may safely imply exists based on your interpretation of the opponent/opponent arguments/situation, or select the weakest aspect of the weakest charges. Amplify their significance and destroy them in a way which appears to debunk all the charges, real and fabricated alike, while actually avoiding discussion of the real issues.
    • Example: When trying to defeat reports by the Times of London that spy-sat images reveal an object racing towards and striking flight 800, a straw man is used. The disinformationalist, later identified as having worked for Naval Intelligence, simply stated: ‘If these images exist, the public has not seen them. Why? They don’t exist, and never did. You have no evidence and thus, your entire case falls flat.’
    • Proper response: ‘You are avoiding the issue with disinformation tactics. You imply deceit and deliberately establish an impossible and unwarranted test. It is perfectly natural that the public has not seen them, nor will they for some considerable time, if ever. To produce them would violate national security with respect to intelligence gathering capabilities and limitations, and you should know this. Why do you refuse to address the issues with such disinformation tactics (rule 4 – use a straw man)?’
  5. Sidetrack Opponents with Name-Calling and Ridicule ~ This is also known as the primary ‘attack the messenger’ ploy, though other methods qualify as variants of that approach. Associate opponents with unpopular titles such as ‘kooks’, ‘right-wing’, ‘liberal’, ‘left-wing’, ‘terrorists’, ‘conspiracy buffs’, ‘radicals’, ‘militia’, ‘racists’, ‘religious fanatics’, ‘sexual deviates’, and so forth. This makes others shrink from support out of fear of gaining the same label, and you avoid dealing with issues.
    • Example: ‘You believe what you read in the Spotlight? The Publisher, Willis DeCarto, is a well-known right-wing racist. I guess we know your politics — does your Bible have a swastika on it? That certainly explains why you support this wild-eyed, right-wing conspiracy theory.’
    • Proper response: ‘You are avoiding the issue with disinformation tactics. Your imply guilt by association and attack truth on the basis of the messenger. The Spotlight is well known Populist media source responsible for releasing facts and stories well before mainstream media will discuss the issues through their veil of silence. Willis DeCarto has successfully handled lawsuits regarding slanderous statements such as yours. Your undemonstrated charges against the messenger have nothing to do with the facts or the issues, and fly in the face of reason. Why do you refuse to address the issues by use of such disinformation tactics (rule 5 – sidetrack opponents with name calling and ridicule)?’
  6. Hit and Run ~ In any public forum, make a brief attack of your opponent or the opponent position and then scamper off before an answer can be fielded, or simply ignore any answer. This works extremely well in Internet and letters-to-the-editor environments where a steady stream of new identities can be called upon without having to explain criticism reasoning — simply make an accusation or other attack, never discussing issues, and never answering any subsequent response, for that would dignify the opponent’s viewpoint.
    • Example: ”This stuff is garbage. Where do you conspiracy lunatics come up with this crap? I hope you all get run over by black helicopters.’ Notice it even has a farewell sound to it, so it won’t seem curious if the author is never heard from again.
    • Proper response: ‘You are avoiding the issue with disinformation tactics. Your comments or opinions fail to offer any meaningful dialog or information, and are worthless except to pander to emotionalism, and in fact, reveal you to be emotionally insecure with these matters. If you do not like reading ‘this crap’, why do you frequent this NG which is clearly for the purpose of such discussion? Why do you refuse to address the issues by use of such disinformation tactics (rule 6 – hit and run)?’
  7. Question Motives ~ Twist or amplify any fact which could be taken to imply that the opponent operates out of a hidden personal agenda or other bias. This avoids discussing issues and forces the accuser on the defensive.
    • Example: ‘With the talk-show circuit and the book deal, it looks like you can make a pretty good living spreading lies.’
    • Proper response: ‘You are avoiding the issue with disinformation tactics. Your imply guilt as a means of attacking the messenger or his credentials, but cowardly fail to offer any concrete evidence that this is so. If you think what has been presented are ‘lies’, why not simply so illustrate? Why do you refuse to address the issues by use of such disinformation tactics (rule 6 – question motives)?’
  8. Invoke Authority ~ Claim for yourself or associate yourself with authority and present your argument with enough ‘jargon’ and ‘minutia’ to illustrate you are ‘one who knows’, and simply say it isn’t so without discussing issues or demonstrating concretely why or citing sources.
    • Example: ‘You obviously know nothing about either the politics or strategic considerations, much less the technicals of the SR-71. Incidentally, for those who might care, that sleek plane is started with a pair of souped up big-block V-8’s (originally, Buick 454 C.I.D. with dual 450 CFM Holly Carbs and a full-race Isky cams — for 850 combined BHP @ 6,500 RPM) using a dragster-style clutch with direct-drive shaft. Anyway, I can tell you with confidence that no Blackbird has ever been flown by Korean nationals nor have they ever been trained to fly it, and have certainly never overflown the Republic of China in a SR or even launched a drone from it that flew over China. I’m not authorized to discuss if there have been overflights by American pilots.’
    • Proper response: ‘You are avoiding the issue with disinformation tactics. Your imply your own authority and expertise but fail to provide credentials, and you also fail to address issues and cite sources. You simply cite ‘Jane’s-like’ information to make us think you know what you are talking about. Why do you refuse to address the issues by use of such disinformation tactics (rule 8 – invoke authority)?’
  9. Play Dumb ~ No matter what evidence or logical argument is offered, avoid discussing issues except with denials they have any credibility, make any sense, provide any proof, contain or make a point, have logic, or support a conclusion. Mix well for maximum effect.
    • Example: ‘Nothing you say makes any sense. Your logic is idiotic. Your facts nonexistent. Better go back to the drawing board and try again.’
    • Proper response: ‘You are avoiding the issue with disinformation tactics. You evade the issues with your own form of nonsense while others, perhaps more intelligent than you pretend to be, have no trouble with the material. Why do you refuse to address the issues by use of such disinformation tactics (Rule 9 – play dumb)?’
  10. Associate Opponent Charges with Old News ~ A derivative of the straw man — usually, in any large-scale matter of high visibility, someone will make charges early on which can be or were already easily dealt with – a kind of investment for the future should the matter not be so easily contained.) Where it can be foreseen, have your own side raise a straw man issue and have it dealt with early on as part of the initial contingency plans. Subsequent charges, regardless of validity or new ground uncovered, can usually then be associated with the original charge and dismissed as simply being a rehash without need to address current issues — so much the better where the opponent is or was involved with the original source.
    • Example: ‘Flight 553’s crash was pilot error, according to the NTSB findings. Digging up new witnesses who say the CIA brought it down at a selected spot and were waiting for it with 50 agents won’t revive that old dead horse buried by NTSB more than twenty years ago.’
    • Proper response: ‘You are avoiding the issue with disinformation tactics. Your ignore the issues and imply they are old charges as if new information is irrelevant to truth. Why do you refuse to address the issues by use of such disinformation tactics (rule 10 – associate charges with old news)?’
  11. Establish and Rely Upon Fall-Back Positions ~ Using a minor matter or element of the facts, take the ‘high road’ and ‘confess’ with candor that some innocent mistake, in hindsight, was made — but that opponents have seized on the opportunity to blow it all out of proportion and imply greater criminalities which, ‘just isn’t so.’ Others can reinforce this on your behalf, later, and even publicly ‘call for an end to the nonsense’ because you have already ‘done the right thing.’ Done properly, this can garner sympathy and respect for ‘coming clean’ and ‘owning up’ to your mistakes without addressing more serious issues.
    • Example: ‘Reno admitted in hindsight she should have taken more time to question the data provided by subordinates on the deadliness of CS-4 and the likely Davidian response to its use, but she was so concerned about the children that she elected, in what she now believes was a sad and terrible mistake, to order the tear gas be used.’
    • Proper response: ‘You are avoiding the issue with disinformation tactics. Your evade the true issue by focusing on a side issue in an attempt to evoke sympathy. Perhaps you did not know that CIA Public Relations expert Mark Richards was called in to help Janet Reno with the Waco aftermath response? How warm and fuzzy it makes us feel, so much so that we are to ignore more important matters being discussed. Why do you refuse to address the issues by use of such disinformation tactics (rule 11 – establish and rely upon fall-back positions)?’
  12. Enigmas Have No Solution ~ Drawing upon the overall umbrella of events surrounding the crime and the multitude of players and events, paint the entire affair as too complex to solve. This causes those otherwise following the matter to begin to loose interest more quickly without having to address the actual issues.
    • Example: ‘I don’t see how you can claim Vince Foster was murdered since you can’t prove a motive. Before you could do that, you would have to completely solve the whole controversy over everything that went on in the White House and in Arkansas, and even then, you would have to know a heck of a lot more about what went on within the NSA, the Travel Office, and the secret Grand Jury, and on, and on, and on. It’s hopeless. Give it up.’
    • Proper response: ‘You are avoiding the issue with disinformation tactics. Your completely evade issues and attempt others from daring to attempt it by making it a much bigger mountain than necessary. You eat an elephant one bite at a time. Why do you refuse to address the issues by use of such disinformation tactics (rule 12 – enigmas have no solution)?’
  13. Alice in Wonderland Logic ~  Avoid discussion of the issues by reasoning backwards or with an apparent deductive logic which forbears any actual material fact.
    • Example: ‘The news media operates in a fiercely competitive market where stories are gold. This means they dig, dig, dig for the story — often doing a better job than law enforcement. If there was any evidence that BATF had prior knowledge of the Oklahoma City bombing, they would surely have uncovered it and reported it. They haven’t reported it, so there can’t have been any prior knowledge. Put up or shut up.’
    • Proper response: ‘You are avoiding the issue with disinformation tactics. Your backwards logic does not work here. Has media reported CIA killed Kennedy when they knew it? No, despite their presence at a courtroom testimony ‘confession’ by CIA operative Marita Lornez in a liable trial between E. Howard Hunt and Liberty Lobby, they only told us the trial verdict. THAT, would have been the biggest story of the Century, but they didn’t print it, did they? Why do you refuse to address the issues by use of such disinformation tactics (rule 13 – Alice in Wonderland logic)?’
  14. Demand Complete Solutions ~  Avoid the issues by requiring opponents to solve the crime at hand completely, a ploy which works best with issues qualifying for rule 10.
    • Example: ‘Since you know so much, if James Earl Ray is as innocent as you claim, who really killed Martin Luther King, how was it planned and executed, how did they frame Ray and fool the FBI, and why?’
    • Proper response: You are avoiding the issue with disinformation tactics. It is not necessary to completely resolve any full matter in order to examine any relative attached issue. Discussion of any evidence of Ray’s innocence can stand alone to serve truth, and any alternative solution to the crime, while it may bolster that truth, can also stand alone. Why do you refuse to address the issues by use of such disinformation tactics (rule 14 – demand complete solutions)?
  15. Fit the Facts to Alternate Conclusions ~ This requires creative thinking unless the crime was planned with contingency conclusions in place.
    • Example: ‘The cargo door failed on Flight 800 and caused a catastrophic breakup which ruptured the fuel tank and caused it to explode.’
    • Proper response: The best definitive example of avoiding issues by this technique is, perhaps, Arlan Specter’s Magic Bullet from the Warren Report. This was eloquently defeated in court but media blindly accepted it without challenge. Thus rewarded, disinformationalists do not shrink from its application, even though today, thanks in part to the movie, JFK, most Americans do now understand it was fabricated nonsense. Thus the defense which works best may actually be to cite the Magic Bullet. ‘You are avoiding the issue with disinformation tactics. Your imaginative twisting of facts rivals that of Arlan Specter’s Magic Bullet in the Warren Report. We all know why the impossible magic bullet was invented. You invent a cargo door problem when there has been not one shred of evidence from the crash investigation to support it, and in fact, actual photos of the cargo door hinges and locks disprove you. Why do you refuse to address the issues by use of such disinformation tactics (rule 15 – fit facts to an alternate conclusion)?’
  16. Vanish Evidence and Witnesses ~ If it does not exist, it is not fact, and you won’t have to address the issue.
    • Example: ‘You can’t say Paisley is still alive… that his death was faked and the list of CIA agents found on his boat deliberately placed there to support a purge at CIA. You have no proof. Why can’t you accept the Police reports?’ This is a good ploy, since the dental records and autopsy report showing his body was two inches too long and the teeth weren’t his were lost right after his wife demanded inquiry, and since his body was cremated before she could view it — all that remains are the Police Reports. Handy.
    • Proper response: There is no suitable response to actual vanished materials or persons, unless you can shed light on the matter, particularly if you can tie the event to a cover up other criminality. However, with respect to dialog where it is used against the discussion, you can respond… ‘You are avoiding the issue with disinformation tactics. The best you can say is that the matter is in contention ONLY because of highly suspicious matters such as the simultaneous and mysterious vanishing of three sets of evidence. The suspicious nature itself tends to support the primary allegation. Why do you refuse to address the remaining issues by use of such disinformation tactics (rule 16 – vanish evidence and witnesses)?’
  17. Change the Subject ~ Usually in connection with one of the other ploys listed here, find a way to side-track the discussion with abrasive or controversial comments in hopes of turning attention to a new, more manageable topic. This works especially well with companions who can ‘argue’ with you over the new topic and polarize the discussion arena in order to avoid discussing more key issues.
    • Example: ‘There were no CIA drugs and was no drug money laundering through Mena, Arkansas, and certainly, there was no Bill Clinton knowledge of it because it simply didn’t happen. This is merely an attempt by his opponents to put Clinton off balance and at a disadvantage in the election: Dole is such a weak candidate with nothing to offer that they are desperate to come up with something to swing the polls. Dole simply has no real platform.’ Assistant’s response. ‘You idiot! Dole has the clearest vision of what’s wrong with Government since McGovern. Clinton is only interested in raping the economy, the environment, and every woman he can get his hands on…’ One naturally feels compelled, regardless of party of choice, to jump in defensively on that one…
    • Proper response: ‘You are both avoiding the issue with disinformation tactics. Your evade discussion of the issues by attempting to sidetrack us with an emotional response to a new topic — a trap which we will not fall into willingly. If you truly believe such political rhetoric, please drop out of this discussion, as it is not germane, and take it to one of the more appropriate politics NGs. Why do you refuse to address the issues by use of such disinformation tactics (rule 17- change the subject)?’
  18. Emotionalize, Antagonize, and Goad Opponents ~ If you can’t do anything else, chide and taunt your opponents and draw them into emotional responses which will tend to make them look foolish and overly motivated, and generally render their material somewhat less coherent. Not only will you avoid discussing the issues in the first instance, but even if their emotional response addresses the issue, you can further avoid the issues by then focusing on how ‘sensitive they are to criticism.’
    • Example: ‘You are such an idiot to think that possible — or are you such a paranoid conspiracy buff that you think the ‘gubment’ is cooking your pea-brained skull with microwaves, which is the only justification you might have for dreaming up this drivel.’ After a drawing an emotional response: ‘Ohhh… I do seem to have touched a sensitive nerve. Tsk, tsk. What’s the matter? The truth too hot for you to handle? Perhaps you should stop relying on the Psychic Friends Network and see a psychiatrist for some real professional help…’
    • Proper response: ‘You are avoiding the issue with disinformation tactics. You attempt to draw me into emotional response without discussion of the issues. If you have something useful to contribute which defeats my argument, let’s here it — preferably without snide and unwarranted personal attacks, if you can manage to avoid sinking so low. Your useless rhetoric serves no purpose here if that is all you can manage. Why do you refuse to address the issues by use of such disinformation tactics (rule 18 – emotionalize, antagonize, and goad opponents)?’
  19. Ignore Proof Presented, Demand Impossible Proofs ~ This is perhaps a variant of the ‘play dumb’ rule. Regardless of what material may be presented by an opponent in public forums, claim the material irrelevant and demand proof that is impossible for the opponent to come by (it may exist, but not be at his disposal, or it may be something which is known to be safely destroyed or withheld, such as a murder weapon.) In order to completely avoid discussing issues, it may be required that you to categorically deny and be critical of media or books as valid sources, deny that witnesses are acceptable, or even deny that statements made by government or other authorities have any meaning or relevance.
    • Example: ‘All he’s done is to quote the liberal media and a bunch of witnesses who aren’t qualified. Where’s his proof? Show me wreckage from flight 800 that shows a missile hit it!’
    • Proper response: ‘You are avoiding the issue with disinformation tactics. You presume for us not to accept Don Phillips, reporter for the Washington Post, Al Baker, Craig Gordon or Liam Pleven, reporters for Newsday, Matthew Purdy or Matthew L. Wald, Don Van Natta Jr., reporters for the New York Times, or Pat Milton, wire reporter for the Associated Press — as being able to tell us anything useful about the facts in this matter. Neither would you allow us to accept Robert E. Francis, Vice Chairman of the NTSB, Joseph Cantamessa Jr., Special Agent In Charge of the New York Office of the F.B.I., Dr. Charles Wetli, Suffolk County Medical Examiner, the Pathologist examining the bodies, nor unnamed Navy divers, crash investigators, or other cited officials, including Boeing Aircraft representatives a part of the crash investigative team — as a qualified party in this matter, and thus, dismisses this material out of hand. Good logic, — about as good as saying 150 eye witnesses aren’t qualified. Then you demand us to produce evidence which you know is not accessible to us, evidence held by FBI, whom we accuse of cover up. Thus, only YOU are qualified to tell us what to believe? Witnesses be damned? Radar tracks be damned? Satellite tracks be damned? Reporters be damned? Photographs be damned? Government statements be damned? Is there a pattern here?. Why do you refuse to address the issues by use of such disinformation tactics (rule 19 – ignore proof presented, demand impossible proofs)?’
  20. False Evidence ~ Whenever possible, introduce new facts or clues designed and manufactured to conflict with opponent presentations — as useful tools to neutralize sensitive issues or impede resolution. This works best when the crime was designed with contingencies for the purpose, and the facts cannot be easily separated from the fabrications.
    • Example: Jack Ruby warned the Warren Commission that the white Russian separatists, the Solidarists, were involved in the assassination. This was a handy ‘confession’, since Jack and Earl were both on the same team in terms of the cover up, and since it is now known that Jack worked directly with CIA in the assassination (see below.)
    • Proper response: This one can be difficult to respond to unless you see it clearly, such as in the following example, where more is known today than earlier in time… ‘You are avoiding the issue with disinformation tactics. Your information is known to have been designed to side track this issue. As revealed by CIA operative Marita Lorenz under oath offered in court in E. Howard Hunt vs. Liberty Lobby, CIA operatives E. Howard Hunt, James McCord, and others, met with Jack Ruby in Dallas the night before the assassination of JFK to distribute guns and money. Clearly, Ruby was a coconspirator whose ‘Solidarist confession’ was meant to sidetrack any serious investigation of the murder AWAY from CIA. Why do you refuse to address the issues by use of such disinformation tactics (rule 20 – false evidence)?’
  21. Call a Grand Jury, Special Prosecutor, or Other Empowered Investigative Body ~ Subvert the (process) to your benefit and effectively neutralize all sensitive issues without open discussion. Once convened, the evidence and testimony are required to be secret when properly handled. For instance, if you own the prosecuting attorney, it can insure a Grand Jury hears no useful evidence and that the evidence is sealed an unavailable to subsequent investigators. Once a favorable verdict is achieved, the matter can be considered officially closed. Usually, this technique is applied to find the guilty innocent, but it can also be used to obtain charges when seeking to frame a victim.
    • Example: According to one OK bombing Federal Grand Juror who violated the law to speak the truth, jurors were, contrary to law, denied the power of subpoena of witness of their choosing, denied the power of asking witnesses questions of their choosing, and relegated to hearing only evidence prosecution wished them to hear, evidence which clearly seemed fraudulent and intended to paint conclusions other than facts actually suggested.
    • Proper response: There is usually no adequate response to this tactic except to complain loudly at any sign of its application, particularly with respect to any possible cover up. This happened locally in Oklahoma, and as a result, a new Grand Jury has been called to rehear evidence that government officials knew in advance that the bombing was going to take place, and a number of new facts which indicate it was impossible for Timothy McVeigh to have done the deed without access to extremely advanced explosive devices such as available ONLY to the military or intelligence community, such as CIA’s METC technology. Media has refused to cover the new Oklahoma Grand Jury process, by they way.
  22. Manufacture a New Truth ~ Create your own expert(s), group(s), author(s), leader(s) or influence existing ones willing to forge new ground via scientific, investigative, or social research or testimony which concludes favorably. In this way, if you must actually address issues, you can do so authoritatively.
    • Example: The False Memory Syndrome Foundation and American Family Foundation and American and Canadian Psychiatric Associations fall into this category, as their founding members and/or leadership include key persons associated with CIA Mind Control research. Read The Professional Paranoid or Phsychic Dictatorship in the U.S.A. by Alex Constantine for more information. Not so curious, then, that (in a perhaps oversimplified explanation here) these organizations focus on, by means of their own “research findings”, that there is no such thing as Mind Control.
    • Proper response: Unless you are in a position to be well versed in the topic and know of the background and relationships involved in the opponent organization, you are not well equipped to fight this tactic.
  23. Create Bigger Distractions ~ If the above does not seem to be working to distract from sensitive issues, or to prevent unwanted media coverage of unstoppable events such as trials, create bigger news stories (or treat them as such) to distract the multitudes.
    • Example: To distract the public over the progress of a WTC bombing trial that seems to be uncovering nasty ties to the intelligence community, have an endless discussion of skaters whacking other skaters on the knee. To distract the public over the progress of the Waco trials that have the potential to reveal government sponsored murder, have an O.J. summer. To distract the public over an ever disintegrating McVeigh trial situation and the danger of exposing government involvements, come up with something else (Flight 800?) to talk about — or, keeping in the sports theme, how about sports fans shooting referees and players during a game and the focusing on the whole gun control thing?
    • Proper response: The best you can do is attempt to keep public debate and interest in the true issues alive and point out that the ‘news flap’ or other evasive tactic serves the interests of your opponents.
  24. Silence Critics ~ If the above methods do not prevail, consider removing opponents from circulation by some definitive solution so that the need to address issues is removed entirely. This can be by their death, arrest and detention, blackmail or destruction of their character by release of blackmail information, or merely by destroying them financially, emotionally, or severely damaging their health.
    • Example: As experienced by certain proponents of friendly fire theories with respect to flight 800 — send in FBI agents to intimidate and threaten that if they persisted further they would be subject to charges of aiding and abetting Iranian terrorists, of failing to register as a foreign agents, or any other trumped up charges. If this doesn’t work, you can always plant drugs and bust them.
    • Proper response: You have three defensive alternatives if you think yourself potential victim of this ploy. One is to stand and fight regardless. Another is to create for yourself an insurance policy which will point to your opponents in the event of any unpleasantness, a matter which requires superior intelligence information on your opponents and great care in execution to avoid dangerous pitfalls (see The Professional Paranoid by this author for suggestions on how this might be done). The last alternative is to cave in or run (same thing.)
  25. Vanish ~ If you are a key holder of secrets or otherwise overly illuminated and you think the heat is getting too hot, to avoid the issues, vacate the kitchen.
    • Example: Do a Robert Vesco and retire to the Caribbean. If you don’t, somebody in your organization may choose to vanish you the way of Vince Foster or Ron Brown.
    • Proper response: You will likely not have a means to attack this method, except to focus on the vanishing in hopes of uncovering it was by foul play or deceit as part of a deliberate cover up.

EOF

Essay by Charles S. Viar: “The Dark Art: Intelligence, Counterintelligence, and the Mind of the State” (2009)

Repost of an essay from 2009 by Charles S. Viar (Twitter: @Charles_S_Viar), present chairman of the Center for Intelligence Studies in Washington D.C. (reposted here for layout reasons; in accordance with the copyright notice at the bottom of the essay):

THE DARK ART

Intelligence, Counterintelligence, and the Mind of the State

Charles S. Viar

Although the origins of intelligence have been lost in the mists of time, the practice is at least as ancient as warfare. In what is perhaps the oldest written reference to an intelligence operation, The Book of Numbers recounts God’s command that Moses dispatch a reconnaissance team to scout the Israelite advance upon the Promised Land:

Send thou men, that they may search the land of Canaan, which I give unto the Children of Israel. Of every tribe of their fathers shall ye send a man, everyone a ruler among them…

Had the Canaanites possessed an effective counterintelligence capability, the story of the Israelite assault might have ended differently. For even a minimal foreknowledge of their intentions and capabilities would have made it possible for the Canaanites to organize a more effective defense. But as may be inferred from the Bible, they failed to detect the operation directed against them.

For that, they paid a fearsome price.

II.

Narrowly defined as “evaluated information,” intelligence is a dynamic process that involves the collection, analysis, and dissemination of data to national policymakers and other government officials of lesser rank. Intelligence serves to forewarn them of likely actions, events, and developments within their sphere of responsibility; and aids in matching available resources to threats and opportunities alike. As such, it is the sine qua non of effective statecraft.

More broadly, intelligence also serves as a force-multiplier. Much as Archimedes Lever makes it possible to magnify mechanical force transmitted across space, covert and clandestine intelligence operations make it possible for states to enhance the power they project beyond their frontiers. History is littered with examples of small and middling states exercising disproportionate influence through the deft application of secret intelligence.

Given the enormous – and occasionally decisive – advantages conferred by effective intelligence in the Great Game of Nations, well-governed states seek to maximize the effectiveness of their own intelligence services and to protect themselves against hostile services deployed against them. Domestic security typically provides one level of defense, and counterintelligence another.

III.

Although counterintelligence has been recognized as an integral component of state security since the Chinese military scholar Sun Tzu published The Art of War in the Fourth or Fifth century BC, the concept remains muddled. For almost two and a half millennia, the term itself has defied definition.

According to James Angleton, the legendary former Chief of CIA Counterintelligence, the term is ineffable. Although Angleton’s Deputy Chief for Operations generally concurred, he believed counterintelligence could nonetheless be described in terms of core functions. Angleton’s Deputy Chief for Analysis, however, disagreed with both. According to Raymond G. Rocca, counterintelligence is self-defined: it applies to any action undertaken to counter, i.e., negate, the efforts of hostile intelligence services.

Having studied under all three of the practitioners listed above, the writer of this paper eventually concluded Rocca’s understanding is more nearly correct; and has since argued that counterintelligence can be best illustrated by contrast. Where counterespionage – or security – seeks to neutralize individual spies and spy rings, counterintelligence attempts to neutralize hostile intelligence services as a whole.

IV.

In a more perfect world, intelligence services would aspire to comprehensive coverage of their targets. But in actual practice, physical, organizational, political, and budgetary constraints have traditionally forced them to limit their collection activities to data pertaining to the targeted state’s organization, capabilities, and intentions. More recently, intelligence services have been tasked with gathering financial, economic, and technical data as well; and with the development of remote collection techniques, the amount of raw data collected by major intelligence services has become staggering in both scope and volume.

From a theoretical standpoint, intelligence collection and analysis should not be especially difficult. But given the fact that intelligence services routinely devote a substantial portion of their resources to deception operations designed to deceive their adversaries, the task is far more difficult than it first appears. Tables of organization and orders of battle can be faked, deployment patterns and readiness indicators manipulated, and communications traffic played for purpose. Indeed, almost any sort of intelligence data can be fabricated and fed to foreign intelligence services through sacrificial spies, dangles, false defectors, and dispatched agents.

This inherent vulnerability to hostile deception operations lays bare what Angleton formally referred to as the Epistemological Problem:

Given the fact that foreign intelligence services routinely mount large and carefully crafted deception operations against us, how can we know what we believe to be true is actually so?

In less guarded moments, he called it “That damnable question.”

V.

As intelligence practitioners will attest, it is a damnable question indeed. Nonetheless, there are two solutions to the problem – one partial, the other complete.

The first solution is to look at intelligence data in terms of a jigsaw puzzle extending across time. After fitting together as many of the pieces as possible, one may flag those that are known to be true beyond doubt. Subsequent pieces that fit with those may be presumed true, in the absence of contrary evidence.

Although this approach has considerable merit – including especially the way it facilitates intuitive judgments – the results it generates are both probabilistic and tentative. The likelihood that new data may significantly alter the pattern is high.

In contrast, the second solution can provide definitive answers – but only rarely, when two relatively unlikely events occur simultaneously: 1) a high-level penetration agent confirms the validity of specific intelligence data, and 2) a code break “backstops” the veracity of the confirming agent. In the world of intelligence, certainty depends upon serendipity.

The recruitment of high-level penetration agents is rare, and code breaks are even more so. They occur together perhaps once a decade, and when they do intelligence analysts emerge from their garrets to enjoy a brief moment of clarity. But when the agent is lost or the codes are changed, they are condemned to wander once more through what Angleton termed “The Wilderness of Mirrors” – an Epistemological Hell from which neither truth nor falsehood may be surely obtained.

VI.

Determining the validity of intelligence data thus depends in part on recruiting from the enemy’s ranks senior political office holders or high-ranking government officials, and in part upon breaking their codes. But once affected, these unlikely circumstances open a window to other intriguing possibilities – including, specifically, offensive counterintelligence operations designed to penetrate, infiltrate, and suborn the target’s intelligence service in order to play it back against the state it serves. The ultimate goal of such operations is to entice or provoke the targeted state into undertaking ruinous and self-destructive actions.

As Angleton observed, successful politicians and senior government officials are a remarkably homogenous lot. For the most part, they derive from roughly comparable social circumstances and share core formative experiences in common. They attend the same schools – or at least the same types of schools – and are imbued with the same canon. They also hold remarkably similar beliefs and values, and share certain characteristic attitudes regarding the larger world. Together these form something akin to a collective psyche, or what Angleton termed the “Mind of the State.”

If states have minds, they also have states of mind – and as with individuals, it is their state of mind that makes them most vulnerable to deception. For a state of mind is a predisposition to belief or action; and if that predisposition can be accurately gauged, tempting or provoking the targeted decision-makers to ruin becomes a plausible exercise in perception management.

VII.

If there is a single failing common to decision-makers throughout history, it is an excessive faith in intelligence. For reasons that remain obscure, decision-makers seem unable or unwilling to grasp the implications of the Epistemological Problem Angleton described. Despite ample warnings, they almost invariably place far more credence in intelligence reports than they deserve; and it is upon this most basic failing that offensive counterintelligence plays.

In The Art of War, Sun Tzu wrote “Supreme excellence is to subdue the enemy without fighting” and argued this end may best be achieved by manipulating the “Golden Threads” of intelligence – that is, the lines of communications that connect agents recruited from within the enemy’s camp to one’s own.  The first Golden Thread may be activated by sacrificing deliberately misinformed low-level agents for capture, dangling double agents for enemy recruitment, and dispatching false defectors to the enemy’s camp. The second is brought into play by querying the agent-in-place to determine how the enemy decision-makers have interpreted the false information they delivered. If the information evokes the intended state of mind, the false message can be reinforced by repeating the process in different ways. If not, it can be modulated until it does.

By these means offensive counterintelligence operations can create a false picture of reality in the minds of targeted decision-makers, much as an artist paints an image upon a sheet of canvass. Brush stroke by brush stroke, the attacking service can exploit the enemy intelligence service it suborned to systematically manipulate the Mind of the State.

VIII.

The many critics of offensive counterintelligence argue that strategic deception operations of the size and scale suggested above are far too complex and complicated to be practical, as they are doomed to eventually collapse under their own weight. The criticism is true at least in part, but nonetheless disingenuous. Intelligence operations of any sort have a relatively short shelf life; and unless shut down by those who initiated them or uncovered by their intended targets, they will ALL eventually collapse for similar cause.

Perhaps more to the point, modern history is strewn with examples of successful strategic deceptions including the TRUST operation of the 1920’s, which saved the nascent Soviet state from ruin; the Soviet-sponsored WIN operation that forced the United States to abandon its post-war efforts to liberate Eastern Europe; and the Anglo-American deception operation that made possible the successful invasion of Normandy in 1944. All of these operations were conducted in the manner outlined above, and each inflicted massive damage upon the states they targeted.

Unfortunately, the United States abandoned its national counterintelligence capability in December of 1974 – and with it, the ability to mount large-scale strategic deception operations. Redefined and re-envisioned by successive administrations, counterintelligence had been reduced to little more than a security function until the Clinton Administration partially resurrected it after disastrous and overlapping penetrations of the CIA and the FBI were uncovered in the 1990’s. Expanded and reorganized in the aftermath of 9-11, a National Counterintelligence Executive now exists as a semi-autonomous supervisory agency. And yet despite the many long overdue reforms that have been undertaken since 2001, U.S. counterintelligence remains hobbled by an obtuse and legalistic definition, conceptual confusion, tangled jurisdictions, and – above all – by institutional timidity. For while offensive counterintelligence operations are now officially recognized, they remain tightly controlled and rarely sanctioned. They are tactical operations, most often mounted in reprisal.

Despite ample modern precedents, strategic deception operations of the sort advocated by Sun Tzu and refined by Angleton remain beyond the pale. This is unfortunate and – for those that seek to limit the suffering caused by armed conflict – deeply disconcerting.

For in the Great Game of Nations, offensive counterintelligence remains the only plausible means for achieving victory without war. For if only in theory, it is the primary offensive instrument of state.
________________

Published by the Center for Intelligence Studies.
1016 K Street NE. Washington, DC. 20002
202 / 399-0292

Copyright 2009. This paper may be reproduced in part or in whole for civic or educational purposes, provided that context is preserved and full attribution is given

EOF

[Dutch] Nederlandse aanpak tegengaan statelijke dreigingen (citaten uit kamerbrief Grapperhaus dd 18 april 2019)

Voor eigen doeleinden (waaronder quick reference) licht ik hieronder de tabel “Aanpak tegengaan statelijke dreigingen” en bijlage van de kamerbrief van Grapperhaus d.d. 18 april 2019 over statelijke dreigingen uit.

1. Tabel: “Aanpak tegengaan statelijke dreigingen”

Aanpak tegengaan statelijke dreigingen
A. Systematiek belangen dreiging weerbaarheid Volgens een vaste systematiek van belangen-dreiging-weerbaarheid wordt bezien welke veiligheidsbelangen beschermd moeten worden, wat de dreiging is vanuit statelijke actoren voor de nationale veiligheid en hoe de weerbaarheid vergroot kan worden. Dit is een constant proces. Hierbij zijn bij uitstek de lidstaten van de EU en NAVO en binnen Nederland meerdere ministeries, lokaal bestuur en private organisaties betrokken. Dat vergt coördinatie en verbinding.
De Minister van Justitie en Veiligheid richt zich, vanuit het perspectief van nationale veiligheid, in samenspraak met andere departementale partners op coördinatie en afstemming tussen de verschillende betrokkenen, verantwoordelijkheden, initiatieven, projecten en informatiestromen.
In deze lijn is onlangs een Taskforce Economische Veiligheid opgericht die in het teken staat van kwetsbaarheden en beheersmaatregelen van het 5G-netwerk.
B. Verbetering informatiepositie Er wordt ingezet op verbetering van de informatiepositie en informatiedeling tussen en met gelijkgestemde partijen, zowel nationaal als internationaal om tijdig zicht te krijgen op en duiden van de (potentiële) dreigingen. Daartoe moet informatie delen gemakkelijker en logischer worden, waardoor een gedeeld normbeeld kan ontstaan.
Waar nodig worden interdepartementale trusted communities ingericht of versterkt.
Werkafspraken rondom specifieke onderwerpen zorgen er voor dat indien nodig informatie snel kan worden gedeeld en handelingsperspectief voor handen is.
Ook in internationaal verband vindt nauwe samenwerking plaats ten aanzien van dreiging en best practices in de aanpak.
Ambassades hebben een belangrijke monitoring- en signaleringsfunctie ter bevordering van het situationeel bewustzijn.
Nederland neemt in EU-verband deel aan het Rapid Alert System, waar direct informatie wordt uitgewisseld in geval van desinformatie campagnes.
In Nederland wordt de civiel-militaire samenwerking geïntensiveerd.
C. Bewustwording & oefenen Bewustwording vormt een belangrijke schakel in het verhogen van de weerbaarheid tegen de dreiging vanuit statelijke actoren.
Er wordt fors ingezet op bewustwording bij onder andere inkopers, ambtenaren, gemeenten, vitale infrastructuur, CEO’s en richting het publiek door middel van bijvoorbeeld bijeenkomsten, voorlichting en communicatiemateriaal. Een voorbeeld hiervan is de bewustwordingscampagne desinformatie die is gestart.
Op nationaal en internationaal niveau wordt geoefend op identificatie van en respons op statelijke dreigingen, mede door het ontwikkelen van en oefenen met scenario’s. Deelname aan oefeningen van NAVO (CMX) en EU (PACE) wordt voortgezet.
D. Integrale kennisontwikkeling Door middel van een integrale onderzoeksagenda en kennisontwikkeling op het gebied van weerbaarheid tegen statelijke dreigingen wordt gezamenlijk kennis opgebouwd.
E. Maatregelen ter verdediging en afschrikking Nederland zet zich ook in voor verdere ontwikkeling van maatregelen ter verdediging en afschrikking.
Diplomatiek: Binnen het responskader heeft het kabinet verschillende diplomatieke instrumenten tot haar beschikking om statelijke dreigingen tegen te gaan.
Ter verdediging van de nationale veiligheid zet Nederland zich, waar mogelijk in samenwerking met internationale partners, in voor verdere ontwikkeling van een effectief diplomatiek responskader, inclusief attributie. Zo kan bij aanvallen van statelijke actoren worden gekozen om tot (publieke) attributie over te gaan.
De aanpak op ongewenste buitenlandse inmenging blijft actueel en verbreed zich naar meerdere landen.
Politieke beïnvloeding wordt tegengegaan door toerusting en bescherming politieke ambtsdragers, een verkenning registratieplicht lobbyisten, veilig verloop van de verkiezingen door het onderkennen van bijzondere signalen, beïnvloeding en desinformatie.
In de Defensienota en het Nationaal Plan zet Defensie in op versterking van capaciteiten oa op het gebied van inlichtingen, cyber en contra-hybrid. In de nieuwe Defensienota zal volgend jaar ingegaan worden op verdere doorontwikkeling ten behoeve van nationale en internationale veiligheid.
F. Economie en Veiligheid Het instrumentarium om onze economische veiligheid te borgen tegen nationale veiligheidsrisico’s moet op orde zijn. Maatwerk, proportionaliteit en aandacht voor de verschillende belangen die spelen zijn daarbij belangrijke uitgangspunten van de aanpak.
Ten aanzien van economische veiligheid wordt onder andere gewerkt aan een uitwerking van een investeringstoets op nationale veiligheidsrisico’s bij overnames en investeringen, aan de ontwikkeling en uitrol van beleid en richtlijnen bij inkoop en aanbesteding bij de overheid en binnen de vitale infrastructuur. Ook wordt gewerkt aan een uitbreiding van de kennisregeling ivm weglekken gevoelige technologie via het academische vlak.
Bij het toetsen van nationale veiligheidsrisico’s wordt gebruik gemaakt van consistente, en technisch up to date zijnde criteria.
G. Digitale aanpak Het kabinet zet middels de Nederlandse Cybersecurity Agenda (NCSA), die in april 2018 aan uw Kamer is verzonden, de Internationale Cyberstrategie en de GBVS, in op een digitaal veilig Nederland. In de aanpak wordt ook rekening gehouden met de invloed van statelijke actoren.
Zo wordt bijvoorbeeld geïnvesteerd in het versterken van de weerbaarheid van digitale processen en een meer robuuste infrastructuur en wordt de digitale slagkracht verder op orde gebracht om te kunnen reageren op de toename van de digitale dreiging en grootschalige cyberincidenten die de nationale veiligheid bedreigen.
In een aparte brief wordt uw Kamer, in samenhang met het CSBN 2019, nog voor de zomer geïnformeerd over de jaarlijkse voortgang van de NCSA.
H. Internationale samenwerking Nederland zet zich in internationaal verband in lijn met de Geïntegreerde Buitenland- en Veiligheidsstrategie in voor:
Goede samenwerking in EU- en NAVO-verband, als ook tussen EU en NAVO, op het gebied van situationeel bewustzijn, weerbaarheid en respons. In EU-verband staan de 22 actiepunten centraal zoals geformuleerd in het Gezamenlijk Kader voor de Bestrijding van Hybride Bedreigingen (2016). In NAVO-verband is de NATO Strategy on NATO’s role in Countering Hybrid Warfare (2015) het leidend kader.
Accurate (internationale) informatiepositie in nauwe samenwerking met internationale partners om informatie uit te wisselen. In EU- en NAVO verband en ad hoc met gelijkgezinde partners.
Het bevorderen van de internationale rechtsorde en een effectief multilateraal systeem op het gebied van statelijke dreigingen. Om de toenemende dreiging het hoofd te bieden zet NL, waar mogelijk en relevant, in op gezamenlijke respons en attributie van operaties.
Geloofwaardige afschrikking tegen statelijke dreigingen in bondgenootschappelijk verband, onder andere in NAVO-verband. In juli 2018 is besloten tot instelling van Counter Hybrid Support Teams (CHST), ofwel NAVO-teams die bondgenoten kunnen adviseren en assisteren rondom hybride dreigingen.
Benutting van het European Centre of Excellence on Countering Hybrid Threats als netwerkorganisatie en platform voor expertiseontwikkeling. Nederland is hier sinds 2018 bij aangesloten.
Verbeterde samenwerking tussen de verschillende EU instellingen om onderwerpen met de noodzakelijke samenhang te adresseren (zoals onder meer desinformatie, verkiezingen, cybersecurity, crisisbeheersing, vitale infrastructuur en buitenlandse overnames).
Met het aantreden van een nieuwe Europese Commissie in 2019 ontstaat een belangrijk momentum om een lans te breken voor een consistentere aanpak op het gebied van interne veiligheid, waaronder statelijke dreigingen.1

1Staat van de Europese Unie 2019, Kamerstuk 35 078, nr. 1.

2. Bijlage: “Accenten van de aanpak statelijke dreigingen”

Bijlage: Accenten van de aanpak statelijke dreigingen

De aanpak rondom het tegengaan van statelijke dreigingen bestaat uit een aantal generieke maatregelen, zoals beschreven in de brief. Gezien de dreiging, de te beschermen belangen en de recente casuïstiek ligt daarnaast het accent van de aanpak de komende periode op de thema’s:

(1) ongewenste buitenlandse inmenging gericht op diaspora, (2) beschermen democratische processen en instituties en (3) economische veiligheid.

Binnen deze thema’s zijn voor een deel al belangrijke stappen gezet en zijn ook weer nieuwe facetten onderkend die een versterkte aanpak behoeven. In deze bijlage treft u de aanpak op deze thema’s aan inclusief uitkomsten ex-ante analyses op economische veiligheid.

1. Ongewenste buitenlandse inmenging gericht op diaspora

Ongewenste buitenlandse inmenging gericht op de diaspora betreft doelbewuste, vaak stelselmatige en in vele gevallen heimelijke activiteiten van statelijke actoren (of actoren die aan statelijke actoren zijn te relateren) in Nederland of gericht op Nederlandse belangen, die door de nagestreefde doelen, de gebruikte middelen of ressorterende effecten het politieke en maatschappelijke systeem kunnen ondergraven. Nederlandse burgers moeten, ongeacht hun achtergrond, in de Nederlandse rechtsstaat in staat zijn om in vrijheid eigen keuzes te maken als het gaat om de inrichting van hun leven, politieke voorkeur en de band met hun land van oorsprong of dat van hun ouders. Contacten vanuit een statelijke actor met Nederlandse burgers dienen op transparante wijze plaats te vinden en op basis van vrijwilligheid en mogen niet leiden tot het exporteren van spanningen naar Nederlands grondgebied of een negatieve invloed op de integratie of de binding met de Nederlandse samenleving.

In het afgelopen jaar zijn verschillende voorbeelden geweest van ongewenste buitenlandse inmenging gericht op diaspora waarover uw Kamer is ingelicht.1 De aanpak op ongewenste buitenlandse inmenging is een generieke – landen neutrale – aanpak waarover uw Kamer eerder is ingelicht.

Betrokken departementen en diensten staan doorlopend in nauw contact om op basis van een gezamenlijke en gestructureerde werkwijze een beeld te vormen en indien nodig te besluiten tot gecoördineerde actie en opschaling. Bij (dreigende) incidenten wordt gebruik gemaakt van een divers instrumentarium. Dit loopt uiteen van monitoren en informeren, tot maatregelen in het kader van de openbare orde en veiligheid. Daarnaast heeft het kabinet verschillende diplomatieke instrumenten, zoals het voeren van een dialoog met landen van zorg of een diplomatieke vertegenwoordiger in Nederland persona non grata verklaren, om ongewenste buitenlandse inmenging tegen te gaan.

Ook zet het kabinet in op maatregelen om de weerbaarheid van betrokken gemeenten en gemeenschappen te verhogen als het gaat om ongewenste buitenlandse inmenging. Het gaat hier zowel om het creëren van bewustwording als het ondersteunen van gemeenten en gemeenschappen bij de ontwikkeling van een handelingsperspectief om ongewenste buitenlandse inmenging die de integratie kunnen belemmeren tegen te gaan.

Ongewenste buitenlandse inmenging blijft een actueel thema (motie Becker2, waarover u voor de zomer wordt geïnformeerd en financiering als modus operandi van statelijke actoren 3), maar ook vanwege ontwikkelingen in andere landen en veranderingen in de migratiestromen. Dit rechtvaardigt een onverminderde inzet op dit onderwerp.

1 Onder meer via de volgende Kamerstukken:

  • –  Beantwoording Kamervragen over het bericht dat de Turkse president Erdogan campagne wil voeren in het buitenland voor de Turkse presidents- en parlementsverkiezingen in juni,TK, vergaderjaar 2017-2018, 2591
  • –  Antwoorden Kamervragen over het bericht ‘Russische trollen ook actief in Nederland’ /ingezonden 7 sept 2018. Kamerstuk nr 14250
  • –  Brief sancties Iran, 8 januari 2019, Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 2018–2019, 35 000 V, nr. 56
  • –  Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 2018–2019, 32 735, nr. 209
  • –  Beantwoording Kamervragen over het bericht «So werden Erdogan-Kritiker in Deutschland per App denunziert» ) Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 2018–2019, Aanhangsel

2  Motie van het lid Becker c.s. over een contrastrategie ten aanzien van ongewenste diasporapolitiek, Tweede Kamer, 30821-56.
3  
Kamerbrief Integrale aanpak Problematisch gedrag en ongewenste buitenlandse financiering van maatschappelijke en religieuze instellingen, Tweede Kamer, 2018-2019, 29614 nr. 108

2. Beschermen democratische processen en instituties

Het tweede accent van de aanpak richt zich op het tegengaan van het ondermijnen van de democratische rechtsstaat door statelijke actoren. Via verschillende maatregelen wordt hier op ingezet:

Tegengaan politieke beïnvloeding door staten Al eerder werd in het kader van ongewenste buitenlandse inmenging aangekondigd dat wordt ingezet op het vergroten van de weerbaarheid van – met name lokale – politieke ambtsdragers. Daarbij richten we ons op twee lijnen, te weten (1) het beschermen van politieke ambtsdragers (hierbij gaat het om het zorgdragen voor de veiligheid en integriteit van politieke ambtsdragers) en (2) het toerusten van politieke ambtsdragers (gericht op het versterken van de kennis, kunde en het handelingsvermogen van politieke ambtsdragers) om ondermijning van de democratische rechtsorde effectief tegen te kunnen gaan. Verder vindt rondom het handelingsvermogen en het verhogen van transparantie in het politiek-bestuurlijke domein een verkenning plaats naar de wenselijkheid en mogelijkheid van een registratieplicht voor lobbyisten. De Verenigde Staten, Australië en Canada, kennen al een dergelijke registratieplicht.

Veilige verkiezingen Acties van statelijke actoren kunnen schade toebrengen aan de politieke en bestuurlijke integriteit wanneer deze onafhankelijke volksvertegenwoordiging, besluitvorming of rechtspraak compromitteert, of wanneer er twijfel is over de vrijheid, eerlijkheid en anonimiteit van verkiezingen. De democratische samenleving komt onder druk te staan, wanneer inmengingsactiviteiten bijdragen aan een gebrek aan acceptatie van de legitimiteit van de overheid of een gebrek aan solidariteit in de samenleving, polarisatie en enclavevorming. Of wanneer intolerantie verspreid wordt en vrijheden beperkt worden. Verschillende departementen en operationele en lokale partners dragen, onder coördinatie van de minister van BZK, tezamen zorg voor veilige verkiezingen vanuit de eigen verantwoordelijkheid. Binnen het Europees verkiezingsnetwerk worden kennis en expertise tussen de lidstaten en de instellingen uitgewisseld. Het kabinet heeft daarbij met name oog voor de onderkenning van bijzondere signalen, ongewenste beïnvloeding en desinformatie.

Tegengaan desinformatie De verspreiding van desinformatie met als doel de democratische rechtsorde te ondermijnen en te destabiliseren is een reële dreiging. Deze dreiging manifesteert zich veelal online. Het kabinet ziet de verspreiding van desinformatie als een probleem waarbij van verschillende partijen in de samenleving gevraagd wordt dat zij hun verantwoordelijkheid nemen, zoals private actoren, de media en wetenschap4. De inzet van het kabinet is daarbij met name gericht op het tegengaan van heimelijke beïnvloeding van de publieke opinie door statelijke actoren (of actoren die aan statelijke actoren zijn te relateren). Belangrijke uitgangspunten voor het kabinet bij het zoeken naar een juiste reactie zijn onder andere dat waarborging van de vrijheid van meningsuiting en vrije pers, democratie en rechtsstaat voorop staan en de focus op campagnes in plaats van individuele nieuwsberichten. Wanneer echter sprake is van een bedreiging van de economische of politieke stabiliteit of nationale veiligheid door inmenging van statelijke of daaraan gelieerde actoren, is een reactie van de overheid gegrond.

In de brede aanpak5 wordt gewerkt aan maatregelen om voorbereid te zijn op desinformatie, signalen te herkennen, deze te duiden, mogelijke proportionele respons te formuleren en indien gewenst uit te voeren zonder afbreuk te doen aan de eerdergenoemde vrijheden. Doordat desinformatie zich veelal online manifesteert, stopt het niet bij de grens. Nederland hecht daarom waarde aan internationale samenwerking en kennisuitwisseling op dit onderwerp. In dat kader verwelkomt Nederland het Europese Actieplan Desinformatie, zoals ook uiteengezet in het BNC-fiche Actieplan Desinformatie (d.d. 25 januari 2019). Een voortvloeisel uit het Actieplan is de Nederlandse deelname in EU-verband aan het Europees Verkiezingsnetwerk en het Rapid Alert System (RAS). In het Europees Verkiezingsnetwerk wordt de overkoepelende aanpak van desinformatie en bescherming van verkiezingen besproken en kennis uitgewisseld tussen lidstaten en EU-instellingen. Het RAS verbindt analisten en beleidsmakers uit EU-lidstaten en de StratCom Taskforces van EDEO om real time informatie uit te wisselen als er sprake is van desinformatiecampagnes. Het Nationaal Crisis Centrum van de NCTV vervult de rol van nationaal Point of Contact voor het RAS, het ministerie van BZK vervult een dergelijke rol voor het Europees verkiezingsnetwerk waarbij alle relevante departementen zijn aangesloten.

4 Kamerbrief van de minister van BZK inzake desinformatie en beïnvloeding verkiezingen (13 december 2018) 5Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 2018-2019, 30821, nr 51

Tevens is Nederland lid van de informele ‘International Partnership to Counter State Sponsored Disinformation’ waarin onder meer de VS, het VK, Baltische en Noordse staten vertegenwoordigd zijn. Het partnerschap heeft tot doel analyses en rapportages over de verspreiding van desinformatie te delen en samenwerking richting techbedrijven te faciliteren.

3. Aanpak Economische Veiligheid Een derde accent is gericht op economische veiligheid. Hieronder vindt u de resultaten van de analyse die is uitgevoerd naar kwetsbaarheden in vitale sectoren alsmede de aanvullende beheersmaatregelen die van belang zijn om de risico’s voor de nationale veiligheid op het gebied van economische veiligheid verder te beperken.

Sectorale ex-ante analyses In het Regeerakkoord heeft het kabinet de bescherming van vitale sectoren aangekondigd, na zorgvuldige analyse van risico’s voor nationale veiligheid. In deze analyses is er bijzondere aandacht voor de risico’s als gevolg van veranderende zeggenschap.6 Het doel is om potentiële risico’s voor de nationale veiligheid per vitale sector te identificeren, en om daarbij te bepalen in hoeverre het bestaande instrumentarium van de overheid voldoende waarborgen biedt. In deze brief deel ik de uitkomsten van de sectorale ex-ante analyses met u en daarbij kom ik tegemoet aan de motie-Van den Berg c.s.7 en de motie-Graus.8

Uit de analyses blijkt dat vrijwel alle vitale sectoren op enigerlei wijze beschermd zijn tegen ongewenste zeggenschap. Daarbij is er een divers beeld van de mate en aard van de bescherming. Een aantal sectoren is in overheidshanden. De Nederlandse overheid kan daardoor (mede) bepalen aan wie en onder welke voorwaarden een bedrijf wordt verkocht. Daarbij worden ook nationale veiligheidsbelangen meegewogen. Een aantal sectoren worden beschermd door sectorale wetgeving. Uit de analyse op telecommunicatie blijkt dat in deze sector ongeadresseerde risico’s bij verandering in zeggenschap bestaan. Het kabinet heeft al in een eerder stadium besloten hier direct actie op te nemen en heeft inmiddels een wetsvoorstel over ongewenste zeggenschap in de telecommunicatiesector ter consultatie aangeboden aan uw Kamer9. Conclusies sectorale ex-ante analyses:

  •   De vitale sectoren, de inzet politie, inzet defensie, de nucleaire sector, openbare drinkwatervoorziening, vitale kerende en beherende objecten en de mainports Schiphol en Rotterdam zijn (grotendeels) in handen van de overheid. Voor een groot deel betreft dit kerntaken van de overheid, waarvan de zeggenschap van de overheid niet verandert. De risico’s voor de nationale veiligheid als gevolg van verandering van zeggenschap zijn hier daarom niet van toepassing.
  •   De vitale sector energie is voor wat betreft de transport- en distributienetwerken in handen van de overheid. De energielevering is verspreid over meerdere aanbieders, wat de risico’s verkleint. Daarnaast heeft de Minister van Economische Zaken en Klimaat de taak en bevoegdheid om een eventuele verandering van zeggenschap binnen de gas- en energieproductie te beoordelen.10 De risico’s voor de nationale veiligheid als gevolg van verandering van zeggenschap zijn daarom voldoende beheerst.
  •   De vitale sector telecommunicatie kent nationale veiligheidsrisico’s als gevolg van veranderende zeggenschap, die nog onvoldoende kunnen worden beheerst door wettelijke normen te stellen en daar toezicht op te houden. De risico’s voor de nationale veiligheid als gevolg van verandering van zeggenschap zullen daarom geborgd worden met aanvullende wetgeving.
  •   De vitale sectoren betalingsverkeer en chemie kennen strenge normen, en bijhorend publiek toezicht, om respectievelijk de integriteit van gegevens en de fysieke veiligheid te borgen die de belangrijkste risico’s voor de nationale veiligheid vormen. De risico’s voor de nationale veiligheid worden daarmee voldoende beheerst binnen deze sectoren. Uit de analyses blijkt dat de continuïteit en inzetbaarheid van (vrijwel) alle vitale processen, zowel in handen van overheid als bedrijfsleven, sterk afhankelijk zijn van private ondernemingen die goederen, diensten of technologie leveren. Dat betekent dat er kwetsbaarheden kunnen ontstaan bij aanbesteding en toelevering. Het kabinet neemt daarom de volgende maatregelen. 6 Regeerakkoord ‘Vertrouwen in de toekomst’, paragraaf 2.4. 7 Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 2016-2017, 29 826, nr. 84. 8 Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 2017-2018, 34 775 XIII, nr. 116. 9 Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 2018-2019, 35 153, nr. 5 10 Zie de Elektriciteitswet 1998 en de Gaswet.

Maatregelen

A. Oprichting Taskforce Economische Veiligheid

Er is een Taskforce Economische Veiligheid opgericht waarin, onder voorzitterschap van de NCTV, de balans tussen nationale veiligheidsbelangen en economische belangen nader verkend wordt, casuïstiek kan worden besproken en economische en veiligheidsbelangen integraal worden gewogen. Momenteel staat de Taskforce in het teken van de kwetsbaarheid van 5G telecommunicatienetwerken en welke maatregelen nodig zijn om risico’s te beheersen.

B. Betere benutting en aanscherping van huidige wet- en regelgeving ter bescherming van nationale veiligheid

Nederland beschikt over een aantal instrumenten die (beter) kunnen bijdragen aan de bescherming van nationale veiligheidsrisico’s bij private ondernemingen. Het betreft onder meer private juridische beschermingsconstructies, sectorale regelgeving, contractuele afspraken, de Ondernemingskamer en het aanwijzen van vertrouwensfuncties. Het kabinet is bezig met een evaluatie en aanscherping van huidige wet- en regelgeving, zodat deze beter kunnen worden benut.

C. Beschermen van nationale veiligheid bij inkoop en aanbesteding

Het kabinet zal de nationale veiligheidsrisico’s die door de afhankelijkheden kunnen ontstaan verder in kaart brengen en bezien hoe deze mogelijke risico’s bij onder andere inkoop en aanbesteding beheerst kunnen worden. In 2018 is voor veilige inkoop en aanbesteding binnen het rijk een instrumentarium ontwikkeld en ingevoerd door het kabinet. Op dit moment wordt bezien hoe dit ook ingezet kan worden binnen onderdelen van de vitale infrastructuur en mede overheden. Het kabinet gaat daarnaast de mogelijkheid van het neerleggen van nationale veiligheidsrichtlijnen voor het gebruik van producten en diensten binnen de Rijksoverheid, vitale infrastructuur en medeoverheden actiever inzetten. Ook werkt het kabinet in het kader van inkoop en aanbesteding aan de Nationale Cyber Security Agenda (NCSA) aan aanvullende cybersecurity- criteria bij inkoop van eigen ICT-middelen door de overheid. Bij deze eisen zullen ook economische veiligheidsoverwegingen worden meegenomen om de weerbaarheid tegen statelijke actoren te verhogen.

D. Beschermen nationale veiligheid bij overnames en investeringen

In de EU wordt ingezet op een verdere versterking van het samenwerkingsmechanisme op het gebied van buitenlandse investeringen. Enerzijds is er tot een raamwerk besloten voor de toetsing door individuele lidstaten van buitenlandse investeringen aan nationale veiligheid of de openbare orde. Anderzijds faciliteert en verplicht de verordening tot het uitwisselen van informatie tussen lidstaten en de Europese Commissie. De verordening vraagt om het realiseren van een samenwerkingsmechanisme waarvoor ook in Nederland processen voor onder andere informatie- uitwisseling moeten worden ingericht. Het raamwerk legt geen verplichtingen op voor een investeringstoets maar stelt wel kaders voor lidstaten die een toets wensen te implementeren.

Binnen dit Europese kader werkt het kabinet aan een uitwerking van een investeringstoets. Dit is een instrument ‘of last resort’ voor nationale veiligheidsrisico’s waarbinnen ruimte is voor maatwerk. Bestaande sectorale wetgeving zal daarbij het uitgangspunt zijn. Op deze manier krijgen, binnen het Europese kader, ook de nationale beleidswensen over de inhoud en reikwijdte van een breder beschermingsmechanismen plek. In de uitwerking zal gekeken worden naar overkoepelende ‘parapluwetgeving’ waar ook bestaande en toekomstige sectorale wetgeving goed op aangesloten is. Hierbij is het uitgangspunt dat een verbod in het kader van de investeringstoets alleen daar wordt ingezet indien er geen alternatieve effectieve beschermingsmaatregelen voor handen zijn.

Initiatieven die raken aan dit thema Naast deze set aan maatregelen om nationale veiligheidsrisico’s beheersbaar te maken zijn er nog een aantal andere initiatieven die onder andere raken aan dit thema. Hierbij staat de beschikbaarheid van kritische technologie en kennis centraal. Ongewenste kennis- en technologieoverdracht kan plaatsvinden in geval van bijvoorbeeld faillissementen en overname van start-ups en het risico van ongewenste kennis- en technologieoverdracht via de weg van (academisch) onderwijs en onderzoek. Er wordt onderzocht op welke manier de kennisregeling kan worden uitgebreid naar andere risicolanden en bijvoorbeeld opleidingen waar zeer specifieke technische kennis kan worden opgedaan11.

11 Zie tevens Kamerbrief, ‘Verscherpen toezicht op studenten en onderzoekers uit risicolanden’, Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 2018-2019, 30821, nr.70

Met een verkenning naar digitaal financieel economische spionage is het beeld ten aanzien van deze dreiging aangescherpt, en is bezien welk instrumentarium, complementair aan de maatregelen uit zoals de Internationale Cyber Strategie en de Nationale Cyber Security Agenda, van toepassing is om deze dreiging te mitigeren. Aanvullend instrumentarium, zoals bijvoorbeeld vergroting van het bewustzijn van deze dreiging, wordt in de verschillende beleidsterreinen opgenomen, zo ook in de aanpak tegengaan statelijke dreigingen. Het gaat hier ook om het inzetten van internationale samenwerking en diplomatieke instrumenten (inclusief attributie) zoals die in het kader van de EU Cyber Diplomacy Toolbox en om het benutten van bestaande WTO procedures ter zake waar opportuun.

 

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Dutch govt intelligence tasks for AIVD and MIVD, 2019-2022 (in Dutch: “Geïntegreerde Aanwijzing Inlichtingen en Veiligheid” aka “GAI&V” aka “GA”)

[TEMPORARY NOTICE, 2019-04-26: until this notice is removed, minor changes may be to improve spelling/grammar/legibility. The current post is 99-100% camera-ready.]

This post provides information about the tasking of the Dutch intelligence activities in 2019-2022 based on recent official public documents. The “Geïntegreerde Aanwijzing Inlichtingen en Veiligheid 2019-2022” policy (aka “GAI&V” aka “GA”), which literally translates to “Integrated Instruction on Intelligence & Security 2019-2022”, describes the Dutch cabinet decisions on tasking of the Dutch intelligence & security services AIVD (general / non-military) and MIVD (military) for 2019-2022. The GA has a public body and a secret appendix. The remainder of this post is based on:

Side note: Dr. Paul Abels, professor of intelligence at Leiden University and former AIVD official, has warned that the introduction of the GA — first seen in 2018 — comes at the risk of politicization of intelligence, because the GA is established by the cabinet, and hence prone to politics (at least in theory; no claim is made that the present GA has characteristics of intent to misuse intelligence for political purposes).

[Related reading: Annual Report 2018 of the Dutch General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD) (unofficial full translation)]

Translation of the Note of Explanation that accompanied the GA (some parts omitted or slightly adapted for readability):

The GAI&V, or GA for short, is established by the prime minister, i.e., the minister of General Affairs; the minister of the Interior; and the minister of Defense. The GA determines what investigations the AIVD and MIVD are to carry out, divided by countries, regions and themes, and it lays down a planning and priorities. The GA does not only determine what investigations the AIVD and MIVD each need to carry out, but also what investigations must be carried out in joint effort by both services, as per the cooperation laid down in Article 86 of the Intelligence & Security Services Act of 2017 (“Wiv2017”).

The GA is made for a period of four years and evaluated annually. The classified appendix of the GA describes intelligence objectives, agreements for cooperation between the AIVD and MIVD, and an elaboration on the desired scope and depth of investigations.

The topics of investigation are determined to gather intelligence that is hard or impossible to obtain via other means, for instance diplomatic channels, to support the Dutch government in establishing foreign policy and in international negotiations. This concerns information that is crucial to national security and is only available at foreign intelligence & security services, or that can only be obtained by the AIVD and/or MIVD. This means the activities of the AIVD and MIVD are complementary to existing tasks of the ministry of Foreign Affairs and its representations abroad (e.g. Dutch embassies abroad). The foreign intelligence task must not be assessed in a narrow sense of immediate use for the Dutch government. Joint European efforts, efforts in allied context, and efforts in international law are taken into account when answering the questions whether and to what extent a certain theme is in the interest of national security. The intelligence yields can be used in bilateral and multilateral cooperation with other countries, insofar possible within the legal framework.

The ability to detect and identify developments that are unknown or not readily visible is of importance to the government, in order for the government to be able to investigate how to respond to sudden, unexpected developments or (imminent) incident in foreign countries, and regarding the response of foreign governments to terrorist threats; or to prepare for civil missions in which the Netherlands participates.

The investigatory themes relate to the ‘a-task’ of the AIVD (national security) and to the ‘a-task’ and ‘c-task’ of the MIVD (security & readiness of the Dutch military; and protecting and promoting the international rule of law).

The unstable and less predictable security environment of the Netherlands is an expression of globally changing power relations, where power and initiative shift to countries who have a different look on the world than us. The threat mostly comes from countries with big geopolitical ambitions. Foreign states are seeking for information to modernize their armed forces, to strengthen their economy, to influence political decision-making or to create strategic dependencies, to thereby increase their geopolitical position. To achieve such objectives, they carry out espionage. This can involve classical espionage, but also digital espionage, and increasingly often a combination of both. Hacking provides a means to sabotage, to use acquired information in decision-making or to influence public opinion. Foreign corporate takeovers and foreign investments are used to create strategic dependence on them.

The terrorist threat in the Netherlands is still an important investigatory theme for the AIVD and MIVD. This threat stems mostly from the global jihadist movement. The AIVD and MIVD carry out intensive investigations into jihadist and radicalized persons and organizations, both domestically and abroad. They also investigate citizens who turned foreign fighter, and returnees. Partner organizations are informed so that they can take measures, leading for instance to possible arrests and criminal prosecution of returnees.

Furthermore, developments in various weapon programs in “countries of concern”, such as North Korea, Iran and countries in the Middle East pose an increasing threat to international security. This involved the development and proliferation of WMDs, means of transportation (ballistic missiles), and chemical and biological weapons. The MIVD investigates military-technological developments in foreign countries, so that the Dutch armed forces can be prepared en protected adequately against existing and future threats.

The AIVD and MIVD investigate developments within right-wing extremism to get insight into radicalization of persons and groups inspired by right-wing extremism. Left-wing extremists are often active in multiple areas, often in changing groups (‘opportunity-based coalitions’), and sometimes operate internationally. Acts against the ministry of Defense from left-wing activist and/or left-wing extremist persons and groups are mainly focused on four themes: recruitment of new employees, the defense industry, the potential storage of nuclear weapons, and the involvement of Defense in execution of the policy on asylum and aliens.

From the outlines of the MIVD year plan for 2019 (note: this is mostly about the MIVD, but touches on themes relevant to both AIVD & MIVD):

Investigation into foreign countries

The investigation into foreign countries offers the Dutch government and armed forces information and perspectives for acting in conflict prevention and management. In 2019, the MIVD will conduct investigations into Afghanistan, Mali, Syria and Iraq. The deployment of Dutch soldiers in enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) is also supported by the MIVD. In addition, the MIVD, together with the AIVD, is investigating the political and socio-economic crisis in Venezuela and the possible impact on the Kingdom of the Netherlands.

Counterproliferation and proliferation of military technology

Weapons of mass destruction pose a major threat to international peace and security. The Netherlands has signed treaties aimed at preventing the proliferation of such weapons. The AIVD and the MIVD are jointly investigating countries that are suspected of working, or contradicting them, to develop weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery.

The MIVD also investigates military-technological developments in other countries and the proliferation of high-quality military technology and weapon systems to crisis areas, so that the Dutch armed forces can be properly equipped against existing and future threats.

Espionage and foreign influence

Espionage, influencing and sabotage pose a serious and growing threat to the Netherlands and its allies. States that have major geopolitical ambitions are looking for information to modernize their armed forces, to strengthen their economy or to influence political decision-making. This may involve classic espionage, but also digital espionage and, increasingly often, a combination of both. Hacking offers opportunities for sabotage and influencing political and administrative decision-making or public opinion through the use of hacked information. Countries also try to obtain information or create strategic dependencies through takeovers or investments.

Radicalization and extremism

The investigation into phenomena of radicalization, of whatever form, among Defense personnel will be continued in 2019. The aim of this investigation is to identify undesirable behavior in a timely manner. The MIVD advises on measures to be taken to identify and deal with these threats. Promoting awareness and understanding requires constant attention.

Outlines of other tasks and objectives in 2019

In addition to the priorities described above, other tasks and objectives for 2019 are given below.

Security screenings

The MIVD has the task of conducting security investigations, as laid out in the Wiv2017 and in the Security Investigations Act (Wvo). Since 1 October 2018, the AIVD and MIVD have been working together in the Security Investigations Unit (UVO). This implements the Dessens Committee’s recommendation to form a joint organization for security investigations. In 2019, the policies on security investigations by the AIVD and MIVD will harmonized, as recommended by the Review Committee on the Intelligence and Security Services (CTIVD).

Regulation of general security requirements for defensie industry companies (ABDO)

The ABDO regulation requires that Defense industry companies are screened. The Ministry of Defense is dependent on third parties for the implementation of large-scale projects and carrying out certain tasks. In addition to the mandatory screening, the MIVD will also carry out investigations in 2019 into espionage and cyber activities that foreign powers may develop against the Defense industry. An important point for attention in this regard are companies that are actively involved in the replacement of defense equipment. The Ministry of Defense will collaborate more closely with the Netherlands Industries for Defense & Security Foundation (NIDV) in the field of cyber security, with the objective of strengthening the (digital) security of the Dutch defense industry and making defense companies more aware of the threat.

Colocation of AIVD and MIVD

As stated in the annual plan letter from the AIVD that was sent to your House on 21 December 2018 (Parliamentary Papers, 30 977, no. 153), there have been a number of developments that have led to a new study into the physical integration of the joint housing at Frederik Barracks and financial consequences. This study takes a little more time than expected. We will inform you about this shortly.

Readers who understand Dutch may also be interested in taking a look at the FY 2019 budget plans for the Dutch MoD, published on 18 September 2018.

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Annual Report 2018 of the Dutch General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD) (unofficial translation)

UPDATE 2019-05-14: the AIVD has now published an official translation of the Annual Report 2018. To state the obvious: henceforth, one probably should reference that url, not my blog.

UPDATE 2019-04-29: the AIVD sent a tweet indicating that an (official) English translation of the Annual Report 2018 will be released in a few weeks. I will add a link to it when it is available. If you have doubts or questions about any part of my unofficial  translation, feel free to contact me to ask for verification — I’ll be happy to double-check for correctness / accuracy.

Below follows an unofficial translation of the Annual Report 2018 of the Dutch General Intelligence and Security Service (GISS, known in Dutch as AIVD). The text below is ~9200 words in total. Hyperlinks and parts between [] brackets were added by me.

Translation was done paragraph-by-paragraph via Google Translate and subsequently correcting or otherwise improving each translated paragraph (precision/accuracy matters in translation of such documents). If you have questions or suggestions/corrections, feel free to contact me.

Some points of interest:

  • Anticipated growth of the AIVD: “In the past year we have welcomed over 190 new colleagues. In 2019 we hope to attract 200 new employees.”
  • There will be a National Crypto Vision/Strategy policy (it is not yet available): “One of the contributions to better information security is the preparation of the National Cryptovision and Strategy, which was launched in 2018.”
  • There will be a new National Security Strategy policy, expected to be released before the parliamentary summer break (i.e., before 5 July 2019).

[Related reading: Dutch cabinet’s decisions regarding the intelligence tasking of AIVD and MIVD for 2019-2022 (in Dutch: “Geïntegreerde Aanwijzing Inlichtingen en Veiligheid” aka “GAI&V” aka “GA”)]

AIVD Annual Report 2018

Table of Contents

Foreword

In front of you is the public annual report of the AIVD for 2018. The annual report offers an opportunity for us to provide insight into what we, and our two thousand colleagues, have dealt with and deal with globally every day. We hereby account for our work and offer a view of our field of work. It gives politics, press and the public a view of our activities.

In a country under democratic rule of law as we know it in the Netherlands it is, in addition to critical internal checks, essential that there is thorough external control of a service that has far-reaching investigatory powers.

Debates about us in parliament and in the media are often based on the oversight reports of the Dutch Review Committee on the Intelligence and Security Services (CTIVD). This committee was established per the Intelligence and Security Services Act of 2002 (Wiv2002). Over the past seventeen years, the CTIVD has conducted around fifty quite diverse investigations into the AIVD and has published frank, and largely public, reports on this.

In addition to the CTIVD, the new Intelligence and Security Services Act of 2017 (Wiv2017) that was enacted last year established an additional check on our work. After the minister has approved a request from us to exercise a special power, the independent Review Board for the Use of Powers (TIB) will review the legality of the minister’s decision.

The TIB and the CTIVD are strict and critical in their oversight, and rightfully so. It does not make our work easy at all times, but we as AIVD know that oversight is of great importance to us and to society.

Of course, parliamentary scrutiny also takes place. The standing committee on the Interior supervises the ins and outs of the AIVD to the extent that this is possible in public. With regard to classified and operational information, the minister is accountable to the parliamentary Committee for the Intelligence and Security Services (CIVD) for our actions.

Our work and the law do not allow us to speak openly about our activities. Also in this public annual report we cannot show the back of our tongue. Yet we are not so much a ‘secret service’ – as such you would not know about our existence – but above all ‘a service with secrets’. This is the only way in which we can recognize threats timely. The fact that two committees supervise and report on this gives us our license to operate. They ensure the legitimacy of functioning in a democracy. As a result, society can be confident that we are doing the right thing here and that we are doing it right, in the interest of national security and the democratic constitutional state.

Dick Schoof
Director General
General Intelligence & Security Service

Introduction

The AIVD has not often received so much attention as it did in the year 2018. The reason for this was primarily the new Intelligence and Security Services Act of 2017 (Wiv2017). In March of that year, the Dutch electorate was allowed to vote on that law in an advisory referendum [NOTE: advisory referendum, hence non-binding].

The new law, which entered into force on 1 May 2018, is necessary to cope with contemporary threats at a time when society in all its facets is permeated by and dependent on internet technology.

The Wiv2017 also exists to give citizens the certainty that data are collected as targeted as possible and are only stored if they are important for our work. Other data must be destroyed immediately. From now on, an independent committee will also review the ministerial authorizations to use a special, infringing power before we can actually exercise that power.

We worked hard to prepare our organization to work in accordance with that law before the law entered into force. Yet the implementation of the law turned out to have a greater impact than anticipated. It took more time and effort to implement the safeguards, including independent ex ante oversight, in our work processes because this deeply affects the core of our work: the acquisition and processing of data. This has permanently changed our work.

At the same time, the threats that the Netherlands faces are complex and aggressive. Almost all of them have a significant digital component. Nation-states try to acquire information on decision-making and influence it, to steal trade secrets, and to intimidate and influence their (former) citizens who now live in the Netherlands. They also try to obtain access and persistence in systems for vital processes in our country. This offers them the opportunity to commit sabotage.

The arrest of seven suspects for the preparation of a terrorist attack, as well as some incidents that have occurred, show that our country can still be a target of jihadist or radical Islamic terrorism.

In addition, public debates are polarizing as population groups become increasingly opposed to each other. There is growing suspicion of the government, fueled by, among other things, extremist statements. Certain radical elements also try to separate groups of young Muslims from Dutch society by encouraging them to distance themselves from it.

All this is set against ever-changing international developments.

The situation in the Middle East remains tense and unstable. The security situation in Iraq and Syria is still poor. The so-called “caliphate” of the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) has already lost its ground. The terrorist threat has not diminished. ISIS has gone underground and manages to disrupt the region almost daily with attacks. Al Qaeda is also still active and is manifesting itself more and more.

Chemical weapons were also used in the fight in Syria in 2018. In April, dozens of civilians lost their lives in an attack with chlorine gas on the city of Douma.

The historical contradictions between major players Iran and Saudi Arabia have a decisive influence on the geopolitical situation.

The reputation of the progressive and modernizing Saudi crown prince Bin Salman has suffered a blow after the critical journalist Jamal Khashoggi was killed in the Saudi consulate in Turkey.

The uncertainty for Iran is growing now that the United States has withdrawn from the nuclear agreement [NOTE: this refers to the INF Treaty]. The European Union remains committed to the agreement with Iran. The non-proliferation treaty that had its 50-year anniversary in 2018 is under pressure due to increasing tensions, decreasing support for international partnerships and the protectionist attitude of various leaders.

A direct nuclear threat from North Korea seemed to have subsided in 2018 when heads of state Donald Trump and Kim Jong-un shook hands and North Korea said it was prepared to dismantle nuclear facilities. The results of the discussions are very uncertain.

The tension between Russia and the West remains high. President Putin is trying to position Russia as a world power, also to strengthen his position in his own country. He tries to sow discord within NATO and the EU in order to weaken his opponents and acts aggressively towards the Baltic states.

The attempts by the Russian military intelligence service GRU to poison a former intelligence officer in the UK and to hack into the network of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in The Hague show the brutality with which this service operates.

On the other side of the world, Venezuela — the largest neighbor of the Kingdom of the Netherlands — is in a deep crisis. The deplorable situation in which the country finds itself, both politically and economically, causes the population to suffer severely. This has led to millions of refugees, which also has consequences for the stability of the areas within the Kingdom, Aruba, Bonaire, and Curaçao. In 2018 we prepared more than 300 intelligence reports on all these developments in the world around us that are important for the Dutch government’s foreign policy. A significant number of the reports served as support for the Dutch membership of the United Nations Security Council in the first half of 2018.

From all our investigations together we have prepared more than 900 written intelligence products, including official messages [in Dutch: “ambtsberichten”], intelligence messages and analyses, risk analyses, threat assessments and information security advice. Increasingly often we also inform our intelligence consumers orally about our findings.

In 2018, the Prime Minister, together with the minister of the Interior and the minister of Defense, set the priorities for the investigations of the AIVD and the MIVD for the coming years. Close consultation was also held with the minister for Justice & Security and the minister of Foreign Affairs.

These agreements are laid down in the Integrated Instruction [in Dutch: “Geïntegreerde Aanwijzing”, or “GA”] on intelligence & security. This states what information authorities need from the AIVD and MIVD to be able to take responsibility for national security. Both services have their own research areas and focus. The GA is evaluated annually.

The national and international developments demonstrate the importance of our work. That is why the government has made funding available for growth of the AIVD in 2018 and 2019. In the past year we have welcomed over 190 new colleagues. In 2019 we hope to attract 200 new employees.

Espionage and foreign interference

We call activities that foreign countries carry out to collect information in and about the Netherlands, and thereby harm our interests, ‘espionage’. Espionage can take place digitally, for example by breaking into a system, or physically by humans. This can be important political information, for example with regard to decision-making processes and viewpoints of the government. Foreign countries can also try to steal (business) secrets through espionage in order to boost their own economy.

Countries can also try to harm Dutch interests in a different way, namely by influencing processes in the Netherlands. We place this under ‘unwanted foreign interference’: covert political influence, influence and intimidation of their emigrated (former) countrymen, sabotage and abuse of the Dutch IT infrastructure. Foreign countries thereby attempt to undermine the Dutch political, economic and social systems.

When states use digital means for espionage and sabotage in order to achieve their own political, military, economic and/or ideological goals at the expense of Dutch interests, we speak of an ‘offensive cyber program’. Our studies show that countries such as China, Iran and Russia have such cyber programs that target the Netherlands.

Espionage

Anyone who has specific or specialist knowledge can be the target of espionage. Not everyone is aware of this. Our research is aimed at protecting the political and economic security of the Netherlands by detecting threats and alerting individuals and authorities in a timely manner.

In the field of espionage, the year 2018 was characterized primarily by the brutality that intelligence officers demonstrated. The attempt by the Russian military intelligence service GRU to gain access to the OPCW network in The Hague shows how far this agency goes.

Our investigations have also shown that digital espionage is becoming increasingly complex. State actors increasingly make use of common methods and techniques, which makes it difficult to determine the origin of an attack (attribution). In addition, state actors are increasingly using internet service providers and managed service providers as a springboard to penetrate a target. These service providers often have in-depth, extensive and structural access to information from organizations or individuals in the course of operating their business. Such methods make detection, analysis and attribution of digital attacks more difficult.

More and more countries are focusing on political and/or economic espionage. We see in our investigations that China, Iran and Russia are at the forefront of this.

Political espionage

To Russia, our country is an interesting target for espionage. The strategic importance of Dutch politics and jurisprudence has increased sharply for Russia since the demise of flight MH17 in July 2014. There is, and will continue to be, a need to obtain information about the course of the investigation into the disaster. The likelihood of this only increases now that the Netherlands has held Russia liable for its share in the downing of the aircraft.

The Netherlands also has Russia’s interest for a long time because of its membership of NATO and the EU. The Russians would like to find out what position the Netherlands takes in these partnerships. In order to gain insight into this, the intelligence services also use classical espionage tools, such as the recruitment of human resources, in addition to digital means.

For other countries, it may be of interest to gain insight into the traffic between a Dutch diplomatic post abroad and the Dutch ministry of Foreign Affairs. We have observed that a number of Dutch embassies in the Middle East and Central Asia were the target of digital attacks carried out by a foreign intelligence service in 2017 and 2018. The digital attacks on these embassies confirm the structural attention of intelligence services for the ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Economic espionage

The biggest threat by far in the field of economic espionage comes from China. This espionage is fueled by Chinese economic policy plans, such as “Made in China 2025” and the “New Silk Roads”, with which the country can increase its economic and geopolitical influence.

These plans not only lead to economic opportunities, but also to increasing competition with Western and hence also Dutch companies. China uses a wide range of (covert) resources to undermine the earning capacity of Dutch companies and which can eventually result in economic and political dependencies. One of these means is (digital) economic espionage.

China is interested in Dutch companies from the high-tech, energy, maritime and life sciences & health sectors.

Another threat to national security is related to globalization. As a result, there is growing economic interaction, digitization, internationalization of labor markets and production processes, and also the liberalization of corporate location and investment policy. This offers more possibilities for (covert) acquisition of Dutch technology and companies. For example, companies can be taken over by foreign companies that are under the influence of their government, or that can easily obtain cheap state funds, creating an uneven economic playing field.

Theft of research findings also takes place within legitimate partnerships between academic and knowledge institutions. This way, Dutch innovations disappear across the border.

The safety awareness and resilience of Dutch business and knowledge institutions against these risks do not seem sufficient. This poses a risk to the economic security of our country.

Covert political influencing

It is perfectly legitimate that a country tries to defend its own interests with and in other countries with an open mind. However, if this transcends regular diplomatic or political lobbying because a country operates under a false flag, we speak of covert political influence.

Covert influence can be directly aimed at political decision-making, but can also take place indirectly if it is aimed at manipulating public perception. The spreading of disinformation is a means that can be used for this. Intelligence services often play a role in covert influencing operations. Russia is a country that has been continuously mentioned in recent years when it comes to interference in the political processes of other countries. It has traditionally been very adept at secretly influencing the image and public opinion in other countries, which can have a disruptive effect on decision-making processes. An example of influencing by Russia is the dissemination of disinformation by proclaiming various speculations regarding the MH17 disaster, which obscures the investigation. We have also found that attempts have been made from Russia, with limited effect, to influence the Dutch online on social media.

We also see that there are states, including China, that try to influence opinions and publications about their own country through educational and knowledge institutions. This may concern countries with which scientific cooperation is relatively fruitful, for example. But that comes at the risk that a dependency on that foreign government arises, for example when investigations are funded by China or when research is conducted that involves a need to travel to that country to carry out research there. That gives that country a certain dominant position that is sometimes abused. Journalists face opposition in a similar way. In the case of unpleasant publications, for example, there may be a threat of withholding work permits.

Countries that we see to be engaged in covert political influencing include China and Russia.

Influencing and intimidating diaspora

States try to influence people in the Netherlands who have emigrated from that country (diaspora), focused on their own domestic political objectives. In some cases, these emigrants still have a passport from their country of origin or have family living there, but have already been living in the Netherlands for some time. It can also be about people who have fled their country of birth for political reasons, and become victims of harassment in the Netherlands. Such intelligence and interference activities create a permanent sense of insecurity in the communities concerned. National tensions from abroad are thereby imported into our country. The influencing sometimes goes so far that people feel limited in the exercise of their fundamental rights, such as freedom of expression. The security services of these states are not afraid to put pressure on the families of emigrants in their country of origin.

Iran is interested in people and organizations that are known to oppose the current Iranian regime. The AIVD has strong indications that Iran is involved in two murders on Dutch territory, in 2015 in Almere and in 2017 in The Hague. Both cases concerned opponents of the current regime. Following the results of the intelligence investigation by the AIVD, the Netherlands has taken measures against two Iranian diplomats.

Countries that we see to be willing to influence and put pressure on their emigrated (former) countrymen include China, Iran, Russia and Turkey.

Sabotage and abuse of infrastructure

States can also pose a threat to the independence and independence of the Netherlands by enabling digital sabotage of vital infrastructure. They do this by gaining access and then embedding themselves in IT systems of vital processes. The AIVD has seen that attempts have been made to this end.

We have not yet detected an intent to actually carry out sabotage actions on Dutch vital infrastructure. A disruption in, for example, the energy supply in countries around us can also have consequences for the Netherlands. The geopolitical unrest in the world makes a sabotage action more conceivable. Russia, for example, has an offensive cyber program for disruption and even sabotage of the vital infrastructure.

The Netherlands also has a special responsibility for the IT infrastructure through which internet traffic flows from virtually all over the world. Just as our country feels responsible for air traffic traveling via Schiphol or cargo ships calling at the port of Rotterdam. Our IT infrastructure is being misused by some countries to carry out digital espionage, influencing and sabotage activities against other countries. These activities harm the international legal order and interests of other countries, in particular allies.

Countries that we see involved in sabotage and/or misuse of the IT infrastructure include Iran, North Korea and Russia.

Activities and results

From our investigations, we have been able to provide insight into the risks of espionage and foreign interference for the Netherlands and for companies. We have visited various agencies, given hundreds of (awareness) presentations and informed government partners such as the National Coordinator for Counterterrorism and Security (NCTV) and various ministries about our findings. The account managers of the intelligence services at the police also play an important role in this.

We have released around 40 intelligence reports on espionage and unwanted foreign interference.

The number of questions to the AIVD about the continuity and integrity of crucial and vital systems within and outside the government has increased in the past year. This is one of the reasons why we have developed and installed accelerated detection tools within the central government to be able to recognize attacks in time. For this, the AIVD had been allocated extra money for 2018.

We were also asked for advice on the risks to national security in the rollout of a renewed C2000 system [NOTE: C2000 is a TETRA-based radio communication system for emergency services; it can also be used by the intelligence services]. The AIVD finds it undesirable that the Netherlands is dependent on the hardware or software of companies from countries for which it has been established that they are conducting an offensive cyber program against Dutch interests for the exchange of sensitive information or for vital processes. We provide insight to involved parties such as ministries about the relationships between such companies and their government, so that they can weigh the risks. It is important to look at the possibilities, intentions and interests of the states involved and the national legislation. It is also important that the Dutch user ensures that he always has control over his own data.

In 2018, the AIVD and the MIVD jointly drew up the Cyber Intelligence Assessment [in Dutch: “Cyber Inlichtingenbeeld”]. This is a classified report written for almost the entire central government and contains an outline of the current threat assessment and expected developments.

With an extra allocated budget, we have strongly focused on recruiting new employees and technical experts for investigations into digital threats. The recruitment of high-quality technical staff and intelligence staff with technical affinity requires considerable effort, certainly in the current labor market.

In the international context, we have worked closely with foreign counterparts and exchanged knowledge with them about developments regarding foreign interference attempts. We were able to provide them with relevant information in specific cases.

Read more at aivd.nl/spionage [only available in Dutch].

(Jihadist) terrorism and radical islam

Within the area of terrorism, the AIVD pays most attention to jihadist terrorism, but terrorism is not solely related to jihadists. The breeding ground for jihadist-terrorist violence can be formed by radical Islam, of which salafism is the best-known variant.

Jihadist terrorism

Last year there was an increase in incidents in the Netherlands with a jihadist, terrorist or radical Islamic background. In the years before, the Netherlands remained unaffected in terms of attacks and there were mainly terrorist incidents in the countries around us. Randomly selected victims fell in stabbings at everyday & freely accessible locations, with apparently little preparation.

Incidents and arrests

Since the murder of Theo van Gogh in 2004, there have been no more incidents in our country by extremist and terrorist jihadists, until last year. A number of incidents took place in 2018 in which the perpetrator probably acted or wanted to act on the basis of a jihadist or radical Islamist motive.

On 5 May 2018 a Syrian man stabbed three people in The Hague. The Public Prosecution Service suspects the man, who has serious psychological problems, of attempted murder with a terrorist motive.

On 31 August 2018 a stabbing took place at Amsterdam Central Station in which a 19-year-old Afghan, who came from Germany, seriously injured two people. The man stated that he wanted to take revenge for a cartoon competition about the prophet Mohammed, which PVV [aka Freedom Party] leader Geert Wilders had announced in the spring.

A few days earlier, a Pakistani was arrested at The Hague’s central train station who wanted to attack the PVV leader for the same reason. The suspect turned to Geert Wilders because, in his eyes, the cartoon competition was insulting the prophet. The Public Prosecution Service charged him with preparing a terrorist attack.

In addition, various arrests were made of jihadists in the Netherlands. For example, the cooperation of the AIVD with various international and national partners on 17 June 2018 led to the arrest of three people in Rotterdam. Two of them are suspected of preparing a terrorist attack in France. It is not ruled out that they also considered Dutch targets.

Perhaps the most striking event in the Netherlands was the arrest of seven jihadists on 27 September 2018. Our investigations showed that they belonged to a jihadist network that originated in the city of Arnhem, and that they were preparing for a large-scale terrorist attack at an event in our country.

The AIVD has been investigating the people involved in a jihadist network in Arnhem for a long time. These members were part of the core of the jihadist movement in the Netherlands. On 25 April 2018 we issued a first official message to the National Prosecutor for Counterterrorism about preparations made by the group to carry out an attack on a large-scale event. In addition, they wanted to make as many victims as possible. It is very worrying that a part of the jihadist movement in the Netherlands has the intention to carry out a major attack on such “soft targets”. The cell is said to have been inspired by ISIS, but most likely operated independently for this attack. The members had contact with other jihadists at home and abroad, but did not share the plans for this attack with people outside their own group.

Jihadist threat against the West

The current jihadist threat is characterized by a constant threat of more complex and relatively simple attacks in and against the West. This is done by globally operating jihadist organizations, such as ISIS and Al Qaida, and smaller jihadist networks or individuals. The incidents of the past year and the many arrests show that the jihadist threat is still present in Western Europe.

Threat from ISIS and Al Qaida

Despite the disintegration of the so-called caliphate and the loss of territory, ISIS continues to pose a threat. In 2018, for example, the organization claimed responsibility in Europe for attacks in Liege (Belgium), Trèbes, Paris and Strasbourg (France). However, the decline of the caliphate and the loss of strength at ISIS have led to a reduction in the attraction to jihadists

Al Qaeda also wants to hit the West with attacks. In recent years it has been able to work on strengthening its organization in the shelter of ISIS. Networks and departments that are counted as Al Qaeda still focus on attack planning against the West.

Threats from foreign fighters

There are two aspects to the potential threat posed by travelers. On the one hand, there are fighters who have left who still choose to stay with terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda and ISIS in Syria and / or Iraq. They are in regular contact with the “home front” in the West. In this way they contribute to the further embedding of jihadist ideas in communities in the West. They use these contacts to encourage people to (support for) attacks.

On the other hand, considerable numbers of fighters from Syria and Iraq have since returned to Europe, including the Netherlands. At the end of 2018, there were around 55.

The returnees include women, with or without children, and men. For each person who returns, the Dutch government makes an assessment of the extent to which this constitutes a threat. At the end of 2018 some 135 jihadists with a Dutch background were among terrorist groups in Syria and Iraq.

The challenge for the AIVD, and for the entire Dutch government, is to find out the purpose for which people return. Have they been disillusioned by the harsh conditions, have they fled and are they missing in Dutch free society? Have they been traumatized by the confrontation with or participation in violence? Are they contacting jihadists in the Netherlands here and are they giving the movement an extra boost? Have they been sent by the organization there to commit an attack in the West or to support it?

Identified returnees are arrested and are on trial. We estimate that some of these jihadists will probably not abandon their ideas during their prison sentence and afterwards. They can join the jihadist networks from which they originate or form new networks.

The Dutch detention system where terrorism suspects and convicts are placed together and not among other prisoners, largely prevents non-extremist prisoners from being radicalized and recruited by jihadists. That does happen in other European countries. The Dutch system can lead to unwanted mutual influence and the formation of new networks. In addition, many detained jihadists will be released in Europe in the coming years. The AIVD expects detained jihadists and released (ex-) jihadists to form an important part of the threat assessment.

The jihadist movement in the Netherlands exists of some 500 persons

The jihadist movement in the Netherlands is a dynamic entity of individuals and groups that adhere to the jihadist ideology.This movement has no hierarchy or well-defined structure. Many jihadists are in contact with each other in both the real and the virtual world. Many undertake activities as a group. Various groups are in contact with each other or with jihadist groups and individuals abroad. In addition, there are jihadists who stand alone and live in isolation from like-minded people.

We count over 500 people as being part of the jihadist movement in the Netherlands.Several thousand people in the Netherlands sympathize with jihadist ideas without really belonging to the movement.

The jihadist movement in the Netherlands is mainly pro-ISIS, but there are also jihadists who align more with Al Qaeda. In recent years the movement has been very focused on the war in Syria and the caliphate of ISIS. More than 300 jihadis traveled to that region. Now that there is no longer a physical caliphate, that focus has decreased. There is a phase of reorientation in which the jihadists are now focusing more on spreading their teachings or ideology and on strengthening their networks.

Whether the movement becomes larger and more powerful depends on several factors. This includes the emergence of new leaders and new sources of inspiration, or issues that arise and can re-mobilize the movement. The war in Syria was such a momentum at the start of this decade. Even in the current phase of reorientation, the jihadist movement in the Netherlands is threatened, as demonstrated by, among other things, the arrests of the Arnhem network.

Unconventional means of attack

Last year, incidents took place that involved the possible use of unconventional means of attack in the form of biological substances, such as in Germany and Italy. We see that such knowledge is disseminated by including the manuals for making and using chemical agents and biological poisons in propaganda expressions.

Activities and results

In 2018 we published more than 100 intelligence reports on developments within jihadist and radical Islamic terrorism. We were able to provide the Public Prosecution Service with information about their criminal investigations via 35 official messages. In addition, we have issued official reports on this to the Immigration and Naturalization Service (8 reports), to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (3 reports) and to mayors (2 reports). We also issued a publication on the state of affairs with regard to ISIS and Al Qaeda in relation to the struggle in Syria. [FOOTNOTE 1: ‘De erfenis van Syrië, mondiaal jihadisme blijft dreiging voor Europa’, AIVD, November 2018.]

Cross-border threats require a cross-border response. International cooperation between colleges remains crucial in the fight against terrorism, as was proven again in 2018.

This collaboration is partly anchored in the Counter Terrorism Group (CTG). This is a collaboration between the security services from the EU countries plus Norway and Switzerland. The platform, based in our country, that directly shares information about jihad fighters, simplifies cooperation and contributes to gaining a better understanding of transnational and international connections.

This cooperation strengthens our intelligence position and that of the affiliated partners. Specifically, this cooperation leads to the earlier recognition, identification and arrest of potential jihadist perpetrators in Europe.

Read more at aivd.nl/terrorisme [only available in Dutch].

Radical islam

The AIVD’s investigation into radical Islam focuses on two types of threat that can arise from radical Islam. On the one hand there is the threat of further radicalization towards the (violent) jihadist ideology. On the other hand, there is a threat to the democratic legal order from an intolerant religious ideology. We are dealing here with a phenomenon that is at odds with our democratic legal order, but is still moving within the legal frameworks. Our research focuses largely on certain driving factors in the Salafi spectrum.

Unwanted foreign investments

The AIVD investigates the extent to which Islamic institutions receive financial support from abroad, including the Gulf States. This support can be accompanied by interference on an ideological level. If this foreign influence poses a threat to the democratic legal order, it has our attention. We work closely together on this issue in a European context.

Radical influence within education

The AIVD notes that radical Islamist promotors are able to position themselves strongly within the range of education for young Muslims. For example, after-school lessons in Arabic and Islam. Such educational programs are also attractive for pupils with a moderate background.

This is partly due to the fact that they often have few or no good alternatives to after-school Islamic education.

At first glance, these educational initiatives appear to be easily accessible and innocent. However, we believe that children and young adults are alienated from society by this interpretation of education and may be hindered in their participation in society. This is caused by the intolerant and anti-democratic ideas of the initiators. In the long term, this can put social cohesion under pressure and thereby undermine the democratic legal order.

In the past, only a few established mosques and educational institutions spreaded this philosophy, but the offer has now become widespread. A new generation of eloquent preachers has been trained and is developing their own initiatives to spread their message. Online drivers also see opportunities to reach their target group quickly and easily. Our research also shows the influence of a few individuals who adopt a dual attitude towards (violent) jihadist ideology, because they are not directly opposed to it. This may create a breeding ground for jihadism.

Activities and results

Six official messages and 12 intelligence reports were issued on developments regarding radical Islam.

The AIVD collaborates on this with the NCTV, various ministries and local authorities. We support both national and regional governments based on concrete examples.

In this way we offer tools with regard to a phenomenon that is at odds with the democratic legal order, but that is (still) mainly lawful. In the past year we have given presentations to various municipalities and other government partners.

Read more at aivd.nl/radicalisering [only available in Dutch].

Non-jihadist terrorist organizations

The AIVD notes that in 2018 the Kurdish Workers Party PKK did not intend to carry out attacks in Europe. The PKK’s primary goal is to be removed from the EU list of terrorist organizations. The use of force in Europe would not contribute to that. However, the organization does have the potential for violence and is able to mobilize PKK supporters in a short time.

The PKK organized solidarity demonstrations in Europe – also in the Netherlands – for the victims who fell as a result of the Turkish military action in the Syrian Afrin. Under the name #fightforAfrin, arson attacks against Turkish targets were committed in a number of European countries – particularly in Germany – resulting in property damage. The call for this came from a youth group that is not officially covered by the PKK, but possibly linked to it.

Activities and results

In the context of the investigation into non-jihadist terrorist organizations, we issued 4 intelligence reports and 2 official messages in 2018.

Read more at aivd.nl/terrorisme>[only available in Dutch].

Extremism

Extremism is the active pursuit and/or support of profound changes in society that can endanger (the continued) existence of the democratic legal order. This can happen with undemocratic methods, such as violence and intimidation, which can undermine the functioning of the democratic legal order.

Although the themes within extremism in general still have a “left” and “right” signature, that subdivision can no longer always be made. Indeed, there are beliefs about which both “left” and “right” are concerned. This is often the result of discontent and mistrust of the government.

In most cases, civil disobedience is involved, such as during protests against nature policy in the Oostvaardersplassen and against gas extraction in Groningen. These protests usually do not transcend activism and therefore there is no immediate threat to the democratic legal order.

We do, however, consider it conceivable that splinter groups or loners will be inspired by activism and seek refuge in extremism. The AIVD has the task of identifying when this activist anger degenerates into extremist activities.

Hate of the foreign/unknown, preference for own race

For certain right-wing extremists, immigration is still synonymous with Islamization. In their view, immigration and Islamization pose a danger to Dutch identity.

For these right-wing extremists, it feels like the government is selling Dutch culture by admitting refugees from Islamic countries. A visible representative of that philosophy is, for example, the group Identitair Verzet [in English: Identity-based Resistance].

The anti-Islam position has many supporters inside extremism, with men becoming less and less exclusive as before. The anti-government sentiment that prevails within this group also attracts sympathizers who have no history of right-wing extremism. They also have distrust of (European) politics and sometimes also of science and (mass) media.

It goes without saying that the AIVD does not consider criticism of Islam, immigration or the government itself as a form of right-wing extremism. After all, such opinions are protected by the freedom of expression. We view such expressions as extremist when they turn into hate speech, intimidation and threats.

Some of the extremists even argue for the prevention of mixing of races. This ethnic-nationalistic ideology is heard within the circle of supporters of the alt-right ideology, such as the “study society” Erkenbrand. In themselves, they say they have nothing against the existence of multiple races, but the Netherlands is for the Dutch.

There are also extremists who are convinced of white supremacy. These people take an anti-democratic position and pursue a racist society in which people are not considered equal. This is contrary to the democratic legal order.

Resistence against ’cause’ of migrant flows

From the “left” there has traditionally been opposition to immigration and asylum policy. The policy is considered to be too strict.

Within the opposition to the immigration and asylum policy, a shift of attention can be seen towards defense industry companies. These are companies that deliver goods to the Ministry of Defense. The reasoning is as follows: without defense order companies there would be less war, so fewer refugees and therefore fewer migrant flows. Companies are also charged for supplying materials to the European Border Guard to stop migrants at the European external borders. The Anti-Fascist Action (AFA) last year joined a number of non-violent campaigns against these types of companies.

In addition, attention is also paid to the “traditional” targets, such as the makers and implementers of the immigration and asylum policy, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the National Agency of Correctional Institutions and the construction companies of detention centers. Actions against asylum policy were conducted less strongly last year than a few years ago.

Ideology based on own identity

A notable development within activism and extremism is the fragmentation of ideologies that fall back on one’s own identity.For example, there are organized anti-racists based on their own identity who oppose the — in their eyes — colonial legacy of the Netherlands and who reject the support of “white” supporters.

Activities and results

Based on official messages from the AIVD, the Public Prosecution Service has launched a criminal investigation into an extremist who wanted to use violence against Muslims. This ultimately led to a conviction by the court in early December 2018.

In 2018 we issued a total of 21 official messages related to extremism and prepared 8 intelligence reports. On the developments within right-wing extremism we published “Right-wing extremism in the Netherlands, a phenomenon in motion” in October 2018. [FOOTNOTE 2: “Rechts-extremisme in Nederland, een fenomeen in beweging“, AIVD, October 2018.]

Read more at aivd.nl/extremisme [only available in Dutch].

For a secure Netherlands

The chapters above deal with the threats that we see for national security and the risks that exist for Dutch interests. We inform various partners with unique information relevant to them from our investigations. With this we enable them to take their responsibility for national security. We call this the creation of an action perspective.

The AIVD itself has limited possibility to take action. But with an official message, for example, we offer the Public Prosecution Service handles to start a criminal investigation into activities that pose a threat to national security and that can also be prosecuted.

In addition, this concerns information for, for example, ministries, executive organizations, mayors, educational institutions and also companies. The latter are especially important when they play a role in vital processes in our society. Think of companies from the energy sector or civil aviation. We want to promote the resilience of the Netherlands by informing, informing and, where possible, advising all these authorities about threats that could affect them and therefore anyone in the Netherlands.

There is also frequent cooperation with Dutch parties that play a role in export control, such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and customs. We are regularly asked for advice regarding an application for an export license. In addition, we have informed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs several times about unsolicited acquisition attempts that have been identified. This often concerns goods that can be used for the development or production of weapons of mass destruction or their means of delivery.

We also provide information to relevant parties about the risks of involvement in the dissemination of knowledge and goods for weapons of mass destruction (proliferation). We advise them on what they can do to identify suspicious transactions. In this way we have been able to recognize and prevent various acquisition attempts.

In 2018 we issued 32 official messages to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with regard to proliferation and export control.

Read more at aivd.nl/massavernietigingswapens [only available in Dutch].

“Safe” people in trusted/essential functions

At various places in society, positions of trust exist where an employee can harm national security. These positions exist among others at the central government, the National Police and companies involved in critical infrastructure.

Preventing the acquisition of knowledge and goods

Countries such as Iran, Pakistan and Syria are looking towards the Netherlands and other Western countries for the knowledge and goods they need for the development of weapons of mass destruction. In a joint unit of AIVD and MIVD we are investigating how these countries are trying to obtain the required knowledge and goods and we are trying to prevent this. To this end, intensive knowledge was exchanged with fellow foreign services in the past year.

The positions of trust are designated by the relevant minister. We conduct security investigations to assess whether we can issue a “declaration of no objection” (VGB) to a (candidate) trust officer. We also enable the relevant authorities to take responsibility for national security by conducting security investigations.

The Ministerial Regulation on Security Investigations Unit entered into force on 1 October 2018. [FOOTNOTE 3: Ministeriële regeling over taken van de Unit Veiligheidsonderzoeken, Staatscourant, nr. 53581, September 2018.] This creates the framework for merging the AIVD’s Security Investigations business unit and the MIVD’s Security Investigations Office Safety investigations (UVO). In anticipation of this cooperation, the policy of the MIVD and AIVD in the field of security investigations was aligned per March 2018. [FOOTNOTE 4:
Beleidsregel Veiligheidsonderzoeken, Staatscourant, nr. 10266, 21 Februari 2018.] First steps were taken in 2018 to also standardize the work processes of both organizations. The idea behind merging is: one policy, one system, one location.

Also in 2018, the electronic Personal Information Form (eOPG) became available for some of the employers. This is currently only available for investigations carried out by the AIVD. The process has been fully digitized for this group. This concerns the application that the employer makes and the personal information that the employee must enter for the investigation. The people who have to undergo a safety investigation log in with DigiD in a secure environment.

In 2018, the AIVD and the mandate holders (National Police and Royal Netherlands Marechaussee) jointly carried out nearly 44,000 security investigations into persons who (wanted to) assume a position of trust. That number hardly deviates from the number of investigations (more than 45,000) conducted in 2017.

The point of departure is that 90% of the security investigations conducted by the AIVD itself must be completed within the maximum legal decision period of 8 weeks. With nearly 89%, this goal was almost achieved.

The main cause of this is the substantially increased inflow of the number of security investigations. The AIVD completed almost 20% more investigations in 2018 than in 2017. This increase is almost entirely due to the increased demand for investigations in civil aviation, which we had to handle. In addition, preparation for the joint Security Investigations Unit also used available resources.

Screening of a person at the request of others

In addition to the security investigations, another type of screening is part of our duties. In those cases we look up information about specific persons in our own systems. This is done at the request of others. An example of this is a request from the Prime Minister for a reference screening of a candidate-minister of government.

This type of screening via our own systems was not explicitly laid down as a task in previous law, i.e., the Wiv2002. With the introduction of the Wiv2017 law this has become an explicit task.

In 2018 we conducted 31 reference screenings and issued official messages about the results to the relevant authorities.

Read more at aivd.nl/naslag [only available in Dutch].

Role in the protection of persons

Just like the MIVD, the National Police and the NCTV, the AIVD has a role in the Monitoring and Protection System for the protection of certain persons. This system is aimed at the safe and undisturbed functioning of dignitaries such as politicians and members of the Royal Family, diplomatic representations and international organizations.

The essence of the system is that it not only looks at the concrete threat of, for example, jihadist terrorists and left and right extremists, but also at conceivable threat. With risk analyses, threat analyses and threat assessments we enable the NCTV to decide on possible security measures.

In the past year, we have drawn up a total of 1 risk analysis, 10 threat analyses and 51 threat assessments in the context of the Monitoring and Protection System.

Read more at aivd.nl/bewakenenbeveiligen [only available in Dutch].

Information security

One expertise of the AIVD is advising the central government on the protection of confidential and state-secret information. We also develop means ourselves to keep such information secure.

One of the contributions to better information security is the preparation of the National Cryptovision and Strategy, which was initiated in 2018. This is done together with other departments. The business community and knowledge institutions also provide input for this. The National Cryptovision and Strategy describes how cryptographic security measures to protect sensitive information will continue to be available in the future.

A lot of oral presentations were given to stakeholders from the National Communication Security Agency [NBV, aka NL-NCSA] of the AIVD last year. In addition, 44 written threat intelligence products were released.

Read more at aivd.nl/informatiebeveiliging [only available in Dutch].

A new law

On 1 May 2018 the new Intelligence and Security Services Act, Wiv 2017, entered into force. The law is a consequence of the report of the Dessens commission from 2013 that concluded that a change to the old Wiv (from 2002) was necessary because it was no longer adequate. [FOOTNOTE 5: ‘Evaluatie Wet op de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten 2002’, 3 December 2013.] In order to continue to carry out our duties, modernization of our investigatory powers was necessary. In addition, the law offers a considerable reinforcement of privacy guarantees.

Modern investigatory powers

The speed of technological developments was not taken into account in the Wiv 2002. Nowadays, everyone uses Internet applications for communication and other data exchange. This leads to data traffic that rages across the world in large quantities and with great speed via cables. Regarding communication transported “on the cable”, the old law only allowed interception based on a specific selector/characteristic of a specific person or organization.

The essence of the AIVD’s work is to make unprecedented threats visible. Without access to digital data streams, it is not possible to identify new threats. An example: if we know that digital attacks on the Netherlands are being carried out frequently from a certain part of the world and we have been able to find out via which fiber optic traffic that traffic is running, then we can investigate that data flow for characteristics that we extract from the attacks. In this way we can determine in time what the attack is aimed at, not after the malicious software has already reached the target and caused damage.

The technology for this research assignment-oriented (OOG) interception on internet cables requires extensive technical preparation. In 2018 we have therefore not yet exercised this power.

Safeguards

The use of internet technology results in large amounts of communication data, and all types of such data are mixed. This means we can potentially make bigger infringements on privacy and regarding more people.

For example, when intercepting and investigating certain data flows through research assignment-oriented (OOG) interception, there is a risk that we will also intercept traffic from people who do not mean any harm. Intercepted data that is determined to be irrelevant to our investigation is immediately destroyed. This concerns approximately 98% of the data collected.

Under the Wiv2002, the use of a large number of special powers required permission from the minister of the Interior. With the Wiv2017, after the minister’s approval and prior to exercise of powers, approval is also required from the independent Review Board for the Use of Powers. Moreover, the Wiv2017 prescribes stricter retention periods than its predecessor.

In the advisory referendum of 21 March 2018 on the Wiv2017, 49.4% of the voters voted against and 46.5% voted in favor of the law.

After the referendum, the government promised extra guarantees to address the outcome of the referendum. For example, it was promised that the consideration notes on foreign cooperation partners would be completed earlier than prescribed by the law (1 May 2020), namely before 1 January 2019. For all foreign services that we have a cooperation with, the written considerations have been completed. A consideration note assesses the extent to which a foreign counterpart and the country in question meets legal criteria and to what extent cooperation is possible.

Furthermore, wee will also ask the minister for approval on an annual basis for (further) retaining the data we collected via research assignment-oriented interception. There was no such interim assessment prescribed in the original law. We have to substantiate whether, and if so, why we still want to save them in order to determine relevance at a later date. After 3 years, the data will be destroyed regardless, except of course for the data that we have determined to be relevant to our investigation.

A policy rule is drawn up that, when requesting approval for the use of a special power, we must state explicitly how we want to use a power “as targeted/focused as possible”, in addition to the standing requirements of necessity, proportionality and subsidiarity.

The government virtually excludes that OOG interception will be used in the coming years for research into cable communication that has its origin and destination in the Netherlands [NOTE: this refers to domestic-domestic communication. Communication between Dutch citizens that takes place via foreign providers, such as Facebook and the like, travels via the US and is considered domestic-foreign communications under the Wiv2017]. An exception to this is research into digital attacks in which the Dutch digital infrastructure is abused. OOG interception may be needed to detect such threats.

Processing of medical data is permitted only if it occurs in addition to the processing of other data, that is, if someone is the subject of an ongoing investigation and the medical data forms the final piece of information that AIVD needs to properly identify a threat. If the AIVD encounters medical data that we are not allowed to view, we will immediately remove it.

Careful consideration is always given when sharing data about a journalist with foreign services. This also takes into account the [societal] function of an individual and the protection of their privacy and security. If the services determine that a journalist is present in data collections, they will not share that data unless it is necessary for national security. [FOOTNOTE 6: Kamerbrief met reactie op raadgevend referendum Wiv, dossier 34588, nr. 70]

Impact on our work

The core of our work consists of acquiring and processing data. The new law and the additional safeguards for citizens in the form of, among other things, independent ex ante oversight and stricter retention periods have led to extra efforts for us.

As is apparent from this annual report, the geopolitical developments and the threat assessment also demanded great commitment from our employees. It has proved difficult to combine implementation of the new law with a non-decreasing commitment to operational task performance. The impact of the implementation was greater than initially anticipated.

For example, the ex ante approval process by the TIB required habituation. In an interim report from the TIB in November 2018, the TIB indicated that they rejected approximately 5% of the requests for approval. [FOOTNOTE 7: Voortgangsbrief Toetsingscommissie Inzet Bevoegdheden, TIB, 1 November 2018.]

In addition, at the request of the government, the Review Committee on the Intelligence and Security Services (CTIVD) carried out a baseline measurement and published a report on it. This critical progress report, released in early December, gave a first insight into progress of the implementation of the new law. [FOOTNOTE 8: Voortgangsrapportage Commissie van Toezicht op de Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdiensten over de werking van de Wiv 2017; CTIVD, 4 December 2018.]

The CTIVD’s investigation focused on elements of modernized powers such as the duty of care, responsible limitation of data processing, and OOG interception (including automated data analysis).

The committee also looked at the other parts of the law that provide for the protection of citizens. The CTIVD investigated the available possibilities for submitting a complaint or reporting abuse.

The CTIVD indicated in its progress report where the service ran the risk of unlawful acts. She based her judgment on the policy and procedures as they were designed and set up at that time. The CTIVD did not find actual cases of an illegal act.

The committee also described in its report that many parts of the law are very complex, such as the principle of data reduction. This involves the destruction of data that appears to be irrelevant. This requires the necessary adjustments in the system and in technical implementation.

The reports from the TIB and the CTIVD gave us the signal to establish implementation of all facets of the law as a priority for 2019, in addition to our primary duties. We seek a considerable reduction of the risks identified by the TIB and CTIVD in their next reports.

Read more at aivd.nl/nieuwewiv [only available in Dutch].

Appendix: statistics [in original Dutch; not translated]

 

 

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